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A Time and a Place for Every Rider? 
Geographic and Temporal Changes in 
Bay Area Transit Ridership 
Executive Summary 
E.1. Context and Background 
Transit ridership is on the wrong track across America. Yet until 2016, 
the San Francisco Bay Area appeared immune to the ridership declines 
plaguing most other cities. However, in 2017, Bay Area ridership began to fall, 
both regionwide and on almost all major transit operators in Northern 
California. Identifying the causes of this downturn, be they unique to the Bay 
Area or shared with other parts of the country, is a critical first step to 
reversing it. 
The Bay Area’s ridership decline has not occurred uniformly. Thus, to 
help explain why transit ridership has changed, this report elucidates how, 
where, and when it has changed across the nine-county Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission region in the past decade. To answer these 
questions, I analyze ridership data for the region as a whole and for three of 
its largest operators in depth: the San Francisco Municipal Transportation 
Agency (SFMTA or Muni), Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), and the Santa Clara 
Valley Transportation Authority (VTA). Following this, I conduct a multivariate 
statistical analysis that simultaneously considers the various factors that have 
influenced ridership on BART. 
Across the nuances of research literature and press accounts, external 
factors beyond the control of transit operators appear to have more influence 
on ridership than internal factors—increasingly so in the past ten years. This 
report tests and confirms this. Additionally, this report contributes to the body 
of research literature on transit ridership by adding distinct focuses on 
ridership change in the past decade and on spatial and temporal variation 
within specific agencies. 
While the landscape of transit use in Northern California is varied and 
shifting, I find and detail three significant trends in the sections that follow. 
First, while the Bay Area had appeared to have stronger ridership than much 
of the rest of the country until recently, gains at major Bay Area transit 
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agencies like BART and Muni masked longer-term declines in the rest of the 
region. Second, the region’s largest operators are suffering from severe and 
deepening peaking problems: ridership during off-peak periods and in off-
peak directions has cratered, while ridership at peak periods and in peak 
directions remains steady. Finally, I find that jobs, and particularly 
concentrated employment, explain far more of variation in ridership than any 
other determinant analyzed, including factors like service provided. 
E.2. Where and When: Descriptive Findings 
E.2.1. Regional Ridership Trends 
From 2016 to 2017, Bay Area transit patronage fell around four percent, 
or nearly 20 million annual boardings. But the problem has deeper roots. 
Annual boardings per capita dropped dramatically in 2017—the steepest one-
year drop since the height of the Great Recession—but the region also saw a 
slower decline of about the same magnitude from 2008 to 2016 (See Figure 
E-1). This last year of freefall should be cause for concern, but so too should 
the preceding decade of ridership failing to keep pace with rising population. 
Figure E-1: The Scale of the Ridership Decline 
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Moreover, gains on BART and Muni until 2017 masked declines on 
other agencies. When these two agencies, which carried over 70 percent of 
2017 regional ridership, are excluded, the region’s ridership looks far more 
similar to the rest of the nation, with an earlier peak and a sharper drop (See 
Figure E-2). Likewise, bus ridership has fared far worse than rail ridership 
across the region in the past decade, though this does not appear to be 
because agencies are investing in the latter at the expense of the former. 
Figure E-2: A Later Decline in Boardings in the Bay Area 
 
In many agencies across America, service cuts and ridership declines 
have created a vicious cycle. This is not the case in the Bay Area, where, after 
recovering from the Great Recession, revenue hours per capita have 
increased as boardings per capita have decreased (See Figure E-3). The Bay 
Area therefore is not in a transit “death spiral”—but has perhaps landed 
somewhere even worse. Ridership in Northern California is falling in spite of 
more service. 
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Figure E-3: Service Changes Are Not Causing Recent Ridership Declines 
 
E.2.2. Ridership Trends on Large Operators 
BART, Northern California’s regional heavy-rail system and its second-
most-ridden operator, has experienced the most severe peaking problems of 
the agencies profiled. On BART, peak and off-peak ridership trends have 
diverged significantly: patronage in counter-commute directions, outside of 
rush hours, and on weekends has plummeted, as riders crowd onto packed 
peak-hour trains. Overall ridership fell over seven million trips between 2015 
and 2018, or six percent. But 86 percent of those losses were among trips that 
did not cross the Bay, despite that trip type making up less than half of 2018 
ridership (See Figure E-4). Likewise, trips between locations other than 
downtown San Francisco account for 56 percent of losses, but made up only 
34 percent of 2018 ridership. Temporal disparities on BART are just as wide. 
Weekday ridership only fell four percent between 2015 and 2018, while 
Saturday patronage dropped 16 percent and Sunday 17 percent. Ridership 
outside of rush hour fell 11 percent, while peak hour trip counts remained 
virtually flat. And while these splits have become wider since 2015, BART was 
experiencing peaking before then. From 2012 to 2015, transbay BART trips 
accounted for all of the growth in BART ridership—and around 43 percent of 
the whole region’s growth. 
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Figure E-4: Geographic Differences in BART Ridership Changes 
 
SFMTA—the region’s largest transit agency, located in its most transit-
supportive built environment—has also lost patronage and suffered from 
peaking, but not to the standout degree of BART. Muni lost 6.6 million annual 
riders in 2017 alone, with even steeper losses on a per capita basis. But unlike 
BART and VTA, it gained significant ridership in 2016 and has generally had 
bumpier ridership trends. During this period, SFMTA has seen significant 
ridership shifts to lines with more frequent service and modes with dedicated 
rights of way. Between fiscal years 2015 and 2018, weekday local bus 
boardings fell three percent, while Rapid bus patronage rose 24 percent and 
light rail six percent. Indeed, many of the lines with the largest losses are the 
local routes along the same corridors as Rapids, which have seen some of the 
largest gains (See Table E-1). Meanwhile, weekday ridership on lines with 
peak frequencies of ten minutes or less grew three percent, while less 
frequent routes carried two percent fewer trips. 
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Table E-1: SFMTA Ridership Change on Locals versus Rapids 
LINES 
LOCAL: 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN DAILY 
BOARDINGS, FISCAL YEAR 2015-
FISCAL YEAR 2018 
RAPID: 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN DAILY 
BOARDINGS, FISCAL YEAR 2015-
FISCAL YEAR 2018 
5 / 5R -1,567 72nd out of 76 +1,053 13th out of 76 
9 / 9R -2,740 75th out of 76 +4,575 2nd out of 76 
14 / 14R -1,242 68th out of 76 +2,692 5th out of 76 
28 / 28R -462 54th out of 76 +2,254 6th out of 76 
38 / 38R -1,429 71st out of 76 +4,649 1st out of 76 
 
VTA’s ridership trajectory looks closer to that of the U.S. than that of 
the Bay Area overall. VTA has experienced ridership declines across modes 
and lines, particularly off-peak. While rush-hour ridership jumped ten 
percent between April 2015 and April 2018, off-peak patronage dipped 18 
percent—and dragged the agency’s topline ridership number down with it. 
Light rail routes and outlying bus services have, respectively, suffered some 
of the agency’s largest absolute and relative losses over the same period.  
E.3. How and Why: Causal Findings 
What explains these changes and divergences? Given BART’s rich data 
and its geographic spread, I looked for answers by employing a robust 
multivariate statistical model of ridership on BART. To explain ridership 
between every pair of stations, the model includes the following inputs: 
residents, jobs, BART-provided parking spaces, and number of lines at the 
origin and destination; whether the origin/destination is a terminus; the BART 
travel time between each station pair; the ratio of driving time to BART travel 
time for each station pair; and whether the trip involves a transfer. I have run 
the models in the weekday A.M. and P.M. periods for the earliest year of fully 
available data, 2011; the latest year of fully available data, 2015; and the most 
recent year, 2018, with some estimated data. 
In a word, the most powerful explanatory factor by far is jobs. Jobs 
concentrated near stations (at the destination in the A.M. and at the origin in 
the P.M.) explained a greater share of the variation in ridership than any other 
factor, for all years. BART travel time, the need to make a transfer, and 
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population density also influence ridership significantly, though not to the 
same degree as employment, while service supply, as measured by the 
number of lines, has surprisingly little effect. Furthermore, the influence of 
jobs has grown. Figure E-5 below plots how much more influential jobs are 
on ridership than the next-most-influential factor, for the years with full data. 
In both the A.M. and P.M., employment has become more predictive over 
time.  
Figure E-5: The Growing Influence of Jobs on BART Ridership 
 
Outputs for 2018 not shown, as the 2018 models relied on estimates for not-
yet-available data. For more details, see Section 5.3. 
 
While the main models explain the continued resilience of peak 
ridership, variants of the model—one without downtown San Francisco 
stations and another with off-peak ridership throughout the week—fail to turn 
up a clear reason for the decline in off-peak ridership, a task left to the 
forthcoming UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies report.  
E.4. Light at the End of the Tunnel?: Conclusion 
The story of ridership in the Bay Area has not reached its happy ending, 
at least just yet. Into 2018, regional ridership is continuing to fall, according to 
preliminary data. And looking back, key indicators like ridership per capita and 
productivity have been on the wane for a long time. Thus, if ridership does 
begin to rise again, but productivity or ridership per capita stay flat or decline, 
planners should still worry about the longevity of the revival. 
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Where should the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) 
and the Bay Area’s transit operators look to reverse the region’s troubling 
transit trends? In light of these findings, I recommend that policymakers focus 
on new pressures on off-peak transit—the booming expansion of ridehail, the 
spatial dispersion of non-work destinations, etc. Given the continued strength 
of peak transit use, these factors merit more scrutiny than peak pressures like 
employment growth and congestion. In fact, transit operators should devise 
strategies to handle the problems that come with an over-reliance on peak 
ridership. When a transit agency carries most of its ridership at weekday rush 
hours, it must maintain a large fleet and hire many vehicle operators, even if 
they are only needed at peak. And it must address rider discomfort caused by 
overcrowding. 
It bears specific mention that service supply and headways do not 
appear to have affected ridership greatly, as demonstrated by the BART 
regression models. Thus, the addition of new service as a response to the 
ridership slump may not have the full restorative effect desired. Since 2014, 
service in revenue hours and revenue miles has increased regionwide and on 
each of the three profiled agencies. On BART, SFMTA, and VTA, service 
increases, extensions, and reallocations have improved ridership in some 
areas, but overall patronage remains stubbornly down. 
When it comes to reviving off-peak transit use, my findings present a 
difficult dilemma for planners. On the one hand, policies targeted at increasing 
non-commute, reverse direction, evening, and weekend trips are of great 
importance for addressing the most significant declining trip types. On the 
other, the most significant factors that influence transit use tend to be beyond 
agencies’ control. Policymakers must therefore make the difficult decision of 
whether to channel resources towards the most crowded trip types, to 
alleviate crowding and double down on their strongest market, or towards 
slumping trips types, to shore up the weakest parts of the transit network 
despite their limited control over them. 
On both horns of this dilemma lie solutions with at least some potential 
to improve ridership. If MTC and transit operators decide to deepen their 
investment in—and reliance on—the most well-ridden trip types, they could 
lengthen trains at rush hour, add more service in commute directions, create 
more transit-only lanes (and eventually construct a second Transbay Tube), 
implement congestion pricing, etc. If instead MTC and operators focus on 
restoring off-peak ridership, they should consider increasing midday, 
evening, and weekend headways; adding more service in counter-commute 
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directions, restructuring route networks; and regulating or working with 
ridehail companies to make them better complements to transit. Of course, 
these latter set of strategies especially are easier said than done, and their 
individual effects may be small or slow to develop. Still, over-dependence on 
peak trips is operationally and financially dangerous for transit agencies, so a 
suite of off-peak investments may be worth pursuing. More research is 
needed on the effectiveness of off-peak-focused interventions in a region 
with high use of ridehail, worrying amounts of displacement, and other unique 
and modern factors. 
Long-term, policies that move and/or enable jobs and housing 
concentrations in the region will significantly affect transit ridership. Plan Bay 
Area 2040, MTC and the Association of Bay Area Governments’ long-range 
Sustainable Communities Strategy, calls for significant employment and 
housing growth near transit. While such a strategy serves a number of 
important policy goals, I urge some caution with respect to its effect on transit 
ridership. Transit-oriented developments (TOD) in less dense areas, where 
trips other than commutes may require a car, may reduce ridership if people 
move there from denser areas. Likewise, TODs without strong affordability 
policies may displace existing residents who ride transit heavily. Thus, a long-
range plan to build transit ridership should not only put housing near transit 
but also jobs near transit. Better yet, MTC should aim to locate housing near 
jobs, and transit ridership growth will follow. With such land-use planning 
strategies and with well-designed affordability and anti-displacement 
policies, employment and housing may restore off-peak transit use and retain 
peak transit riders across the region. 
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Ridership on the Wrong Track: 
Introduction 
1.1. Study Background and Purpose 
Transit ridership is on the wrong track. Instead of recovering after the 
Great Recession, patronage is plummeting in metropolitan areas across 
America. After years of general growth, unlinked boardings fell by over 500 
million trips nationally from 2014 to 2017; ridership per capita dropped even 
more steeply. This trend is especially troubling in light of how much money 
has been invested and service added in recent years. In other words, just as 
transit is becoming more frequent and better funded, it is hemorrhaging 
riders. 
Until 2016, the San Francisco Bay Area appeared immune to the 
ridership declines plaguing most other American cities. However, in 2017, Bay 
Area ridership began to fall, both regionwide and on almost all major transit 
operators in Northern California. In just that one year, the region lost nearly 
20 million annual boardings, representing around four percent of transit 
patronage—and the trends for 2018 look no better. For Bay Area agencies and 
leaders trying to reverse this downturn, identifying its causes is a critical first 
step. 
The Bay Area’s ridership decline has not occurred uniformly. My 
analysis finds that transit trips are highly concentrated at certain times, in 
certain locations, and on certain agencies—so small changes in specific trip 
types have caused noticeable top-line effects. Thus, to help explain why Bay 
Area transit ridership has changed, this report elucidates how, where, and 
when it has changed. Any policy response to falling ridership will be aided 
greatly by focusing on these agencies, lines, times, and places where transit 
use is changing the most. From these findings, regional policymakers and 
transit operators can implement targeted strategies to improve service, 
remedy the causes that they can control, and potentially staunch or reverse 
the decline. 
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1.2. Study Context and Contribution 
The cause(s) of the transit patronage drop and their relative 
importance have become among the most critical issues in transportation 
planning today. Indeed, this report joins an ongoing discussion in the press 
and research literature, where the recent declines have spurred a vigorous 
debate. Section 2 describes the latest findings on how service cuts, the growth 
of ridehail companies like Lyft and Uber, central-city residential displacement, 
fare increases, macroeconomic changes, gas prices, crime, weather, and 
more affect transit patronage. 
Overall, the literature on the determinants of transit ridership has 
covered almost every potential factor in depth. While debate continues, 
external factors beyond the control of transit operators appear to have more 
influence on ridership—increasingly so in the past ten years. However, two 
significant gaps remain. First, few works have examined recent ridership 
trends. New influences like the rise of ridehail, the increase in displacement, 
the suburbanization of poverty, and the re-urbanization of employment have 
thus gone relatively unexplored. Second, most previous work studies 
ridership for the whole country or a whole metropolitan area. Into this lacuna, 
this report examines ridership change in the past decade and focuses on 
spatial and temporal variation within specific agencies.  
This report follows upon Manville, Taylor, and Blumenberg’s 2019 
study Falling Transit Ridership: California and Southern California, in which 
they identify increased auto access as the most significant reason for Los 
Angeles’ ridership decline.1 While their study provides a model and inspired 
the Metropolitan Transportation Commission to sponsor this report, auto 
access is not the reason for the Bay Area’s downturn (or at least not a central 
one). The factors at play in Northern California’s transit ridership changes are 
different and require examination on their own terms. As anyone from the Bay 
Area will tell you, the region is unique: A West Coast metropolitan area with 
an East Coast urban form, it comprises perhaps America’s most vibrant 
economic cluster but also its most visible epicenter of residential 
displacement. Learning more about transit patronage changes here will 
therefore illuminate much about the extremes of the transit crisis nationally. 
 
1. Michael Manville, Brian D. Taylor, and Evelyn Blumenberg, Falling Transit 
Ridership: California and Southern California, Jan. 2018. 
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1.3. Study Outline 
This study explores and explains how, where, and when transit 
ridership has changed across the nine-county Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission (MTC) region in the past decade. To answer these questions, I 
analyze ridership data for the region as a whole and for three of its largest 
operators in depth, followed by a multivariate statistical analysis that 
simultaneously considers the various factors that have influenced ridership at 
one major agency, Bay Area Rapid Transit. While the landscape of transit use 
is varied and shifting, I find and detail three significant trends in the sections 
that follow. First, while the Bay Area had appeared to have stronger ridership 
than the rest of the country until recently, gains at a few major agencies had 
masked longer-term declines in the rest of the region. Second, the region’s 
largest operators are suffering from severe peaking problems: ridership 
during off-peak periods and in off-peak directions has cratered, while 
ridership at peak periods and in peak directions remains steady. Finally, I find 
that jobs explain far more of variation in ridership than any other determinant, 
including factors like service provided. 
In order to ground my work in the latest findings and methods, this 
report begins with a review of academic literature and press accounts of the 
determinants of transit ridership, followed by an explanation of my 
methodology. Next, I offer an overview of ridership trends across the Bay 
Area, especially in comparison to elsewhere in California and the U.S. 
Following that, I provide a detailed analysis of spatial and temporal changes 
at three major transit operators: the San Francisco Municipal Transportation 
Agency (SFMTA or Muni), Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), and the Santa Clara 
Valley Transportation Authority (VTA). The first two carried 70 percent of the 
region’s passengers in 2017. VTA, the area’s fourth-largest agency by 
patronage, offers a helpful control case of sorts, given its operating 
environment is more similar to the rest of the country. A regression analysis 
of ridership trends on BART—the agency with the most severe peaking 
problem and the most complete data—follows, offering a comparison of the 
relative influences of different factors identified in the literature. Finally, I close 
with some thoughts on what my findings mean for the future of Bay Area 
transit ridership and policy implications for how to revive transit ridership in 
a targeted manner. 
What Explains Changes in Transit Use?: Literature Review | 4 
What Explains Changes in Transit 
Use?: Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
With ridership on the decline in California and the nation, the search is 
on for the prime cause or causes—ideally, in order to then restore ridership 
by targeting that factor. In the past decade and before, academic researchers 
and media accounts have explored and weighed the various potential 
determinants of transit ridership—and have come to many different 
conclusions. Thus, to provide context for my analysis, the following section 
reviews these scholarly and descriptive works, organizing them by the 
primary cause they identify for the ridership slump. Overall, external factors 
beyond agencies’ control, like economic conditions, auto access, and land 
use, have a greater influence on transit use than internal factors—which, 
nonetheless, do play a role. The weight of evidence from research literature 
confirms my findings on the importance of job locations on ridership, detailed 
in Section 5. 
This review focuses heavily—though not exclusively—on literature 
published in the last decade. While some important pieces from before then 
continue to presciently describe ridership changes, today’s decline in transit 
use is occurring in a unique landscape different from the operating 
environment even ten years prior. The adoption of smartphones, the rise of 
Uber and Lyft, and the intensification of residential displacement,have likely 
altered the determinants of transit ridership. Of course, these new factors 
may not actually have had much of an effect, but studies before the last 
decade did not—and could not—have considered them at all. Likewise, the 
recent transit ridership drop is steeper and more prolonged than any since 
the mid-1990s. Today’s slump is the first major fall since America began 
significantly reinvesting in transit; from around 1995 to 2014, ridership 
generally increased. With that in mind, the explanations for declining 
ridership may be different than the determinants of steady or rising ridership 
(For instance, reducing fares—which a few agencies have recently done or 
considered in response to falling patronage—has an asymmetric effect on 
ridership compared to raising fares.). These differences all merit a focus on 
more recent literature. For a synthesis of earlier analyses, Taylor and Fink’s 
reviews (working paper, 2003; updated version, 2013) provide a 
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comprehensive account.2 
Taylor and Fink provide a helpful framework to understand the 
different methodological approaches to studying transit ridership. On one 
hand, many academic and non-academic publications provide descriptive 
analyses of attitudes and perceptions, treating riders or agencies as the unit 
of analysis. On the other, a different set of papers has attempted causal 
analyses of transit systems or rider behavior, including aggregate studies of 
regions or operators and disaggregate examinations of individual mode 
choices. The determinants of transit ridership lie in the conversation between 
and intersection of these two literatures, where the totality of factors can be 
considered and synthesized (See Figure 2-1). Of course, this middle ground 
needs to exclude some areas of research; Taylor and Fink therefore exclude 
disaggregate causal analyses of individual and household travel patterns as 
too broad and far afield.3 I largely follow their lead but examine a few relevant 
examples briefly at the end of this review to show how insights from discrete 
choice analysis might inform aggregate transit ridership. I also include a 
review of non-academic accounts of ridership changes from newspapers and 
popular press, to compare their reporting with academic findings and to hone 
the focus on the Bay Area. 
  
 
2. Hart Schwartz, “Declining Transit Ridership: Revolutionary or Routine?,” The Fuse, 
Apr. 4, 2018; Todd Litman, “Transit Price Elasticities and Cross-Elasticities,” Journal of Public 
Transportation 7, no. 2 (2004): 40-1; “Sacramento Regional Transit District Rolls Back 
Fares,” Sacramento Regional Transit District, Aug. 28, 2018; Angie Schmitt, “D.C. Metro 
Seeks Better Service, Fare Cuts to Stop Ridership Death Spiral,” Streetsblog USA, Oct. 29, 
2018; Brian D. Taylor and Camille N. Y. Fink, “The Factors Influencing Transit Ridership: A 
Review and Analysis of the Ridership Literature,” (UCLA Dept. of Urban Planning Working 
Paper, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, Sept. 1, 2003); and Brian D. Taylor and Camille N. Y. Fink, 
“Explaining Transit Ridership: What Has the Evidence Shown?,” Transportation Letters 5, 
no. 1 (Winter 2013): 15-26. 
3. Taylor and Fink, “Explaining Transit Ridership,” 15-8. 
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Figure 2-1: Taxonomy of Research on Transit Ridership (from Taylor and 
Fink, 2013)4 
 
Within this academic space, researchers have studied two sets of 
influences, both independently and in combination: internal factors and 
external factors. The former describe policies that transit agencies control: 
fares, frequency, routing, marketing, etc. The latter covers everything outside 
of operator’s direct domain, including age-old factors like demographics, 
economic conditions and employment, land use characteristics, and even 
weather and newer issues like ridehail and displacement. Generally, Taylor 
and Fink conclude that external factors have a larger effect on transit ridership 
but arrive at that conclusion after wading through a muddied and mixed 
academic landscape. In the years since their review, the evidence in favor of 
external factors has strengthened, especially given new research on ridehail 
and displacement. 
2.2. Media Accounts 
National news media and online transit commentators have written 
with some anxiety about the collapse of transit ridership for the past few 
years. While such analyses usually are not conducted with the statistical rigor 
of academic studies, they do offer 1) an examination of rapidly changing 
recent trends that may take years to filter into academic journals and 2) a look 
into what decision-makers, operators, and the public themselves view as the 
 
4. Ibid., 16. 
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problem. Overall, explanations for ridership declines vary widely—or, as 
CityLab’s Laura Bliss put it, “What’s behind declining transit ridership 
nationwide? Pick a culprit.”5 Prominent explanations include service and 
budget cuts, plummeting reliability, Uber and Lyft, and relatively cheap gas. 
Many writers worry about a “death spiral” of ridership declines causing fare 
revenue losses causing service reductions causing ridership declines. But 
across the country, writers have tended to emphasize factors unique to their 
metropolitan areas. In New York, the MTA has purportedly spent far too little 
on rail; in Los Angeles, Metro has spent far too much. In D.C., deadly train 
crashes and the line-closing repair work that followed forced riders off in 
dramatic plunges; in other cities, gradual service cuts have supposedly 
caused a slower ridership erosion. Throughout the media conversation, 
though, a few metropolitan areas stood out as bulwarks against the tide of 
ebbing ridership: Seattle, Houston, and San Francisco. In 2017, however, 
transit patronage began to fall in the Bay Area, knocking Northern California 
into the roiling sea with the rest of the country.6 Three main factors emerged 
in the popular narrative: safety and security, Uber and Lyft, and overcrowding 
at peak hours. 
Local news media have treated Bay Area ridership declines with a fair 
degree of sensationalism. The relationship between security and ridership on 
BART has generated particularly significant press coverage. In 2017 and 2018, 
a number of high-profile crimes led to speculation that safety fears have 
driven away riders. However, some of these reports, concerning robberies at 
least, were likely overblown. For instance, when 50 or so teens dramatically 
robbed a whole train car’s worth of passengers in less than five minutes, 
reporters claimed that the ambush would hurt ridership. According to follow-
up reporting, though, many people’s posts online that they would stop riding 
were as much empty racist commentary as actual plans to leave BART. On 
 
5. Laura Bliss, “What’s Behind Declining Transit Ridership Nationwide?: Pick a 
Culprit: The Rise of Ride-hailing Services, Budget Cuts, Cheap Oil, or Bad Service,” CityLab, 
Feb. 24, 2017. 
6. Ibid.; Benjamin Kabak, “Where Have All the Transit Riders Gone?,” Second 
Avenue Sagas, May 20, 2018; Laura J. Nelson, “The Metro Can Take You Farther than Ever. 
Here’s Why Ridership Dropped—Again,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 13, 2017; Laura J. Nelson 
and Dan Weikel, “Billions Spent, but Fewer People Are Using Public Transportation in 
Southern California,” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 27, 2016; Ethan Elkind, “L.A. Times Misleads on 
Metro Rail Ridership History,” Jan. 27, 2016; Thomas A. Rubin, “Is the Los Angeles Times 
Article, ‘Billions Spent, But Fewer People Are Using Public Transportation in Southern 
California,’ Misleading?,” n.d., Electronic Drummer; Lori Arantani, “Metro’s Multimillion-
dollar Mystery: Where Have Our Riders Gone?,” Washington Post, Oct. 1, 2016; Henry 
Grabar, “The Astounding Collapse of American Bus Ridership,” Slate. Jul. 21, 2016; Jeremy 
Hobson, “Why Public Transit Ridership Is Down in Most U.S. Cities,” WBUR, Mar. 21, 2017; 
Faiz Siddiqui, “Falling Transit Ridership Poses an ‘Emergency’ for Cities, Experts Fear,” 
Washington Post, Mar. 24, 2018; and Skip Descant, “Seattle, Houston Buck Declining Bus 
Ridership Trend,” Government Technology: FutureStructure, May 16, 2018. 
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the other hand, the brutal, unprovoked murder of teenager Nia Wilson at a 
BART station last July highlighted genuine faults with BART’s security systems 
that have potentially driven away riders of color, especially given the distrust 
BART Police have engendered since an officer killed Oscar Grant at the 
Fruitvale Station in 2009. On top of these headline-grabbing crimes, BART 
and other area transit agencies have faced unprecedented numbers of 
homeless individuals in stations and on vehicles (the effects of which are 
discussed in Section 5.5.2), as cities and others literally force people 
experiencing homelessness underground. Again, news media have focused 
on homelessness and attendant drops in safety perceptions and system 
cleanliness as a cause of ridership changes.7 
The rise of Uber and Lyft and overcrowding on trains have also earned 
top-billing in popular accounts of Bay Area patronage declines. Regarding the 
former, reporters and columnists have focused on off-peak use, assuming 
causation between increased ridehailing and decreased night and weekend 
transit use. Many officials at transit agencies agree: BART spokesperson Alicia 
Trost named ridehail and public safety as the two main reasons for the 
decline. Meanwhile, BART trains have become so overcrowded at peak hours 
in peak directions that, to paraphrase that master of paradox Yogi Berra, no 
one rides anymore—it’s too crowded. However, a few press accounts have 
homed in on other issues. A report in the Marin Independent Journal, for 
example, argued that increased congestion slowing down buses and rising 
rents pushing out low-income transit users have hurt bus ridership across the 
region. Still, these major causes, identified by academic literature, do not 
feature prominently in regional press accounts.8 
 
7. Rick Hurd, “Audio Dispatch of Oakland BART Mob: ‘It’s a Group of 50. They Bum-
rushed the Entire Train,’” Mercury News (San José, CA), Apr. 25, 2017; John Diaz, “BART 
Attack Brings Out Racist Responses,” SFGATE, Apr. 29, 2017; KGO-TV, “What We Know 
about Deadly Stabbing at Oakland’s MacArthur BART Station,” ABC7 News, Jul. 25, 2018; 
Paul Eichenholtz, “BART Security Strategies Clash with Distrustful Ridership,” Golden Gate 
Xpress (SF State), Oct. 23, 2018; Aaron Sankin, “BART Police Department: Is It Necessary?,” 
Huffington Post, Aug. 31, 2011; Michael Cabanatuan, “With BART Ridership Down, and 
Complaints Up, Agency Promises New Cleanup,” San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 10, 2018; 
Michael Cabanatuan, “With Ridership Down, Complaints Up, BART to Look at Homeless 
Problem,” SFGATE, May 11, 2017; and Lyanne Melendez, “BART Riders Increasingly 
Concerned with Safety,” ABC7 News, Jul. 26, 2018. 
8. Phil Matier and Andy Ross, “BART Ridership Drops on Nights, Weekends,” San 
Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 20, 2018; Chloe Veltman, “BART Looks for Solutions After Another 
Steep Drop in Weekend Ridership,” KQED, Aug. 20, 2018; Jay Barmann “Overcrowded 
BART Trains Likely Causing Drop in Ridership, Ironically,” SFist, Feb. 24, 2017; Houston 
Mitchell, “Yogi Berra Dies at 90: Here Are Some of His Greatest Quotes.” Los Angeles Times. 
Sept. 22, 2015; Gary Richards, “Marin Bus Ridership Decline Mirrors Bay Area,” Marin 
Independent Journal, Jun. 4, 2018; and Joe Castiglione et al., TNC’s and Congestion. October 
2018. 
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2.3. Previous Research 
Indeed, unlike the popular narratives around ridership declines, the 
findings of academic literature—with some notable dissenters—point towards 
factors largely outside of the control of transit agencies (though internal 
factors do nonetheless have some significant effect). Two types of papers 
generally indicate this same result. First, a few scholars have tackled a 
synthetic causal analysis of transit ridership using as many factors as possible 
as explanatory variables. Most of these papers take data nationwide and use 
metropolitan areas as the unit of analysis. A second set of works provide more 
focused examinations of individual factors, determining what effect each 
alone has on transit ridership through both descriptive and causal lenses. 
Below, I discuss each in turn. 
2.3.1. Synthetic Regressions 
In the past decade, two major papers have conducted regressions 
analyses to explain nationwide ridership tends. In 2009, Taylor et al. modeled 
patronage for urbanized areas in the U.S. and found a number of significant 
determinants, including population density, percent of carless households, 
and median household income. Overall, their regression finds that that 
internal factors (vehicle revenue miles and fares) account for only 26 percent 
of transit ridership variation per capita. However, a 2015 Mineta 
Transportation Institute report by Alam et al. reaches the opposite conclusion 
for metropolitan statistical areas: of the eight statistically significant variables 
in the regression, only one (gas prices) is external. In fact, six external 
variables that are significant in Taylor et al.’s regression end up insignificant in 
Alam et al.’s. More recently, Boisjoly et al. come to the same conclusion, with 
revenue vehicle mileage by far contributing the most to ridership in 
metropolitan areas across the U.S. and Canada.9 
What explains the difference? Primarily, the divergence arises from 
ways that each handles transit supply. Taylor et al. assume that service 
changes both cause and are caused by ridership changes—i.e., agencies 
supply more service when increased ridership calls for it, which may in turn 
 
9. Brian D. Taylor, Douglas Miller, Hiroyuki Iseki, and Camille Fink, “Nature and/or 
Nurture?: Analyzing the Determinants of Transit Ridership across U.S. Urbanized Areas,” 
Transportation Research Part A 43 (2009): 60-77; Bhuiyan Alam, Hilary Nixon, and Qiong 
Zhang, Investigating the Determining Factors for Transit Travel Demand by Bus Mode in 
U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MTI Report 12-30, Mineta Transportation Institute, San 
José, CA, May 2015); and Geneviève Boisjoly, et al., “Invest in the Ride: A Fourteen-year 
Longitudinal Analysis of the Determinants of Public Transport Ridership in Twenty-five 
North American Cities,” Transportation Research Part A: 116 (2018): 434-45. 
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further boost ridership. Therefore, the authors estimate a two-stage 
regression model using a predicted transit service variable independent of 
ridership. Alam et al., citing a similar finding in 2006 by Thompson and Brown, 
do not do so, assuming that the reciprocal relationship between transit supply 
and ridership only occurs in the long term. This objection, though, 
misunderstands Taylor et al.’s reasoning: even if the reciprocity takes a few 
years, the circularly causality still holds true, in whatever year the study 
chooses for its cross-sectional data. Overall, as Taylor et al. write, “when the 
levels of transit supply and consumption are jointly determined, it is not 
possible to consider one in isolation from the other.”10 Indeed, since Alam et 
al. and Boisjoly, et al. find such significance in transit supply, their assumption 
that transit supply is not in turn caused by ridership surely deserves a 
statistical analysis in and of itself. In other words, if variation in transit supply 
determines most of the variation in ridership, far more so than other factors, 
then this raises the question of what determines variation in transit supply.11 
Synthetic studies of transit ridership in individual metropolitan areas 
also give conflicting weights to internal and external factors. In a report for the 
Southern California Association of Governments, Manville, Taylor, and 
Blumenberg conducted a number of descriptive and causal analyses of Los 
Angeles’ ridership. They found that increased household auto access 
accounted for the vast majority of changes in transit trips per capita. Other 
external factors, like income, immigration status, etc., affected ridership in an 
indirect, mediated manner: these factors influenced auto access, which in 
turn influenced transit use. Service hours and miles, meanwhile, increased as 
ridership fell, and the authors also found fares to have a smaller effect than 
common elasticities would predict. Nevertheless, other studies have found 
greater effect from internal factors. Chen et al., for instance, find that the 
ridership elasticity with respect to fares is higher than the elasticities with 
respect to gas prices and employment. In Atlanta, Brown and Thompson saw 
a larger effect in their regression from service and fare levels than from 
various measures of employment distribution. Still, neither of these studies 
corrects for the simultaneity of transit supply and demand, though Chen et al. 
do find that service supply determines service demand far more than the 
reverse.12 
 
10. Taylor et al., “Nature and/or Nurture?,” 63. 
11. Ibid.; Alam et al., Investigating the Determining Factors; Gregory L. Thompson 
and Jeffrey R. Brown, “Explaining Variation in Transit Ridership in U.S. Metropolitan Areas 
between 1990 and 2000: Multivariate Analysis,” Transportation Research Record 1986 
(2016): 172-81; and Boisjoly, et al., “Invest in the Ride.” 
12. Manville, Taylor, and Blumenberg, Falling Transit Ridership; Cynthia Chen, Don 
Varley, and Jason Chen, “What Affects Transit Ridership? A Dynamic Analysis Involving 
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At a more micro-scale, other papers have examined ridership not by 
metro area but by individual stations. Here, the regressions involve different 
methods of geographically weighting variables by distance from stations. At 
this level of analysis, external factors predominate—though in part because 
most of the independent variables in the regression models are external 
factors to begin with. A 2011 paper by Gutiérrez et al. exemplifies the group. 
Six of the nine statistically significant factors are outside of agencies’ control. 
However, in their model, the numbers of rail and connecting bus lines serve 
to proxy service supply, but only in some cases are these very well-
correlated (e.g., on BART, modeled in Section 5 of this report, whose lines 
each operate at same headways most of the day). When more detailed 
variables like number of buses per day are included, as Cervero et al. did in 
2010 in studying Los Angeles’ Orange Line bus rapid transit, their effect is 
roughly on par with external attributes like population density.13 My report 
largely fits within this literature, but seeks to expand the scope of analysis and 
bring lessons from macro-scale studies to bear on more granular ridership 
changes. 
One synthetic study of transit ridership is of particular relevance: 
Gregory Erhardt’s 2016 dissertation on modeling BART and Muni ridership. In 
his thesis, Erhardt uses an advanced time-series model (RegARIMA) to 
explore why BART patronage grew while Muni ridership fell between 2009 
and 2013 (the results of which are presented in Tables 2-1 and 2-2). He 
concludes that employment was the most important reason BART ridership 
rose, far more so than service supply. Jobs also boosted Muni ridership, but 
an unexplained negative factor more than counteracted the effect of 
employment and pulled down overall patronage. Erhardt leaves this factor 
unresolved, although he does rule out ridehail and displacement. All told, 
Erhardt’s models demonstrate the greater influence of external factors than 
of fares and service, though a Muni service cut and BART extensions have had 
some effect. While his models cover a period before the current decline and 
 
Multiple Factors, Lags, and Asymmetric Behavior,” Urban Studies 48, no. 9 (Jul. 2011): 1893-
1908; and Jeffrey R. Brown and Gregory L. Thompson. “The Relationship between Transit 
Ridership and Urban Decentralization: Insights from Atlanta.” Urban Studies 45, no. 5 and 6 
(May 2008): 1119-39. 
13. Javier Gutiérrez, Osvaldo Daniel Cardozo, and Juan Carlos García-Palomares, 
“Transit Ridership Forecasting at Station Level: An Approach Based on Distance-decay 
Weighted Regression,” Journal of Transport Geography 19, no. 6 (Nov. 2011): 1081-92; 
Michael Kuby, Anthony Barranda, and Christopher Upchurch, “Factors Influencing Light-rail 
Station Boardings in the United States,” Transportation Research Part A 38, no. 3 (Mar. 
2004): 223-47; Xuehao Chu, “Ridership Models at the Stop Level” (NCTR-473-04, BC137-31, 
NCTR, CUTR, USF, Tampa, FL, Dec. 2004); and Robert Cervero, Jin Murakami, and Mark 
Miller, “Direct Ridership Model of Bus Rapid Transit in Los Angeles County, California,” 
Transportation Research Record 2145 (2010): 1-7. 
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are not geographically disaggregated at the stop level, Erhardt confirms my 
findings in Section 5 on the predictive power of employment on BART.14 
Table 2-1: Contributions of Various Factors to Change in Muni Ridership 
(from Erhardt, 2016)15 
FACTOR CONTRIBUTION TO MUNI RIDERSHIP CHANGE, SEPT. 2009 TO SEPT. 2013 
Bus service miles -4.6% 
Rail service miles +2.2% 
Average bus speed -4.3% 
Employment in San Francisco +11.3% 
Unexplained trend -14.0% 
Residual +2.9% 
Total (Net Effect of the Above Factors) -6.5% 
 
Table 2-2: Contributions of Various Factors to Change in BART Ridership 
(from Erhardt, 2016)16 
FACTOR CONTRIBUTION TO BART RIDERSHIP CHANGE, SEPT. 2009 TO SEPT. 2013 
Service miles -0.9% 
Number of stations +1.5% 
Employment in BART-served counties +10.4% 
Share of employment in San Francisco +1.9% 
Fare +1.4% 
Gas price +0.5% 
Days of BART strike 0.0% 
Unexplained trend +5.3% 
Residual -2.5% 
Total (Net Effect of the Above Factors) +17.6% 
 
  
 
14. Gregory D. Erhardt, “Fusion of Large Continuously Collected Data Sources: 
Understanding Travel Demand Trends and Measuring Transport Project Impacts” (PhD diss., 
Univ. College London, London, 2016), 117-267, 303-5 and Richard A. Mucci and Gregory D. 
Erhardt. “Evaluating the Ability of Transit Direct Ridership Models to Forecast Medium-Term 
Ridership Changes: Evidence from San Francisco,” Transportation Research Record 2672, 
no. 46 (2018): 21-30. 
15. Erhardt, “Fusion of Large,” 251. 
16. Ibid. 
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2.3.2. External Factors 
As these studies demonstrate, external factors, viewed in total, have a 
dramatic effect on patronage—though alone, some may only have small 
influences. Manville, Taylor, and Blumenberg, as discussed above, join a 
number of authors, like Boisjoly et al., in emphasizing the critical significance 
of auto access and ownership on transit ridership. Regional economic factors 
like median income also proved significant in the models of Taylor et al. and 
others. In academic circles, the most discussed factor influencing travel 
behavior is likely the built environment. Ewing and Cervero’s 2010 meta-
analysis and Stevens’ updated 2017 meta-regression have both caused a 
flurry of writing and debate on the effect of land use variables like population 
and employment density, land use diversity, and intersection density on 
vehicle miles traveled. These studies indirectly discuss transit use—less 
driving may mean more transit-riding—but in many cases, they also look at 
the direct effects of the built environment on transit patronage. To take one 
study, Guerra and Cervero find significant correlations between population 
density and ridership and between job density and ridership. Overall, these 
elasticities are significant but small. Larger are the effects of parking supply 
and road pricing policy on transit use. For instance, Chatman has found 
parking in transit-oriented developments better predicts auto ownership (and 
therefore transit use) than rail access itself.17 
Other external factors also play roles in transit use. Studies have 
shown an influence of gas prices on ridership, though a much smaller one 
than media reports might suggest. On top of the prior examinations detailed 
in Taylor and Fink’s review, a more recent study by Lane finds a significant but 
small effect. This effect is greater on rail travel than bus and occurs after a 
variable lag of up to 13 months after a gas price change. Even weather and 
climate likely have an effect on transit patronage—though a review by Liu et 
al. finds very mixed results on whether high temperatures and precipitation 
 
17. Manville, Taylor, and Blumenberg, Falling Transit Ridership; Boisjoly, et al., 
“Invest in the Ride”; Taylor and Fink, “Explaining Transit Ridership”; Reid Ewing and Robert 
Cervero, “Travel and the Built Environment: A Meta-Analysis,” Journal of the American 
Planning Association 76, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 265-94; Mark R. Stevens, “Does Compact 
Development Make People Drive Less?” Journal of the American Planning Association 83, 
no. 1 (Winter 2017): 7-18; Erick Guerra and Robert Cervero, “Cost of a Ride: The Effects of 
Densities on Fixed-guideway Transit Ridership and Costs,” Journal of the American 
Planning Association 77, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 267-90; Michael Manville, “Travel and the 
Built Environment: Time for Change,” Journal of the American Planning Association 83, no. 1 
(Winter 2017): 29-32; and Daniel G. Chatman, “Does TOD Need the T?: On the Importance 
of Factors Other than Rail Access,” Journal of the American Planning Association 79, no. 1 
(Winter 2013): 17-31. 
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increase or decrease ridership.18 
2.3.2.1. Displacement and Immigration 
Displacement of poorer residents from more transit-accessible areas 
to less has intensified in recent years and likely plays a role in ridership 
changes in the Bay Area, the poster child for displacement through rising 
rents. However, while the literature is large on individual and household 
housing location decisions and their relation to travel behavior, far fewer 
papers have tied changing residential patterns to aggregate ridership. In a 2017 
study, Wang and Woo found that the decentralization of poverty in the 
Atlanta area has lowered the average income in transit-rich suburban 
neighborhoods, which in turn has increased transit ridership significantly. On 
a national scale, Driscoll et al. descriptively note that population is increasing 
markedly in counties with poor transit service and use. Blumenberg et al. find 
that millennials—the generation that, according to conventional wisdom, 
would give up their cars and move back to cities en masse—have actually 
moved to suburbs at much higher rates than to cities, albeit less so than the 
prior generation. On top of recent changes in intranational residential location, 
the size and nationalities of immigration flows into the U.S. have also changed. 
In 2007, Blumenberg found that immigrants accounted for almost all of 
California’s then two-decade transit ridership growth and presciently 
predicted that decreases in immigration thereafter would pull down 
patronage. Indeed, the flow of immigrants has decreased, become more 
Asian and less Hispanic, and overall assimilated into auto use faster than 
before. Both of these factors merit further study in relation to transit patronage 
trends.19 
2.3.2.2. Ridehail 
The effect of ridehail on transit has seen hot debate among scholars 
and policymakers. A number of splashy reports have blamed ridership 
declines and traffic congestion on Uber and Lyft—but their methods fail to 
 
18. Taylor and Fink, “Explaining Transit Ridership”; Bradley W. Lane, “A Time-series 
Analysis of Gasoline Prices and Public Transportation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas,” Journal of 
Transport Geography 22 (2012): 221-35; and Chengxi Liu, Yusak O. Susilo, and Anders 
Karlström. “Weather Variability and Travel Behaviour—What We Know and What We Do 
Not Know,” Transport Reviews 37, no. 6 (2017): 715-41. 
19. Kyungsoon Wang and Myungje Woo, “The Relationship between Transit-rich 
Neighborhoods and Transit Ridership: Evidence from the Decentralization of Poverty,” 
Applied Geography 86 (Sept. 2017): 183-96; Richard A. Driscoll et al., “The Effect of 
Demographic Changes on Transit Ridership Trends,” Transportation Research Record 2018: 
1-9; Evelyn Blumenberg et al., Typecasting Neighborhoods and Travelers: Analyzing the 
Geography of Travel Behavior among Teens and Young Adults in the U.S., Sept. 25, 2015, 
viii, 86; and Taylor and Fink, “Explaining Transit Ridership,” 20. 
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properly consider an alternative scenario without ridehail, and their evidence 
consists primarily of pointing at a plot of increasing ridehail use and 
decreasing transit use and inferring causation. They do demonstrate, though, 
the high stakes of the research on ridehail.20 Indeed, unlike most other major 
factors, not only is the magnitude of ridehail’s effect on transit disputed, but 
also the direction. On one hand, Uber and Lyft could be attracting riders away 
from transit, replacing trips that could have been made—or once were made—
on bus or rail. On the other hand, ridehail could complement transit: in the 
short term, bridging the first-mile/last-mile gap between transit stops and 
destinations and in the long term, reducing car ownership altogether. Finally, 
transit service may be deteriorating for reasons unrelated to ridehail, pushing 
people to Uber and Lyft through no doing of their own. 
Some researchers have attempted to investigate the first of these 
hypotheses by surveying Uber and Lyft customers and asking how they 
would have traveled if ridehail did not exist. Table 2-3 summarizes their 
findings: 
  
 
20. Bruce Schaller, Unsustainable?: The Growth of App-based Ride Services and 
Traffic, Travel and the Future of New York City, Feb. 27, 2017. 
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Table 2-3: Surveys of Ridehail Customers21 
AUTHOR(S) 
AND YEAR 
SURVEY 
POPULATION 
TYPE OF TRIP 
ASKED ABOUT 
PERCENT THAT 
WOULD TAKE TRANSIT 
IF/WHEN RIDEHAIL 
WERE NOT AVAILABLE 
SURVEY 
METHOD 
Hampshire 
et al., 2018 Austin 
most recent 
trip 3% 
Internet 
survey after 
ridehail left 
APTA, 2016 seven cities 
most 
frequent 
trip 
14% 
Internet or 
phone 
survey 
Clewlow 
and 
Mishra, 
2017 
seven metro 
areas all trips 15% 
Internet or 
phone 
survey 
Circella et 
al., 2018 
California 
millennials 
and Gen Xers 
most recent 
trip 21.1% 
Internet or 
phone 
survey 
Henao, 
2017 Denver 
most recent 
trip 22.2% 
In-person 
survey 
Rayle et al., 
2016 San Francisco 
most recent 
trip 30% 
In-person 
survey 
Gehrke et 
al., 2018 Boston area 
most recent 
trip 42% 
In-person 
survey 
NYCDOT, 
2018 
New York 
City 
most recent 
trip 50% 
Internet or 
phone 
survey 
 
As the fourth column shows, the surveys come to very different conclusions. 
 
21. Robert C. Hampshire et al., “Measuring the Impact of an Unanticipated 
Disruption of Uber/Lyft in Austin, TX” (paper presented at the TRB 97th Annual Meeting, 
Washington, D.C., Jan. 7-11, 2018); Colin Murphy, Shared Mobility and the Transformation of 
Public Transit (TCRP Project J-11, Task 21, Shared-use Mobility Center, Chicago, IL, Mar. 
2016), ed. Tim Frisbie; Regina R. Clewlow and Gouri Shankar Mishra, Disruptive 
Transportation: The Adoption, Utilization, and Impacts of Ride-Hailing in the United States 
(UC Davis-ITS-Research Report-17-07, ITS, UC Davis, Davis, CA, Oct. 2017); Giovanni 
Circella et al., The Adoption of Shared Mobility in California and Its Relationship with Other 
Components of Travel Behavior, Mar. 2018; Alejandro Henao, “Impacts of Ridesourcing—
Lyft and Uber—on Transportation Including VMT, Mode Replacement, Parking, and Travel 
Behavior,” PhD diss., University of Colorado, 2017; Lisa Rayle et al., “Just a Better Taxi?: A 
Survey-based Comparison of Taxis, Transit, and Ridesourcing Services in San Francisco,” 
Transport Policy 45 (2016): 168-78; Steven R. Gehrke, Alison Felix, and Timothy Reardon, 
Fare Choices: A Survey of Ride-hailing Passengers in Metro Boston (Report #1, MAPC 
Research Brief, Metropolitan Area Planning Council, Boston, MA, Feb. 2018); NYCDOT, New 
York City Mobility Report, Jun. 2018, 8, 26, 39; and Bruce Schaller, The New Automobility: 
Lyft, Uber and the Future of American Cities, Jul. 25, 2018. 
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Part of the difference stems from the wording of the question: most surveys 
ask riders how they would have taken their most recent trip if Uber and Lyft 
did not exist, while APTA and Clewlow and Mishra asked how riders would 
have taken their most frequent trip or all their ridehail trips, respectively. 
These two surveys asked respondents to imagine a counterfactual without 
ridehail but with their most frequent destinations in the same locations, 
ignoring the fact that people move, take jobs, choose social venues, etc. based 
in part on transportation access. Regardless of the question wording, though, 
seven of the eight surveys rely on stated preferences, yet respondents’ actual 
behaviors could differ greatly than what they tell a surveyor. Only Hampshire 
et al. rely on revealed preferences, using a natural experiment: looking at 
behavior of former ridehail customers during a period when Uber and Lyft 
temporarily left Austin, Texas. Their low three percent transit replacement 
rate may indicate that ridehail does not substitute for transit to a large degree 
in an urban area with already relatively low rates of public transit use.22 
Given the limitations of this type of survey question, researchers have 
used other methods to investigate ridehail’s effects on transit. Some have 
found that ridehail and transit serve different markets. A number of studies, 
including many in Table 2-3, have uncovered that the most popular ridehail 
trip times and purposes are those that transit serves poorly, like late-night and 
weekend travel. However, per Conway et al., transit users also resemble 
ridehail users over a number of characteristics. Looking at actual Lyft data, 
Brown finds that transit stop density is the variable most positively associated 
with Lyft use among a set of built environment and demographic factors—a 
discovery that could support ridehail as transit complement or substitute.23 
Despite the mixed findings above, I see reason for operators to worry 
about ridehail substituting for transit trips, particularly in the Bay Area. In the 
Bay Area—a dense, transit-rich region where riderhail has operated longer 
than anywhere else and where a greater share of people drive for ridehail 
than anywhere else24—these mature services may indeed be substituting for 
 
22. Hampshire et al., “Measuring the Impact”; Murphy, Shared Mobility; Clewlow 
and Mishra, Disruptive Transportation; Circella et al., Adoption of Shared Mobility; Henao, 
“Impacts of Ridesourcing”; Rayle et al., “Just a Better Taxi?”; Gehrke et al., Fare Choices; and 
NYCDOT, Mobility Report, 8, 26. 
23. Rayle et al., “Just a Better Taxi?,” 171-2; Murphy, Shared Mobility, 11-2; Robert 
James Evans, “The Value of Data: Analyzing Transportation Network Company Trips for 
Transit Planning,” PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2018; Matthew Wigginton 
Conway, Deborah Salon, and David A. King, “Trends in Taxi Use and the Advent of 
Ridehailing, 1995-2017: Evidence from the U.S. National Household Travel Survey,” Urban 
Science 2, no. 3 (Sept. 2018): 79 ff.; and Anne Elizabeth Brown, “Ridehail Revolution: Ridehail 
Travel and Equity in Los Angeles,” PhD diss., UCLA, 2018, 65. 
24. Diana Farrell, Fiona Greig, and Amar Hamoudi, The Online Platform Economy in 
Twenty-seven Metro Areas: The Experience of Drivers and Lessors. Apr. 2019, 9. 
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transit. Using differences in when Uber entered various markets, Graehler et 
al. find that, for every year after the arrival of Uber, heavy rail patronage falls 
1.3 percent and bus ridership 1.7 percent, all else equal. “Our 
research…suggests,” they conclude, “that past research findings that [ridehail] 
and other emerging modes either increase or do not affect transit ridership 
are likely incorrect.”25 This contradicts an earlier study by Hall et al. that found 
that Uber increases transit ridership by 5 percent after two years, though Hall 
et al. uncover significant heterogeneity and do not control for car ownership. 
But in support of Graehler et al., a piece by Babar and Burtch with comparable 
methodology finds that ridehail does reduce bus ridership (though it increases 
subway and commuter rail ridership).26 
Other papers also point towards substitution of transit trips by ridehail 
in dense urban settings. Returning to Table 2-3, the more recent surveys and 
especially those taken in larger metropolitan areas have higher rates of 
substitution. In a different part of their study, Clewlow and Mishra find that 
ridehail users who now take transit less often outnumber those who take it 
more often by six percentage points. Likewise, Henao discovered that only 
one percent of riders surveyed were taking ridehail to connect to transit. 
Finally, Lavieri et al. find that higher bus frequencies reduce ridehail use, again 
supporting substitution over complementarity.27 Thus, even if ridehail and 
transit initially served different markets, more mature and ubiquitous ridehail 
networks do have the potential to substitute for transit’s core trips—especially 
in Uber and Lyft’s longest-served market. 
2.3.3. Internal Factors 
Given the influence on transit use of the many factors discussed above, 
agencies appear to have little, well, agency. However, even those studies that 
show external factors predominating also find a significant role for internal 
policies in determining ridership. As mentioned above, Taylor et al. find that 
internal factors explain 26 percent of ridership variation per capita. In Alam et 
 
25. Michael Graehler, Jr., Richard Alexander Mucci, and Gregory D. Erhardt, 
“Understanding the Recent Transit Ridership Decline in Major US Cities: Service Cuts or 
Emerging Modes?” (paper presented at the TRB 98th Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., Jan. 
13-7, 2019), 15. 
26. Ibid.; Angie Schmitt, “Study: Uber and Lyft Caused U.S. Transit Decline,” 
Streetsblog USA, Jan. 22, 2019; Jonathan D. Hall, Craig Palsson, and Joseph Price, “Is Uber a 
Substitute or Complement for Public Transit?” (Working Paper tecipa-585, University of 
Toronto, Department of Economics, Toronto, ON, Jun. 13, 2018); and Yash Babar and Gordon 
Burtch, “Examining the Impact of Ridehailing Services on Public Transit Use,” Sept. 25, 2017. 
27. Clewlow and Mishra, Disruptive Transportation; Henao, “Impacts of 
Ridesourcing”; and Patrícia S. Lavieri et al, “A Model of Ridesourcing Demand Generation 
and Distribution,” Transportation Research Record 2672, no. 46 (2018): 39. 
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al.’s model, such factors together have the largest influence on ridership.28 
Other studies, described below, have looked more specifically at the effects 
of fares and service levels on ridership. 
2.3.3.1. Fares 
The literature on ridership elasticity with respect to fares dates back 
decades and is as much a topic of economics research as of planning. In 2004, 
Litman conducted a literature review of elasticities with respect to fares and 
estimated a consensus elasticity of -0.2 to -0.5 in the short term and -0.6 to 
-0.9 in the long term. Peak-period riders tend to be less elastic in their 
responses to fare changes than off-peak riders, while suburban commuters 
have higher elasticities than other riders. Moreover, Litman concluded in his 
review that riders were more elastic in the responses to service changes than 
fare changes. These findings confirm research by Cervero in 1990, finding that 
seniors, people with low incomes, people without a car, commuters, and 
people taking short trips all have lower elasticities than their counterparts, as 
they depend on transit more for those trips. More recently, Schimek created 
a model that confirms Litman’s fare elasticities and likewise finds transit to be 
more elastic with respect to service (measured in terms of vehicle revenue 
miles) than fares or gas prices.29 
2.3.3.2. Service 
Turning from fares to service, in 2012, Thompson et al. investigated the 
effects of travel speed and network structure in Broward County, Florida. 
Their model explains the success of Broward’s bus system as a function of its 
multi-destination, non-radial route structure (as measured by its in-vehicle 
travel times), more so than the land use or density of the area. Applications of 
these principles, like Houston’s bus network redesign, offer real-world proofs 
of concept that good management of internal factors can stabilize or increase 
ridership.30 
 
28. Taylor et al., “Nature and/or Nurture?” and Alam et al., Investigating the 
Determining Factors. 
29. Litman, “Transit Price Elasticities”; Robert Cervero, “Transit Pricing Research: A 
Review and Synthesis,” Transportation 17 (1990): 117-39; and Paul Schimek, “Dynamic 
Estimates of Fare Elasticity for U.S. Public Transit,” Transportation Research Record 2538 
(2015): 96-101. 
30. Gregory Thompson, Jeffrey Brown, and Torsha Bhattacharya, “What Really 
Matters for Increasing Transit Ridership: Understanding the Determinants of Transit 
Ridership Demand in Broward County, Florida,” Urban Studies 49, no. 15 (Nov. 2012): 3327-
45. 
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2.3.4. Discrete Choice Analyses 
All these studies of the determinants of transit ridership sit alongside 
the literature on discrete choice analysis. Discrete choice analysis broadly 
describes models of how individuals make decisions among defined, mutually 
exclusive choices. Scholars have applied it to many fields, but it began, 
fittingly enough, with a model of BART ridership. While the method generally 
produces disaggregate predictions of behavior outcomes, some applications 
can also help illuminate aggregate transit ridership trends. For instance, Ben-
Akiva and Morikawa find that infrequent service and multiple transfers reduce 
people’s propensity to ride transit, echoing many of the results above. On the 
external side, Rajamani et al.’s discrete choice model shows that mixed-use 
environments and higher residential densities increase the likelihood of transit 
use for non-work travel. Cervero and Duncan complicate this, finding that 
about 40 percent of the decision to commute by rail is due to residential self-
selection, based on data from the Bay Area. Finally, in contrast to Conway et 
al.’s findings above, Dias et al.’s model determines that ridehail users in the 
Seattle area differ demographically from core transit riders—the former tend 
to be younger, more well-educated, and higher-income.31 
2.3.5. Financial Implications 
Affected by all of the influences detailed above, transit ridership in turn 
influences the financial health of an agency. For instance, Taylor, Garrett, and 
Iseki found in 2000 that peaking—the concentration of ridership during rush 
hours—significantly increases the costs of providing service, above what the 
agency cost-allocation model they examined had estimated. It is expensive 
to hire workers for full shifts and to maintain a large fleet of vehicles—both of 
which are mainly needed at peak and sit idle otherwise. On the capital side, 
Guerra and Cervero calculated in 2011 that many rail projects across the nation 
did not meet their ridership projections because they were built in an 
environment not dense enough to support them. This led many to be highly 
 
31. “Discrete Choice Analysis,” Columbia Mailman School of Public Health, n.d.; 
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cost-ineffective.32 Whatever the causes of transit ridership changes and 
ridership peaking, they can cause public agencies profound fiscal harm. 
2.4. Conclusion: Gaps and Place in the Literature 
With a large dose of nuance and dissent, external factors do appear to 
have more influence on ridership than internal factors—an influence that has 
likely grown recently. However, despite the breadth of the literature, two 
gaps remain. For one, few works have explored recent ridership trends in the 
last decade. Even fewer examine ridership change, as opposed to absolute 
levels of ridership. Because of this gap, new influences like the rise of ridehail 
services like Lyft and Uber, the increase in central-city residential 
displacement, the suburbanization of poverty, and the re-urbanization of 
employment have gone relatively unexplored. These factors are especially 
relevant in the explosive economic climate of the Bay Area, also the nation’s 
epicenter of gentrification and the original home of ridehail. Secondly, most 
previous work analyzes ridership for the country or for a metropolitan area 
on aggregate. The pieces that do look at station-level ridership do not 
consider variation in ridership by time of day or day of the week, and they 
generally are more focused on methodological debates on how to 
geographically weigh inputs than broader questions of explaining ridership. 
By examining recent ridership change and by looking at geographic and 
temporal variation within agencies, this report offers a novel addition to the 
existing literature. 
 
32. Brian D. Taylor, Mark Garrett, and Hiroyuki Iseki, “Measuring Cost Variability in 
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A Method to Explore Transit’s 
Madness: Data and Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
Like a rowboat that just sprung a leak, transit ridership in the Bay Area 
is beginning to founder. Patronage regionwide has fallen for the past two 
years, in both absolute numbers and per capita. But as with the listing boat, 
pulled down by holes in certain parts of the hull and buoyed by others, transit 
ridership is dropping unevenly, pulled down by declines in certain trip types 
and buoyed by other resilient or growing rider markets. In many non-central 
areas, at off-peak times, and in counter-commute directions, ridership has 
sunk deeply. These problem areas are the focus of my analysis. Below, I 
describe the data with which I have identified these patterns—data which can 
guide policymakers in plugging the Bay Area’s patronage leaks and righting 
their transit ship. 
3.2. Methodological Choices 
The analysis in this report draws on a variety of data sources, almost 
all of which function as censuses, not samples. In other words, rather than, 
say, measuring ridership at a random set of stops, the major datasets I employ 
are as complete a record of transit ridership and characteristics of transit 
supply as agencies can provide. These sources—the National Transit Database 
and ridership reports from three major Northern California operators—
provide a full picture of the state of transit today and how it has changed over 
the past decade, without being so large that sampling becomes necessary. To 
be sure, rider intercept surveys, like agency customer satisfaction surveys, 
and travel diary samples, like the National Household Travel Survey, provide 
a valuable look at how individuals make travel decisions and perceive the 
quality of their transportation. But an aggregate-level analysis, with agencies, 
lines, and stops as the units of analysis, best shows operators the regional 
transit landscape and specific spatial and temporal changes in their service. 
These sizable datasets also allow the multivariate statistical analysis in Section 
5 to return statistically significant results. 
This report analyzes the nine-county Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission region, with specific attention paid to the areas therein where 
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transit use is changing the most.33 In this report, “Bay Area” will refer to these 
nine MTC counties. Additionally, when I use the term “ridership,” I generally 
mean unlinked passenger trips—i.e., boardings, counting transfers as multiple 
trips. While this method may appear to inflate patronage, good data on 
transfers do not exist on most agencies. However, since BART riders do not 
tag their farecards again when they change trains, BART’s ridership reports 
track linked passenger trips, where intra-agency transfers count as a single 
trip. I use these linked figures only when comparing BART stations and lines 
to one another (the descriptive analysis in Section 4.2 and the multivariate 
statistical analysis in Section 5), not across agencies.34 Finally, I focus far more 
on change over time than on cross-sectional snapshots in this report. The 
absolute number of weekend trips on BART in August 2018, say, matters less 
than the change in weekend trips from 2015 to 2018 in answering the key 
questions of this report. 
3.3. National Transit Database 
Before delving into specific geographic and temporal differences 
within the Bay Area, I analyze ridership at the regional level and provide 
nationwide context using the National Transit Database (NTD). The NTD 
includes annual data on ridership and service characteristics on every transit 
agency that receives federal funds, from 1991 to 2017. These operators submit 
their data every year to the Federal Transit Administration, which compiles 
the NTD and hosts it on their website. The NTD includes the following 
variables, broken down by agency, travel mode, and year: boardings, 
passenger miles traveled, service miles, service hours, fare revenues, 
operating expenses, capital expenses, and more. From these, I calculated 
additional variables, including productivity (boardings per service hour) and 
boardings per capita.35 I also grouped agencies by which metropolitan 
planning organization (MPO) their service area lies within, building from a 
helpful table created by UCLA transportation researcher Mark Garrett. Finally, 
I cleaned up a few small errors in the NTD through manual checks. 
Using NTD data, I conducted symmetric descriptive analyses of all of 
the above variables, observed common trends among them, and delved 
further into indicative geographies and attributes. These analyses use the Bay 
Area as a whole as the unit of analysis (as compared to the U.S., California, 
 
33. Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, 
Solano, and Sonoma Counties 
34. Save for one instance, which is noted. 
35. Using population figures from the Census in decennial years and intercensal 
population estimates in yeas in between 
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and Southern California36) or use individual agencies as the units of analysis 
(compared to each other). The findings of these analyses are presented in 
Section 4.1, outlining national ridership baselines, the timeline of ridership 
declines regionwide and by agency, and differences in service provision, etc. 
between agencies and modes. 
3.4. Specific Agencies 
3.4.1. Choice of Operators 
To describe the specifics of transit ridership changes in the Bay Area, I 
have also conducted a more detailed descriptive analysis of ridership changes 
at three major agencies: the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, 
Bay Area Rapid Transit, and the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority. 
The former two carry approximately 70 percent of boardings in the region 
and represent exceptional agencies different from all others west of the 
Mississippi. Muni’s comparatively small service area—contained almost 
wholly in the City and County of San Francisco, under 50 square miles—is 
denser than any other in the state.37 BART, meanwhile, is the third most 
extensive heavy rail network in America and the first of the major postwar 
transit systems.38 Both operate in an environment where driving and parking 
are costlier, slower, and more difficult than the rest of the region and where 
destinations and housing are packed closely together. By studying these two 
agencies, I not only got a good sense of the majority of Bay Area ridership but 
also found some peaking issues that differ from transit operators elsewhere. 
In contrast, VTA represents a far more typical U.S. transit agency. VTA 
serves the sprawling, suburbanized South Bay, more characteristic of the 
state as a whole than San Francisco or Oakland. Its rail system opened much 
more recently than BART or Muni, at the beginning of the wave of new light-
rail systems over the past three decades. Given its similarities with all but the 
largest transit operators nationwide, VTA therefore represents something of 
control case for the Bay Area. I chose VTA because it still carries a substantial 
portion of the region’s boardings—the fourth-largest—but unlike third-ranked 
AC Transit, it operates both rail and bus service and does not overlap with 
another major agency, as AC does with BART. 
 
36. The five-county Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) region: 
Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino  
37. “Population Density for U.S. Cities Statistics,” Governing, 2019. 
38. Yonah Freemark, “Route Miles for U.S. and Canada Rail Systems,” The Transport 
Politic, 2019 and Michael C. Healy, BART: The Dramatic History of the Bay Area Rapid 
Transit System (Berkeley, CA: Heyday, 2016). 
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3.4.2. Data Sources 
The datasets for each of the agencies vary in the specific variables 
collected and the reliability and quality of the numbers. BART has the richest 
ridership dataset. Unlike most other transit agencies, BART charges a 
distance-based fare and therefore requires customers to tag their farecards 
both when entering and exiting. Thus, BART has origin and destination data 
on every paying rider, tabulated from data on the fare gates. Every month, 
BART staff publishes a matrix of aggregate average daily trips between every 
pair of stations, divided into weekday, Saturday, and Sunday spreadsheets. I 
calculated monthly totals by multiplying each matrix cell by the number of 
weekdays, Saturdays, and Sundays, respectively, in that month and then 
summing them; I then added up monthly totals to arrive at annual figures. All 
told, I aggregated matrices from 2001 to 2018 into one dataset. I then 
calculated the ridership over each segment of BART track by creating a series 
of functions that assigned the proper segments to every origin-destination 
pair. BART staff also annually publish an even more comprehensive matrix of 
ridership between every pair of stations, broken down by date and by hour 
band; I use these in my causal analysis. 
BART’s incredibly detailed datasets has allowed me not only to look at 
which stations have seen the greatest changes in combined entries and exits, 
but also which lines, segments, and trip types have changed the most, 
especially just before and since BART’s ridership peak in 2016. I analyze most 
of the agency’s metrics by their change between 2015 and 2018—one year of 
flat ridership followed by two years of decline—adding 2015 to help ensure 
that changes are not anomalies. As with the NTD data, an initial symmetrical 
analysis of all of the variables above revealed certain areas and times that 
merited deeper investigation, the results of which are presented in Section 
4.2. 
Because Muni and VTA only collect complete rider information upon 
boarding, their data are somewhat less rich—but nonetheless informative. 
Muni staff have provided a spreadsheet of average daily boardings from Fiscal 
Year 1998 to Fiscal Year 2018, broken down by fiscal year, day of the week, 
and line. These data come from automated passenger counters on vehicles 
and fareboxes and -gates, with some degree of agency estimation, From 
information on SFMTA’s website, I have matched these data with information 
on the peak frequency, mode, etc. of each line.39 I have looked at changes in 
ridership across these variables and have found the greatest changes are 
 
39. SFMTA, “Muni System Map,” SFMTA. Aug. 2017. 
A Method to Explore Transit’s Madness: Data and Methodology | 26 
shifts among different Muni services, as opposed to outright ridership losses. 
More details follow in Section 4.3. Likewise, VTA staff have provided a 
spreadsheet of average daily boardings by month, every three months from 
January 2015 to July 2018, broken down day of the week, time of day, and line 
and collected in a similar manner as Muni’s. I have again matched this dataset 
to route types and modes from VTA’s website.40 I also eliminated January 
2018 from the dataset and replaced that month with averages of the prior and 
following months. I did this because the reported ridership totals for January 
2018 were over 50 percent higher than the months before or after it. This 
increase was evenly spread across most lines, creating an unexplained spike 
likely due to a data error. After doing this cleaning, I conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of the available data and honed in on peaking 
problems and other significant service changes, outlined in Section 4.4. 
3.5. Causal Analysis 
3.5.1. Model Overview 
While my findings from these agency-specific descriptive analyses 
contain a multitude of findings of geographic and temporal changes in transit 
service and use, two major themes run through them: relatively constant peak 
ridership and precipitously dropping off-peak ridership. What, then, explains 
the uneven patterns of transit use—and transit use more generally in the Bay 
Area? To answer this question, I have conducted a multivariate statistical 
analysis of BART ridership. A statistical model that considers and determines 
the significance of many possible factors provides an additional degree of 
certainty to the descriptive breakdowns and shows agencies if factors within 
their control or outside their control primarily cause ridership changes. 
Of the three agencies examined above, BART makes the most sense to 
study with a multi-variate statistical model. BART has suffered the most 
pronounced peaking, making it an interesting case study of whether the boom 
in jobs and population in San Francisco explains the bulk of ridership changes. 
As mentioned above, the agency also collects of numbers of both entries and 
exits, by date and by hour, providing a fuller picture than the other operators. 
I have estimated a regression model of BART ridership, wherein I used 
various internal and external factors to explain BART use. Uniquely, I designed 
the model to explain ridership by origin-destination pair—a strategy I have not 
seen elsewhere in the research literature. For each pair of entry and exit 
 
40. VTA, “By Type,” Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, 2019. 
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stations, I have the number on annual trips, from 2011 to 2018. Unlike other 
models that examine ridership by origin only, this model includes 
demographic, economic, and built-form factors for both ends of the trip and 
determines their influence independently. Using ridership by origin-
destination pair also increases the number of data points used in the model. 
To better delineate origin and destination effects, I ran separate models 
for A.M. and P.M. weekday ridership. Because much—and likely most—of 
BART riders on weekday mornings are commuting from home to work, 
residential patterns are generally reflected at the origin and employment 
patterns at the destination of each trip. To a lesser extent, the reverse is true 
of P.M. ridership. To be sure, some A.M. weekday trips may be from work to 
home (night-shifts commutes), some P.M. weekday trips from home to work 
(evening shifts), and many trips at both times not commutes at all (errands, 
etc.). The model therefore includes employment and residential factors for 
both origins and destinations. Still, by separating the model into periods when 
riders predominantly travel from home to work and the reverse, effects 
related to each can be most clearly isolated. The limitations of this decision 
are discussed further in Section 5.5.3. I also ran a model of all off-peak trips, 
defined as all weekend trips plus weekday trips at hours beyond morning41 
and evening peak42 (See Appendix D). 
3.5.2. Model Inputs 
The model includes the following explanatory factors, related to the 
origin, destination, or trip itself: 
  
 
41. Defined as the three, hour-wide, weekday, A.M. time bands with the most 
riders: 7 A.M. to 10 A.M. 
42. Defined as the three, hour-wide, weekday, P.M. time bands with the most 
riders: 4 P.M. to 7 A.M. 
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Table 3-1: Hypothesized Relationship of Model Inputs to Ridership 
 FACTOR DATA SOURCE 
HYPOTHESIZED 
EFFECT ON 
A.M. 
RIDERSHIP 
HYPOTHESIZED 
EFFECT ON 
P.M. 
RIDERSHIP 
O
rig
in
 
Residents within a half-mile43 ACS44 + + 
Jobs within a quarter-mile LODES45 Ø + 
BART-provided parking 
spaces 
BART 
internal 
data, 201946 
+ not in model 
Lines serving the station manual coding + + 
Whether the station is a 
terminus47 
manual 
coding + Ø 
Median household income 
within a half-mile43 ACS
44 – Ø 
De
st
in
at
io
n 
Residents within a half-mile43 ACS44 Ø + 
Jobs within a quarter-mile LODES45 + + 
BART-provided parking 
spaces 
BART 
internal 
data, 201946 
not in 
model + 
Lines serving the station manual coding + + 
Whether the station is a 
terminus47 
manual 
coding Ø + 
Median household income 
within a half-mile43 ACS
44 Ø – 
Tr
ip
 
BART travel time in the 
A.M./P.M. 
MTC travel 
model48  – - 
Ratio of driving time to BART 
travel time in the A.M./P.M. 
MTC travel 
model48  + + 
Whether the trip involves a 
transfer 
manual 
coding – - 
 
 
43. Calculated by proportionally allocating parts of census block groups 
44. American Community Survey five-year estimates, centered on the year in 
question 
45. Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Origin-Destination Employment 
Statistics 
46. BART, Parking Statistics 2019, 2019. 
47. Meaning the end of a branch of track, not necessarily the end of a BART line 
48. By transportation analysis zones, 2010 A.M./P.M. peak; BART travel time 
modeled as average walk-to-transit-to-walk time 
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The model uses jobs within a quarter-mile and population within a half-mile 
based on best practices from Guerra and Cervero, 2013.49 
Tables 3-2 and 3-3 provide summary statistics for each of the inputs, 
for the earliest year of fully available data, 2011, and the most recent, 2015.  
Table 3-2: Summary Statistics, 2011 
 FACTOR MEDIAN HIGH LOW STANDARD DEVIATION 
By
 st
at
io
n 
Residents within a half-
mile 8,264 35,510 717 7,817 
Jobs within a quarter-mile 1,005 80,983 13 15,995 
BART-provided parking 
spaces, 201950 1,006 2,978 0 900 
Lines serving the station 2 4 1 1.13 
Whether the station is a 
terminus 
dummy variable (6 termini; 38 through-
stations) 
Median household income 
within a half-mile $69,967 $184,578 $26,921 $31,462 
By
 tr
ip
 (s
ta
tio
n 
pa
ir)
 BART travel 
time 
weekday 
A.M.51 1:01 2:52 0:06 0:30 
weekday 
P.M.52 1:01 2:42 0:06 0:30 
off-peak53 1:04 2:41 0:08 0:31 
Ratio of 
driving time 
to BART 
travel time 
weekday 
A.M.51 0.50 1.94 0.12 0.23 
weekday 
P.M.52 0.53 1.72 0.11 0.20 
off-peak53 0.44 1.47 0.10 0.18 
Whether the trip involves 
a transfer 
dummy variable (518 trips with a transfer; 
1,418 without) 
 
  
 
49. Erick Guerra and Robert Cervero, “Is a Half-mile Circle the Right Standard for 
TODs?,” ACCESS 42 (Spring 2013): 17-22. 
50. Historical BART parking data were not available, so the number of spaces in 
2019 were used in all models and years. 
51. Travel times at morning weekday peak, as defined by MTC’s travel model 
52. Travel times at afternoon weekday peak, as defined by MTC’s travel model 
53. Unweighted average of travel times at weekday early morning, midday, and 
evening, as defined by MTC’s travel model 
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Table 3-3: Summary Statistics, 2015 
 FACTOR MEDIAN HIGH LOW STANDARD DEVIATION 
By
 st
at
io
n 
Residents within a half-
mile 8,317 39,491 33 8,564 
Jobs within a quarter-mile 987 95,591 19 20,058 
BART-provided parking 
spaces, 201950 954 2,978 0 903 
Lines serving the station 2 4 1 1.15 
Whether the station is a 
terminus 
dummy variable (7 termini; 38 through-
stations) 
Median household income 
within a half-mile $78,707 $207,385 $29,905 $34,422 
By
 tr
ip
 (s
ta
tio
n 
pa
ir)
 BART travel 
time 
weekday 
A.M.51 1:01 2:52 0:06 0:30 
weekday 
P.M.52 1:06 2:42 0:06 0:32 
off-peak53 1:04 2:41 0:08 0:30 
Ratio of 
driving time 
to BART 
travel time 
weekday 
A.M.51 0.50 1.94 0.12 0.23 
weekday 
P.M.52 0.52 1.72 0.11 0.19 
off-peak53 0.44 1.47 0.10 0.18 
Whether the trip involves 
a transfer 
dummy variable (604 trips with a transfer; 
1,421 without) 
 
Of special note in the model is the amount of service supplied, 
operationalized as the number of lines serving the origin and destination 
stations. Since BART lines generally operate at the same headways, the 
number of lines fairly captures service levels as well as a rough measure of 
destination accessibility. But the amount of service supplied is a complex 
factor in explaining ridership. While increased service tends to boost 
ridership, agencies often respond to higher ridership demand by increasing 
service. The same applies to service cuts. Teasing out this relationship with 
full rigor requires statistically accounting for the endogeneity between transit 
service supply and demand. As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, Taylor et al. (2009) 
estimate two-stage statistical models where predicted (rather than actual) 
service supply is estimated using variables thought to be otherwise unrelated 
to transit use. This predicted service supply is then included in a second 
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model, along with a host of other variables, to explain ridership.54 
While acknowledging the methodological superiority of doing so, I do 
not attempt to account for endogeneity, for two reasons. First, neither 
headways nor schedules changed over the model’s timeframe. While new 
extensions have opened, BART has purchased and run new trains to keep 
headways the same at every station, according to staff. In BART’s specific 
case, at least, staff appear not to be responding to change in ridership with 
change in headways, reducing potential endogeneity between service supply 
and patronage within this analysis. Secondly, a one-stage regression model 
is, in effect, a best-case scenario: if the influence of service supply were to 
show up anywhere, it would be here. In other words, ignoring endogeneity 
should heighten the observed effect of service supply. The fact that service 
has so little influence, as shown in Section 5, is therefore all the more telling. 
Returning to the full set of inputs, the factors in Table 3-1 are the 
outcome of dozens of draft models. In these drafts, I included a number of 
other inputs that ended up not part of the final model for a number of reasons. 
Some inputs proved too correlated with other factors, and/or they lacked as 
strong a theoretical basis for inclusion. The tested but omitted independent 
variables include: surveyed station cleanliness, surveyed presence of a BART 
police officer, racial and ethnic percentages of the population within a half-
mile of the station, fares between each pair of stations, whether the station 
lies in downtown San Francisco, whether the station lies in downtown 
Oakland, and more. The exclusion of these inputs from the final model did not 
change the primary findings described below; the model proved quite robust. 
The model does not include a specific measure of the built 
environment and urban form around the origin or destination. The job density, 
population density, and transit service supply variables each partially account 
for urban form, but only indirectly. Earlier versions of the model included a 
direct measure—Voulgaris et al.’s (2017) neighborhood typologies, which are 
a composite of built environment, job access, and transit supply 
characteristics.55 However, since this variable was constructed using much of 
the same data as the other inputs in my model, it explains the same portion 
of the variation in ridership as they do. I thus excluded the neighborhood 
typologies from the final model. I also left out MTC’s Priority Development 
Areas, another possible land use input, for lack of a sound theoretical 
 
54. Taylor et al., “Nature and/or Nurture?” 
55. Carole Turley Voulgaris et al., “Synergistic Neighborhood Relationships with 
Travel Behavior: An Analysis of Travel In 30,000 U.S. Neighborhoods,” Journal of Transport 
and Land Use 10, no. 1 (2017): 437-61. 
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relationship to current (as opposed to future) transit use. 
3.5.3. Model Outcome Variable 
The regression model estimated above is a log-linear model. In other 
words, the dependent variable of the model—that is, the variable that the 
model attempts to predict using the inputs—is the natural logarithm of the 
number of trips between each origin-destination pair. Using a log-linear 
model instead of a typical linear regression fits the data much better and 
ensures that the model’s residuals are normally distributed. In simpler terms, 
a log-linear model makes more sense, given that ridership on the most 
traveled origin-destination pairs is exponentially higher than the least-
traveled pairs. Practically, a log-linear model can be interpreted roughly as 
follows: a unit increase in one of the inputs—say, an additional minute of travel 
time—results in some percent increase in the number of trips. A linear 
increase in an input results in an exponential increase in the outcome variable. 
  
Where and When: Descriptive Findings | 33 
Where and When: Descriptive 
Findings 
4.1. Regional Ridership Trends 
4.1.1. Boardings 
Transit ridership in the Bay Area is declining. This should come as no 
surprise to anyone who has read this far in this report. However, before 
delving into reasons for the drop, the decline itself merits examination, given 
its scale and its timing. Unlike the rest of the country, Bay Area ridership held 
steady until around the end of 2016. Indeed, ridership had been rising at 
around two to three percent per year since 2011, a fairly consistent rise that 
had more than made up for losses during the Great Recession. But in 2017, 
regionwide patronage fell around four percent, or nearly 20 million annual 
boardings. Ridership therefore fell to just over 2013 levels, a significant step 
backwards. In theory, only one year of decline is not necessarily a harbinger 
of a longer-term trend. However, while 2018 data from the NTD will not be 
released until October 2019, the 2018 numbers from the three large agencies 
discussed below indicate continued dips in ridership last year as well. In the 
Bay Area, ridership continues to veer off the rails. 
A look at boardings per capita shows the scale of the region’s problem. 
The Bay Area has experienced substantial population growth in the past 
decade, growing 11 percent since 2008 (compared to seven percent 
nationally and seven percent in Southern California).56 Thus, Bay Area 
operators’ seemingly healthy ridership prior to 2017 may have been caused in 
large part simply by having more people from which to draw riders. Trends 
in ridership per capita reveal this to be the case (See Figure 4-1). On the 
positive side, Bay Area agencies have long carried around twice as many trips 
per person as the United States and California. Still, from 2008 to 2016, the 
region saw a slow decline in ridership per capita, falling from 72 trips per 
person to 69. In 2017, ridership per capita plummeted, dropping to 66 trips 
per person in a single year. This represents the steepest one-year drop since 
the height of the Great Recession. Thus, as the region gets more and more 
 
56. U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 
to July 1, 2017,” March 2018; U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Intercensal Estimates 
of the Resident Population for Counties of California: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010, Sept. 2011; 
and U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Intercensal Estimates of the Resident 
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 
2010, Sept. 2011. 
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residents, they are riding less and less—dramatically so since the start of 2017. 
This last year of freefall should be cause for concern, but so too should the 
preceding decade of ridership failing to keep pace with rising population. 
Figure 4-1: The Scale of the Ridership Decline 
 
Falling ridership is not unique to the Bay Area. Indeed, across the 
country and state, transit patronage is down. The difference though, is in 
timing. Figure 4-2 shows how ridership in the U.S., California, Southern 
California, and the Bay Area has changed since 2008. The former three 
peaked in 2014 and have declined ever since, steepening every year. In 
contrast, the Bay Area continued to climb until 2016, only falling thereafter. At 
first glance, by this metric, Northern California ridership looks more resilient. 
The region’s decade-long downward trend in ridership per capita, though, 
shows that these top-line ridership numbers have long masked earlier 
warning signs. Still, the timing difference between the Bay Area and the rest 
of the country is notable. This lag may mean that a wholly different set of 
factors are behind Northern California’s drop or merely that the same factors 
are operating on a delay. The forthcoming UCLA Institute of Transportation 
Studies report will provide a fuller answer to this question. But based on the 
fact that Southern California has lost the most riders on its busiest routes, 
while major Bay Area agencies have lost most of their riders off-peak, the 
former may well be the case. 
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Figure 4-2: A Later Decline in Boardings in the Bay Area 
 
The region’s ridership trends look quite different when Muni and BART 
are excluded (See Figure 4-2). As in most metropolitan areas, ridership is 
asymmetric by agency, meaning that a few operators carry most of the trips. 
In the Bay Area, Muni and BART carried over 70 percent of 2017 regional 
ridership. In fact, their combined share in 2017 is the highest of any year in the 
NTD’s online data, dating back to 1991 (See Figure 4-3). Therefore, not only 
are riders within in each agency concentrating at peak times and directions, 
as described below, but riders are also concentrating onto the busiest 
agencies. 
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Figure 4-3: Muni and BART’s Share of Bay Area Boardings 
 
Taking out these two agencies, Bay Area ridership more resembles the 
rest of the nation (See Figure 4-2). Without Muni and BART, ridership never 
fully recovered from the Great Recession, during which patronage dropped 
just over nine percent between 2008 and 2012. Thereafter, non-BART-and-
Muni ridership peaked in 2015—one year after the U.S. and one year before 
the full Bay Area—and has fallen on a similar slope as the country and state 
ever since. Most of these other agencies do not operate in dense, transit-
friendly environments like downtown San Francisco, which may partially 
explain why their trends look more like the rest of the nation’s. Indeed, if 
different factors than in the rest of the U.S. are causing the Bay Area’s ridership 
decline, these unique influences may actually only affect BART and Muni, 
while the rest of the region operates under the same forces as elsewhere. 
More than that, the differences between the two largest agencies and 
the rest of the region’s operators are not new. The recent patronage decline 
may have drawn these contrasts to the fore, but ridership trends have differed 
between agencies for the past decade (See Figure 4-4). Since 2008, Muni 
ridership has remained at roughly the same level—albeit with some noticeable 
year-to-year jumps and without overall growth despite San Francisco’s 
expanding population. BART, meanwhile, has grown its patronage 
significantly and steadily, gaining 18 million additional annual boardings 
between 2008 and 2017. Increases on BART over that period and on Muni 
between 2011 and 2015 account for essentially all of the region’s ridership 
increase in the past decade. These gains have masked stagnant or slipping 
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ridership on most other operators. VTA, for instance, remained virtually flat 
for the past decade before falling in 2017. AC Transit, the region’s third busiest 
operator, lost nearly 12.5 million annual trips over the past decade, the most 
of any agency regionwide. All of the other Bay Area operators together had 
nearly flat ridership, gaining only a combined 1.5 million annual trips since 
2008 and losing ridership per capita. To be sure, some small operators have 
made gains. But overall, the seeds of the current decline have been 
germinating for a while, masked by BART’s and Muni’s relatively robust 
performance until recently. The top-line ridership figures for the whole region 
have painted an incomplete and perhaps too rosy picture of regional ridership 
trends when examined at a more granular level. 
Figure 4-4: Ridership Trends among Bay Area Operators: 
High Ridership on Muni and BART Has Masked Declines Elsewhere 
 
4.1.2. Service 
In many agencies across America, service cuts and ridership declines 
have created a vicious cycle. As headways and reliability fall, riders find other 
ways to travel, reducing operator farebox revenues and in turn resulting in 
another round of cutbacks. New York and Washington, D.C., regions with 
very high levels of transit use, have fallen down this spiral.57 The Bay Area, 
though, appears to have escaped it. From this seemingly positive finding, 
however, follows a perhaps more worrisome conclusion: ridership in 
 
57. Dave Colon, “Who’s to Blame for MTA’s Declining Ridership?,” Curbed N.Y., Jul. 
25, 2018 and Arantani, “Metro’s Multimillion-dollar Mystery.” 
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Northern California is falling in spite of more service. 
Figure 4-5 shows regionwide trends in revenue hours per capita 
versus boardings per capita. Overall, the two tracked neatly during the Great 
Recession. From 2010 to 2014, ridership recovered somewhat, while the 
lingering effects of recession-induced budget cuts likely kept agencies from 
restoring service, at least initially. Since then, most Bay Area transit agencies 
have added significant service, yet in spite of this, ridership has begun to drop. 
The same trends hold true for revenue miles of service per capita. BART, for 
instance, has opened two new extensions in as many years, and the Sonoma-
Marin Area Rail Transit (SMART) system opened recently as well, but these 
service-mileage-boosting routes have not increased the region’s overall 
ridership numbers. Overall, service increases as of late appear to be having 
no effect on bolstering falling ridership. 
Figure 4-5: Service Changes Are Not Causing Recent Ridership Declines 
 
Perhaps, though, service is only increasing on operators with steady 
ridership, while agencies with falling ridership have cut service. To test this, I 
separated Bay Area operators into those whose ridership fell between 2014 
and 2016 and those whose ridership rose (After 2016, ridership fell at nearly 
every agency.). Looking at this critical two-year period separates operators 
with patronage trends similar to most of the rest of the country and operators 
with the relatively resilient ridership unique to a select few transit-resilient 
metropolitan areas. Coincidentally, the total number of service hours 
provided by each of these two categories back in 2010 was nearly equal (See 
Figure 4-6). Since then, the Bay Area agencies whose 2014-2016 ridership 
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rose have added more slightly more service than those whose 2014-2016 
ridership fell. Still, both categories of operators have added service since 2014 
at roughly the same rate. Given the small difference—and the fact that neither 
category has actually cut service since 2012—service changes appear to be 
neither attracting nor repelling riders. 
Figure 4-6: Service Hour Differences between Agencies with Different 
Ridership Trends 
 
These dual trends of falling patronage and rising service have caused 
transit productivity to drop. Productivity—the number of boardings per hour 
of service—is a key indicator of how effectively agencies are operating. Like 
the ocean receding before a tsunami, productivity often ebbs some time 
before ridership itself crashes down. This has been the case in Southern 
California, where productivity has fallen every year from 2013 on, two years 
before overall ridership began its descent. Northern California has followed 
the same pattern on a slight delay: productivity declines beginning in 2014; 
ridership declines in 2017 (See Figure 4-7). But the Bay Area’s recent 
productivity drop is steeper than America’s overall. In fairness, Bay Area 
transit still operates at a markedly higher rate of service productivity than the 
state and the nation—a distinction the Bay Area has held all but one year since 
1991. But without Muni and BART, the region’s productivity lies below 
America’s and California’s. Even considering all agencies, with more hours of 
service supplied for residents who are taking fewer and fewer trips, Northern 
California operators face a conundrum. As detailed in the following sections, 
these parallel trends may be explained at least in part by the loss of off-peak 
riders on many agencies, while ridership remains steady at peak times where 
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capacity constrains prevent more service from being easily added. 
Figure 4-7: Productivity
 
4.1.3. Trends by Mode 
Like in metropolitan Los Angeles, trends in ridership in Northern 
California vary by mode.58 However, unlike L.A., the Bay Area has not 
expanded its rail network much in recent years (See Figure 4-8). After a spurt 
of building by Muni and VTA in the mid-2000s, the region saw no new rail 
miles opened from 2007 until the opening of BART’s Oakland Airport 
Connector in 2014. Only recently did rail openings pick up again, with BART’s 
Warm Springs/South Fremont extension in 2017 and the East Contra Costa 
extension in 2018. These two coincide with the recent ridership decline, but 
given the small scale of these extensions relative to the entire system, the 
timing appears a coincidence. The overall lack of new rail miles in the past 
decade suggests that criticisms leveled against Los Angeles’ rail expansions—
huge new investments that starved buses of funds and riders, per critics—do 
not apply in the Bay Area.59 To be sure, the cost-effectiveness and marginal 
ridership effect of BART and VTA’s earlier extensions (from the 1990s and 
2000s) are not as high as was hoped or projected. However, within the 
timeframe of this report, active, new rail expansion is not causing ridership 
 
58. Manville, Taylor, and Blumenberg, Falling Transit Ridership. 
59. Manville, Taylor, and Blumenberg, Falling Transit Ridership; Leroy Demery, U.S. 
Urban Rail Transit Lines Opened from 1980, Mar. 30, 2004, last updated Nov. 2011; VTA, 
“Light Rail Service Overview,” Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, 2019; BART, 
“System Facts,” Bay Area Rapid Transit, 2019; and Matt Tinoco, “Metro’s Declining 
Ridership, Explained,” Curbed L.A., Aug. 29, 2017. 
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declines. 
Figure 4-8: Rail Mileage Steady as Rail Boardings Rose and Fell 
 
Track mileage data are available through 2018; regional rail boardings only 
through 2017. 
 
That said, ridership on rail in the region has increased as ridership on 
buses has decreased (See Figure 4-9). Rail ridership has steadily risen the past 
decade, save for a brief dip during the Great Recession and a drop in 2017. 
Trains carried around 31 million more trips in 2017 than 2008. Bus boardings, 
meanwhile, have slid downward since the Recession, at best flat-lining most 
years. Buses have lost nearly 26 million trips between 2008 and 2017. To 
some degree, the difference is due to operating trends specifically on BART, 
which carried 59 percent of the region’s rail riders in 2017 and accounted for 
57 percent of rail ridership growth the prior decade. Nonetheless, rail 
boardings across agencies have grown since the Great Recession to a degree 
that more than offset losses on buses, until 2017. As the data presented above 
indicate, this has not occurred because new rail lines have taken ridership 
from buses, though some riders may be switching from buses to existing rail 
lines due to increased street congestion, changing job locations, or other 
factors. Worth noting, though, is the fact that rail and bus ridership finally did 
start moving in tandem in 2015, both rising the next year and falling the year 
after. While various pressures may have boosted rail ridership and dampened 
bus ridership before then, their parallel movements since suggest that a new 
or newly strengthened set of factors is now affecting both modes similarly. 
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Figure 4-9: Rail Gains and Bus Losses 
 
All this comes as rail and bus service have increased at relatively 
similar rates. Bay Area agencies supply far more hours of bus service than rail 
service, but both have increased markedly since 2014 (See Figure 4-10). 
Meanwhile, buses and trains have traveled nearly the same number of service 
miles over the past decade, with a slightly larger uptick for rail since 2014 (See 
Figure 4-11). Again, this evidence does not support a story of investment in rail 
at the expense of buses, but rather increases in service on both. 
Figure 4-10: More Revenue Hours for Bay Area Buses than Rail 
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Figure 4-11: Similar Revenue Miles for Bay Area Buses and Rail 
 
Buses in the Bay Area have slowed, but not trains (See Figure 4-12). 
Dividing revenue hours by revenue miles, speeds on buses have dropped 0.8 
miles per hour, or seven percent, since 2008 (over half of which occurred in 
2017), while rail speeds have increased 0.3 miles per hour, or one percent. 
Stuck behind traffic with few dedicated lanes, slower buses rather than fewer 
buses may therefore be a cause of bus ridership declines. In fairness, this 
speed decrease could also result from shifting service from outlying lines to 
central routes, where delays are higher. But since the bulk of the speed drop 
occurred in just one year and since I found no evidence of such a coordinated 
regional service shift, worsening congestion on existing routes appears the 
more likely culprit. 
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Figure 4-12: Slowing Speeds on Buses 
 
4.2. BART Ridership Trends 
4.2.1. Overview and Data Validation 
Bay Area Rapid Transit, Northern California’s regional heavy-rail 
system and its second-most-ridden operator, has experienced the most 
severe demand peaking problems and the largest divergence between peak 
and off-peak ridership trends of the agencies profiled. BART straddles a 
sometimes awkward dual role: it functions as commuter rail in the suburbs, 
at the ends of its branches, and as a high-frequency subway in and between 
downtown San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley at the core of its system. 
BART serves an (expanding) variety of jurisdictions and land uses, making it 
the closest to a regionwide operator in the Bay Area. Trends on BART, 
therefore, carry great import for the whole Bay Area. 
As discussed above, BART releases a rich set of origin-destination 
matrices on its ridership monthly. To test the validity of the matrices, Figure 
4-13 below compares the data that BART submit to the National Transit 
Database with the ridership numbers from the origin-destination matrices.60 
Overall, the numbers are fairly close, with year-over-year changes in each 
mostly consistent with one another. The NTD numbers are slightly higher, 
 
60. The average weekday, Saturday, and Sunday system ridership from each 
monthly matrix was multiplied by the number of weekdays, Saturdays, and Sundays, 
respectively, in that month and then summed for the entire year to arrive at an annual 
ridership figure. 
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because they represent BART estimates of unlinked trips, as opposed to the 
linked trips tracked in the matrices. Neither data source accounts for trips 
made by fare-evaders, whose numbers fragmentary evidence suggests may 
be increasing over time and whose travels are not recorded by Clipper-card 
readers. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the origin-destination 
matrices are among the highest-quality sources of transit data from any 
agency nationwide: they track both origins and destinations, unlike most 
systems, and break down ridership by day and even hour.  
Figure 4-13: BART Annual Ridership: NTD versus Origin-Destination 
Matrices 
 
BART origin-destination trip data are available through 2018; NTD data only 
through 2017. 
 
4.2.2. BART’s Peaking Problem 
These data reveal a long period of steady ridership growth for BART, 
followed by a more recent downswing. As mentioned above, BART 
experienced steady growth between 2003 and 2015, gaining around 3.7 
million riders on average every year and weathering the Great Recession 
better than most American transit agencies. Since 2016, though, BART 
ridership has dropped noticeably. Over these two years, BART lost 7.8 million 
riders, six percent of their 2016 ridership. This decline returned BART to its 
ridership numbers from around 2013, erasing the three years of growth. 
Over this period of decline, one issue appeared again and again: a 
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severe peaking problem. Since 2015, riders have continued packing onto peak 
trains but abandoning off-peak trips in droves. This trend has created the 
worrisome levels of crowding to which many news reports discussed earlier 
have ascribed blame for ridership declines. Meanwhile, both on weekends 
and in off-commute directions, trains are becoming emptier and emptier. 
Indeed, peak-hour and -direction crowding cannot explain why off-peak 
ridership is down. A detailed look at the geography of the system’s declines 
reveals some clues about why these two trends have diverged. 
As more jobs are concentrating in downtown San Francisco, ridership 
into and out of its four BART stations—the system's busiest—has held up far 
better than other trip types. Trips that begin or end in downtown San 
Francisco61 account for a huge share of ridership—66 percent in 2018—
compare to 24 percent that begin or end in downtown Oakland62 and 21 
percent that begin and end elsewhere.63 Figure 4-14 shows just how 
important downtown San Francisco trips have been for BART and how they 
have grown since 2003. Since 2015, ridership has declined most heavily in 
trips outside of downtown San Francisco. All other trip types besides those 
starting or ending in downtown San Francisco account for over half (56 
percent) of system losses. As discussed below, these losses have particularly 
come from trips starting and ending south of downtown San Francisco and 
from trips between the north and south halves of the East Bay. While trips to 
the four Market Street stops have also fallen, all other trip types have dropped 
off even more (See Figure 4-15). 
  
 
61. Defined by BART as Embarcadero, Montgomery Street, Powell Street, and Civic 
Center Stations. 
62. Defined by BART as MacArthur, 19th Street/Oakland, 12th Street/Oakland City 
Center, West Oakland, and Lake Merritt Stations. 
63. Percentages do not add to 100 percent because trips between downtown San 
Francisco and downtown Oakland are double-counted. 
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Figure 4-14: Trips to or from Downtown San Francisco Dominate BART 
Ridership 
 
Figure 4-15: Trips to and/or from Downtown San Francisco Have Lost 
Less Ridership 
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Ridership changes on either side of the San Francisco Bay are even 
more skewed. Transbay trips—those that cross San Francisco Bay—made up 
55 percent of rides in 2018 but accounted for only 14 percent of 2015-2018 
ridership loss. Meanwhile, trips wholly on the east side of the Bay (East Bay) 
and wholly on the San Francisco Peninsula (West Bay64) together represented 
45 percent of 2018 trips but an astonishing 86 percent of BART’s patronage 
decline. 
This spatial skew in patronage has affected BART long before 2015-
2018. Much as BART’s overall ridership gains prior to 2015 propped up the 
whole region’s ridership total, BART’s transbay ridership propped up the 
whole system’s ridership total. From 2012 to 2015, transbay trips accounted 
for all of the growth in system ridership, while East and West Bay trips 
remained almost perfectly flat (See Figure 4-16). In fact, transbay BART trips 
accounted for 43 percent of the whole region’s ridership growth during that 
period, while making up only 15 percent of 2015 patronage.65 Since then, all 
three types saw a drop, but East and West Bay trips have fallen more sharply, 
largely in tandem (See Figure 4-17). In other words, BART has been dependent 
on transbay trips to prop up its systemwide ridership for most of the past 
decade. This presents a significant problem for the agency, as the Transbay 
Tube is operating at capacity and construction of a second tunnel is many 
years away.66 
  
 
64. Credit to my cousin Lara Ginsberg, proud Oaklander, for introducing me to the 
term “West Bay” for the San Francisco Peninsula, despite San Franciscans themselves never 
referring to their side of the Bay in the same manner as the North, South, and East Bay. 
65. Admittedly a rough estimate, as the internal BART data on transbay trips count 
linked trips, while the regional NTD data count unlinked trips. 
66. New Transbay Rail Crossing: Program Overview + Project Contracting Plan, 
Nov. 15, 2018, Bay Area Rapid Transit. 
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Figure 4-16: Geographic Differences in BART Ridership Changes since 
2012 
 
Figure 4-17: Geographic Differences in BART Ridership Changes since 
2015 
 
A similar trend is occurring by day of the week. As with transit use 
nationwide, BART ridership is highest during the traditional work week: 
around 412,000 riders per weekday in 2018, compared to 172,000 per 
Saturday and 124,000 per Sunday. Again, though, the off-peak trip type has 
seen the largest losses. Between 2015 and 2018, weekday ridership only fell 
four percent, compared to a 16 percent drop on Saturdays and a 17 percent 
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drop on Sundays (See Figure 4-18). While jobs are scheduled less and less on 
a traditional nine-to-five work week, the relative stability of BART’s weekday 
ridership points to its continued usefulness as commuter transportation. This 
is especially the case given that, unlike on most transit, BART provides a faster 
travel time than driving for many trips (transbay trips at weekday rush hours, 
primarily).67 
Figure 4-18: Temporal Differences in BART Ridership Changes since 2015 
 
Indeed, at rush hour, ridership remains more resilient than at off-peak 
times. Figure 4-19 plots the number of annual trips taken on weekdays at the 
six busiest hours (7 A.M. to 10 A.M. and 4 P.M. to 7 P.M.) versus at all other 
times (weekends and weekdays outside of rush hour). Since 2012, peak-hour 
patronage has grown faster than off-peak and has increased its share of the 
agency’s overall ridership, cresting 50 percent in 2017. More than half of all 
BART trips, in other words, happen within these six weekday hours. Since 
2015, rush-hour ridership has dropped only slightly. Meanwhile, off-peak 
ridership fell over 11 percent, at an increasingly steep rate of descent nearly 
every year. BART has become a primarily rush-hour service. In so doing, BART 
is spending more and more on delivering expensive peak service, potentially 
endangering its financial bottom line. From Fiscal Year 2011 to Fiscal Year 2015, 
BART consistently spent 33¢ per passenger mile in operating costs, but in 
Fiscal Year 2017, the agency spent 37¢ per passenger mile, as high as at the 
 
67. Jana Kasperkevic, “Do People Even Work 9-to-5 Anymore?,” Marketplace, May 
28, 2018; Kim Parker et al., “The State of American Jobs,” Pew Research Center, Oct. 6, 2016; 
and KGO-TV, “Commute Challenge: This Might Be the Fastest Way around the Bay,” ABC 
News, Oct. 24, 2018. 
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middle of the Great Recession. On top of BART’s significant capital 
expenditures for extensions and system rehabilitation, the cost of rush-hour 
peaking is worrisome.68 
Figure 4-19: BART’s Peaking Problem, by Time of Day 
 
4.2.3. Detailed Geographic Analysis 
The effects of increased peaking have played out geographically 
across the BART system by intensifying the passenger load at the busiest 
stations and on the busiest track segments. For instance, among the 48 
stations in the BART network, Table 4-1 lists the top ten stations by number of 
combined entries and exits in 2018. They are, as one might expect, mostly in 
job-rich areas like downtown San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley (See 
Figure 4-20). More than that, though, these busy stations have tended to 
weather the recent ridership declines the best. As shown in the last column 
of Table 4-1, three of these busiest stations are among the ten best-
performing stations by percent change in entries and exits between 2015 and 
2018; five are among the top 15. The busiest stations have gotten busier, or at 
least retained their crowds. On the other hand, three of the busiest stations 
are among the ten worst-performing stations by percent change in entries 
and exits between 2015 and 2018. Nevertheless, two of the three, Downtown 
Berkeley and Balboa Park, are outside of BART’s core areas (downtown San 
Francisco and Oakland). 
 
68. BART Annual Report, Jan. 2019, 21. 
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Table 4-1: Stations with the Most Combined Entries and Exits, 2018 
STATION COMBINED ENTRIES 
AND EXITS, 2018 
PERCENT CHANGE IN COMBINED ENTRIES AND 
EXITS, 2015-2018 
Embarcadero 25,539,142 +1.7% 5th out of 45 
Montgomery 
Street 24,711,292 -0.4% 7
th out of 45 
Powell Street 18,154,191 -13.5% 40th out of 45 
Civic Center 14,018,068 -4.9% 13th out of 45 
12th Street/ 
Oakland City 
Center 
7,845,980 -4.9% 12th out of 45 
16th Street 
Mission 7,637,341 -9.5% 26
th out of 45 
19th Street/ 
Oakland 7,601,917 +1.0% 6
th out of 45 
24th Street 
Mission 7,558,706 -9.9% 29
th out of 45 
Downtown 
Berkeley 7,083,270 -17.2% 43
rd out of 45 
Balboa Park 6,468,168 -14.1% 42nd out of 45 
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Figure 4-20: Stations with the Most Combined Entries and Exits, 2018 
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From the list of best-performing stations by 2015-2018 change in 
entries and exits (See Table 4-2), perhaps the most striking takeaway is that 
only six of the 45 stations open during the whole period gained riders. The 
stations that have gained ridership or dipped only slightly are clustered on 
either side of the Transbay Tube, in inland Contra Costa County, and in the 
Tri-Valley. As discussed below, the Contra Costa and Tri-Valley branches 
have retained riders by percentage, though they carry few riders in absolute 
terms. On the other hand, many of the stations that have lost the most entries 
and exits from 2015 to 2018 (See Table 4-3) lie south of downtown San 
Francisco and near Berkeley. The two stations with the largest percentage 
losses get a pass, though—they used to be their line’s terminus, until the 
Warm Springs/South Fremont and East Contra Costa “eBART” extensions 
opened in March 2017 and May 2018, respectively.69 The bottom performers 
do not necessarily paint a clear picture in which all downtown stations are 
growing and all suburban stations are declining, but they do show that certain 
outlying areas have seen significant drops. 
Table 4-2: Stations with the Largest Gains in Entries and Exits, 2015-2018, 
by Percent Change 
STATION PERCENT CHANGE IN COMBINED ENTRIES AND EXITS, 2015-2018 
Pleasant Hill +4.3% 
West Oakland +3.9% 
Dublin/Pleasanton +3.4% 
San Leandro +1.9% 
Embarcadero +1.7% 
19th Street/Oakland +1.0% 
Montgomery Street -0.4% 
Orinda -1.9% 
West Dublin/Pleasanton -3.0% 
Walnut Creek -4.6% 
 
  
 
69. Roger Rudick, “Pics from the Warm Springs/South Fremont BART Opening 
Celebration,” Streetsblog S.F., Mar. 24, 2017 and BART, “BART to Antioch: East Contra Costa 
BART Extension,” Bay Area Rapid Transit, 2019. 
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Figure 4-21: Stations with the Largest Gains in Entries and Exits, 2015-
2018, by Percent Change 
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Table 4-3: Stations with the Largest Losses in Entries and Exits, 2015-
2018, by Percent Change 
STATION PERCENT CHANGE IN COMBINED ENTRIES AND EXITS, 2015-2018 
Millbrae -11.0% 
Hayward -12.2% 
North Berkeley -12.5% 
Ashby -13.4% 
Powell Street -13.5% 
North Concord/Martinez -13.7% 
Balboa Park -14.1% 
Downtown Berkeley -17.2% 
Pittsburg/Bay Point* -21.7% 
Fremont* -29.3% 
 
* Ridership losses likely due to the opening of extensions beyond these 
previously terminal stops during the comparison period70 
 
  
 
70. Rudick, “Pics from the Warm Springs,” and BART District, “BART to Antioch.” 
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Figure 4-22: Stations with the Largest Losses in Entries and Exits, 2015-
2018, by Percent Change 
 
Analyzing BART ridership by track segment instead of by station 
reveals similar geographic distributions of gains and losses. In this section, I 
look at ridership over a segment of track instead of the number of entries and 
exits at a station. In other words, segment ridership measures how many 
riders traveled over the whole of or part of a given stretch of track, regardless 
of whether they started or ended their trip along it. Though it does not equate 
to crowding per se, segments with higher ridership as I measure it here will 
have more people, on average, on the trains that pass through them. For this 
analysis, I broke the system down into 15 large segments, each covering a 
branch or a trunk of the network, and 49 small segments, each covering the 
track between a pair of adjacent stations. 
Appendix A provides maps of each of the larger segments and graphs 
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of their ridership trends. Figure 4-23 below excerpts the segments with the 
largest relative ridership gains between 2012 and 2018; Figure 4-24 the largest 
losses. In nearly every case, ridership rose between 2012 and 2015 and has 
fallen since. The most variation occurred in 2018, where about half of the 
segments stabilized or slightly grew their ridership, while the other half 
continued on the roughly same downward trajectory as the year or two prior. 
Across the spread of different segments, though, ridership appears again to 
be healthiest into and out of downtown San Francisco, while patronage is 
falling from the airports, among intra-East-Bay trips, and on the Richmond-
Berkeley and southern San Francisco routes. 
Among the best performing segments between 2012 and 2018 by 
percent change (See Figure 4-23) are the two branches immediately east of 
West Oakland in the Oakland Wye (#1 and #4).71 While these segments 
appear small, recall that the measure of ridership in use here includes all trips 
that pass through a stretch of track, and these two segments carry all riders 
between San Francisco and the southern East Bay and between San Francisco 
and the northern East Bay, respectively. The second-highest-ranked segment 
is the Dublin/Pleasanton branch, a surprisingly strong performer, and the 
third-highest is the Transbay Tube and Market Street in downtown San 
Francisco. Three of these four are further evidence of BART’s peaking problem 
and show why crowding and train capacity constraints in the Transbay Tube 
have become such problems for the agency. 
  
 
71. The three-way intersection of BART lines between West Oakland, 12th 
Street/Oakland City Center, and Lake Merritt 
Where and When: Descriptive Findings | 59 
Figure 4-23: BART Track Segments with the Largest Relative Ridership 
Gains, 2012-2018 
#1 #2 #3 
   
 #4 #5  
 
  
 
 
At the other end of the rankings (See Figure 4-24) lie the south of the 
City of San Francisco (#10), the Berkeley-Richmond branch (#11), and the two 
airport connections (#12 and #13). The poor performance of the first may 
indicate some mode shift of people with jobs in San Mateo County and Silicon 
Valley switching from BART (or a BART-Caltrain combination) to company 
shuttles or other means of transportation. The plummeting ridership on the 
two airport connections, meanwhile, indicate further problems for these 
routes that compete with ridehail, taxis, and airport shuttles. In the case of the 
Oakland Airport Connector, falling patronage represents the latest bad news 
for an extension plagued by cost overruns and civil-rights concerns since its 
inception.72 Most tellingly, the segment between 12th Street/Oakland City 
Center and Lake Merritt, the north-south track in the Oakland Wye (#14), had 
the greatest drop in riders between 2012 and 2018. Carrying all riders between 
 
72. Jay Barmann, “BART Says Their Oakland Airport Connector Is Losing Money 
Because Of Uber, Lyft,” SFist, Mar. 8, 2017; Phil Matier, “BART’s Oakland Airport Connector 
Turning into Big Money Loser,” San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 8, 2017, last updated Mar. 9, 
2017; Phil Matier, “BART’s Oakland Airport Connector Isn’t a Big Money Maker Yet,” KPIX 5: 
CBS S.F. Bay Area, Mar. 8, 2017; Phil Matier and Andy Ross, “BART’s Oakland Airport 
Connector Too Costly to Stop,” SFGate, May 11, 2011; Michael Cabanatuan, “Oakland Airport 
Connector Back to BART Board,” SFGate, Jul. 22, 2010; and Michael Rhodes, “Civil Rights 
Complaint Filed Against BART Over OAK Airport Connector,” Streetsblog S.F., Sept. 4, 2009. 
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the north and south East Bay, this segment not only experienced a precipitous 
decline since 2015 but also did not grow, like the other segments, during the 
boom years between 2012 and 2015. The epicenter of BART’s ridership 
problems, then, is intra-East-Bay trips. 
Figure 4-24: BART Track Segments with the Largest Relative Ridership 
Losses, 2012-2018 
#10 #11 #12 
   
 #13 #14  
 
  
 
 
A look at segment ridership between each station reveals more 
nuance. Figure 4-25 maps changes between 2015 and 2018 for each station 
segment. Again, the segments south of downtown San Francisco, north from 
Oakland to Richmond, and to the airports have lost a large share of riders over 
the past three years. The ends of the Pittsburg/Bay Point, Dublin/Pleasanton, 
and Fremont branches have experienced significant growth in relative terms, 
though their absolute growth is small compared to the downtown parts of the 
system. While the Pittsburg/Bay Point and Dublin/Pleasanton stations 
themselves may have lost riders due to extensions opening beyond them (not 
pictured in Figure 4-25), the number of riders passing through them has 
increased for the same reason. Moreover, while many segments in the East 
Bay have experienced growth, the short segment between 12th 
Street/Oakland City Center and Lake Merritt again shows up in the negatives. 
Therefore, while some of the East Bay branches have grown their ridership, 
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these travelers are going to San Francisco instead of other East Bay 
destinations. This somewhat contradictory finding—large parts of the East Bay 
have experienced ridership growth but overall travel within the East Bay is 
falling—shows yet again the difficulties of BART’s peaking problem. 
Figure 4-25 
 
4.3. SFMTA Ridership Trends 
4.3.1. Overview 
If BART represents a clear case of peaking problems across a regional 
network, Muni shows the more uneven decline of an operator in one of the 
most transit-favorable areas in America. For context, the SFMTA, whose 
transit service is called Muni, carries the most riders of any transit agency in 
the Bay Area, bearing 44 percent of trips in 2017 (See Figure 4-4). Confined 
almost exclusively to the compact, 47-square-mile City and County of San 
Francisco, Muni enjoys the benefit of operating in the densest service area of 
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any Bay Area agency—or, in fact, of any agency in the state. San Francisco is 
the second-densest city in America of 100,000 people or more, meaning that 
if transit can succeed anywhere beyond New York, it would be San 
Francisco.73 And indeed, with 256 boardings per capita in 2017, Muni does 
boast impressive ridership and mode share. 
However, Muni has lost riders in recent years all the same. Figure 4-26 
shows change in absolute boardings and boardings per capita on SFMTA, 
from the NTD. Muni’s overall ridership trend is far bumpier than BART’s, with 
relatively substantial changes year to year. Patronage fell in 2015, only to 
recover in 2016 roughly back to where it would have been if its growth had 
proceeded evenly since 2012. Ridership again dropped in 2017, this time by 
6.6 million annual riders, but in light of Muni’s 2016 recovery, the agency may 
be better positioned to recover than other transit agencies. As for ridership 
per capita, the trends are more worrisome. Boardings per capita have never 
recovered from the effects of the Great Recession, staying flat until 2014 and 
then jaggedly falling again. San Francisco’s population has grown quite a bit, 
but Muni ridership has failed to keep pace. 
Figure 4-26: SFMTA Ridership Bumpy and Not Keeping Pace with 
Population Growth 
 
4.3.2. Breakdown by Mode and Frequency 
How do these trends vary temporally and spatially? To answer this, I 
reviewed data provided by Muni staff, breaking down ridership by fiscal year 
 
73. “Population Density for U.S. Cities Statistics.” 
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(July 1-June 30), mode, and route. Unfortunately, SFMTA’s data are not as 
complete as BART’s. Muni riders only need to pay a fare upon entry, so their 
exits are not tracked. Nonetheless, important differences in the data reveal a 
waxing peaking problem on Muni as well, albeit not as stark as on BART. 
One facet of Muni’s peaking issues is that ridership has concentrated 
on certain modes. Beyond bus versus rail, SFMTA operates many different 
modes. Per the NTD, only four agencies nationwide operate more transit 
modes than SFMTA. Muni runs motorbuses, trolleybuses, light rail, historic 
streetcars, (contracted) paratransit, and the only cable car fleet in the country. 
Furthermore, Muni also categorizes bus lines as Rapid, Express, Owl, etc. 
based on their service pattern. To sort through this, Figure 4-27 breaks down 
three core categories of Muni service: light rail (excluding the more tourist-
oriented cable cars and streetcars), local bus (excluding peak-only 
expresses), and Rapid bus (a network of limited-stop lines, some of which 
have features of bus rapid transit, that saw a rebranding and service increase 
in April 2015).74 Since Fiscal Year 2015, weekday ridership on light rail is up six 
percent, and weekday patronage on Rapids has jumped 24 percent. Over the 
same period, local bus trips—over half of the agency’s total boardings—have 
fallen three percent on weekdays. Whether the same passengers are 
changing mode or whether different passengers are riding locals less and rail 
and Rapids more is unclear, though evidence from specific lines below points 
toward the former. Either way, these trends show a slightly different peaking 
problem than BART—a modal peaking problem—that could bring to Muni the 
type of crowding and capacity issues experienced on BART. 
  
 
74. SFMTA, “Muni Forward Brings You More Service, Muni Rapid, New Map,” 
SFMTA, Apr. 3, 2015. 
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Figure 4-27: Local Buses Losing Ridership as Rapid Buses and Light Rail 
Grow 
 
Divergent patterns likewise emerge when ridership is broken down by 
route frequency. On routes with peak weekday headways of 10 minutes or 
less, weekday ridership is up three percent from Fiscal Year 2015, while on 
routes with longer peak weekday headways, ridership is down two percent 
(See Figure 4-28). These changes are relatively small, but their different 
directions nevertheless indicate that busier routes are getting busier and the 
converse. 
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Figure 4-28: Ridership Growth on High-frequency Lines and Losses on 
Low-frequency Lines 
 
4.3.3. Breakdown by Line 
Unlike on VTA, discussed below, Muni’s most patronized routes have 
seen the greatest absolute ridership gains (See Table 4-4). Four of the 
agency’s light rail lines top the list by ridership last fiscal year, and the Geary 
Rapid rounds out the top five—a route that, along with its local counterpart, 
are among “the busiest bus lines west of the Mississippi and carry almost as 
many riders as Caltrain’s entire daily service,” as the San Francisco Examiner 
put it.75 These lines all also rank in the top ten in terms of gains since Fiscal 
Year 2015, roughly when the Bay Area’s regionwide ridership slump began. 
These busy lines are carrying more and more trips, causing crowding and 
necessitating high amounts of service and a number of planned 
improvements to give them priority lanes.76 
  
 
75. Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, “Geary Bus Rapid Transit Gets Environmental ‘Green 
Light to Advance’ From Feds,” San Francisco Examiner, Jun. 21, 2018. 
76. Ibid. 
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Table 4-4: Lines with the Most Boardings, Fiscal Year 2018 
LINE DAILY BOARDINGS, FISCAL YEAR 2018 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN DAILY BOARDINGS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2015-FISCAL YEAR 2018 
N 
(light rail) 48,152 +2,027 8
th out of 76 
K/T 
(light rail) 41,609 +4,493 3
rd out of 76 
L 
(light rail) 32,302 +1,746 9
th out of 76 
M 
(light rail) 29,907 +2,059 7
th out of 76 
38R 
(Rapid bus) 29,484 +4,649 1
st out of 76 
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Figure 4-29: Lines with the Most Boardings, Fiscal Year 2018 
 
Notably, some of Muni’s most ridership-gaining lines are Rapid buses, 
while some of its most ridership-losing lines are the local buses along the 
same corridors. Table 4-5 lists the five corridors with Rapid bus routes77 and 
compares the change in boardings since Fiscal Year 2015 on each. The local 
buses have all lost significant ridership, with three of the five placing in the 
bottom five by absolute change. Meanwhile, the Rapids have all markedly 
grown in patronage, with three placing in the top five by absolute change. The 
38 and 38R on Geary Boulevard exemplify the group, with the former losing 
 
77. The five corridors with Rapid bus routes today, to be specific. The 7R, 
discontinued in August 2017, is not included (SFMTA, “7R Service to Become 7 Local 
Service,” SFMTA, Aug. 14, 2017.). 
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six percent of its riders and ranking 71st and the latter gaining 19 percent and 
ranking first. Among lines that lost riders since Fiscal Year 2015, the five local 
routes in Table 4-5 account for just over a quarter of their total losses, while 
the five Rapid routes account for 39 percent of total gains among lines that 
increased in patronage. While these data do not directly indicate that the 
same individual passengers have switched from locals to Rapids, the weight 
of these statistics makes this scenario very likely. To be sure, Muni has 
suffered outright losses on other lines that are pulling the system’s numbers 
down. But it also is shifting riders onto faster service options, which, despite 
the risk of crowding and expense, represents a positive outcome for the 
agency. 
Table 4-5: Ridership Change on Locals versus Rapids 
LINES 
LOCAL: 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN DAILY 
BOARDINGS, FISCAL YEAR 2015-
FISCAL YEAR 2018 
RAPID: 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN DAILY 
BOARDINGS, FISCAL YEAR 2015-
FISCAL YEAR 2018 
5 / 5R -1,567 72nd out of 76 +1,053 13th out of 76 
9 / 9R -2,740 75th out of 76 +4,575 2nd out of 76 
14 / 14R -1,242 68th out of 76 +2,692 5th out of 76 
28 / 28R -462 54th out of 76 +2,254 6th out of 76 
38 / 38R -1,429 71st out of 76 +4,649 1st out of 76 
 
Looking at the agency overall, the lines that have gained the most riders 
lie along major transit corridors: three Rapid lines, the longest light rail line, 
and a major local, trunk-line bus (See Table 4-6 and Figure 4-30). By percent 
change, the biggest gainers include a few significant north-south routes and 
few local buses in rapidly developing areas like Park Merced (See Table 4-7 
and Figure 4-31). Overall, the lines that already had high ridership have grown. 
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Table 4-6: Lines with the Largest 
Absolute Gains, Fiscal Year 2015-
Fiscal Year 2018 
LINE 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN 
DAILY BOARDINGS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2015-
FISCAL YEAR 2018 
38R 
(Rapid bus) +4,649 
9R 
(Rapid bus) +4,575 
K/T 
(light rail) +4,493 
49 
(local bus) +2,703 
14R 
(Rapid bus) +2,692 
 
Figure 4-30: Lines with the Largest 
Absolute Gains, Fiscal Year 2015-
Fiscal Year 2018 
Table 4-7: Lines with the Largest 
Percentage Gains, Fiscal Year 
2015-Fiscal Year 2018 
LINE 
PERCENT CHANGE IN 
DAILY BOARDINGS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2015-
FISCAL YEAR 2018 
28R 
(Rapid bus) +103% 
57 
(local bus) +89% 
9R 
(Rapid bus) +65% 
14X 
(express bus) +59% 
35 
(local bus) +39% 
 
Figure 4-31: Lines with the Largest 
Percentage Gains, Fiscal Year 
2015-Fiscal Year 2018 
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Meanwhile, the lines that have shed the most riders include a number 
of long local routes (again, some of whose riders may be switching to Rapids) 
and the F historic streetcar (See Table 4-8 and Figure 4-32). The F’s ridership 
decline is more bad news for an already troubled line facing an operator 
shortage due to safety concerns.78 The five lines that have seen the largest 
percentage losses include another set of local buses and two commuter-
focused express services (See Table 4-9 and Figure 4-33). 
  
 
78. Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, “Historic Muni Streetcar Shortage Highlights Driver 
Training Woes,” San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 8, 2016. 
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Table 4-8: Lines with the Largest 
Absolute Losses, Fiscal Year 2015-
Fiscal Year 2018 
LINE 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN 
DAILY BOARDINGS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2015-
FISCAL YEAR 2018 
5 
(local bus) -1,567 
F 
(streetcar) -1,653 
29 
(local bus) -1,695 
9 
(local bus) -2,740 
30 
(local bus) -3,498 
 
Figure 4-32: Lines with the Largest 
Absolute Losses, Fiscal Year 2015-
Fiscal Year 2018 
 
Table 4-9: Lines with the Largest 
Percentage Losses, Fiscal Year 
2015-Fiscal Year 2018 
LINE 
PERCENT CHANGE IN 
DAILY BOARDINGS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2015-
FISCAL YEAR 2018 
18 
(local bus) -21% 
30X 
(express bus) -21% 
9 
(local bus) -22% 
3 
(local bus) -34% 
83X 
(express bus) -37% 
 
Figure 4-33: Lines with the Largest 
Percentage Losses, Fiscal Year 
2015-Fiscal Year 2018 
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4.4. VTA Ridership Trends 
4.4.1. Overview and Data Validation 
Compared to BART and Muni, the Santa Clara Valley Transportation 
Authority operates in a more typical American metropolitan environment. 
Home to the office parks, corporate campuses, and single-family suburbs of 
Silicon Valley, Santa Clara County contains just over 1,500 people per square 
mile, as compared to 2,250 people per square mile in Alameda County and 
around 18,900 people per square mile in San Francisco. To be sure, Santa 
Clara is still quite urban—San José is America’s tenth-most-populous city, 
after all—but the more spread-out urban form in which VTA operates is still 
markedly different from Muni’s San Francisco or AC Transit’s inner East Bay 
cities. Indeed, using the neighborhood typology created by Voulgaris et al., 
one percent of Santa Clara County residents live in the most transit-
supportive neighborhood type, “old urban,” compared to seven percent in 
Alameda County and 36 percent in San Francisco.79 
Likewise, VTA itself is more typical of transit agencies nationwide. In 
1991, VTA opened the first segment of its light rail system, near the start of 
America’s current light-rail building boom, while BART began rail service in 
1972 and Muni in 1912. Buses carried over three quarters of VTA’s unlinked trips 
in 2017, while Guerra and Cervero calculated that VTA’s rail extensions were 
among the least cost-effective, per passenger mile traveled, of the 59 projects 
they analyzed across America.80 Thus, a detailed look at VTA can reveal 
whether unique influences have affected ridership across the whole Bay Area 
or whether the rest of the region’s otherwise nationally typical ridership 
trends are largely hidden by Muni and BART. 
VTA staff have provided data on the agency’s monthly ridership every 
three months, from January 2015 to July 2018, broken down by line, time of 
day, and day of the week. Aside from one month of likely erroneous data—
addressed in Section 3.4.2—I summed up the four months of ridership each 
year, multiplied by three to estimate annual ridership, and compared the 
results to numbers from the National Transit Database to validate them (See 
Figure 4-34). The two datasets appear to track fairly closely, in both absolute 
 
79. Census Bureau, “Annual Estimates”; and “CA Geographic Boundaries,” California 
Open Data Portal, Feb. 2, 2017, last updated Feb. 27, 2019; and Voulgaris et al., “Synergistic 
Neighborhood Relationships.” 
80. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority History, Nov. 7, 2005, Santa Clara 
Valley Transportation Authority, 1; BART Historical Timeline: Achievements Over the Years, 
n.d., Bay Area Rapid Transit; SFMTA, “Muni History,” SFMTA, 2019; and Guerra and Cervero, 
“Cost of a Ride,” 268, 283. 
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values and direction of trends over time. Therefore, VTA’s own data appear 
valid for comparison internally and with other agencies. 
Figure 4-34: VTA Annual Ridership: NTD versus Internal VTA Data 
 
4.4.2. Temporal Breakdown of VTA Ridership 
VTA’s ridership trajectory looks closer to that of the U.S. than that of 
the Bay Area overall. VTA ridership, for instance, flattened in 2015 and fell 
thereafter. This pattern looks similar to American transit’s overall 2014 plateau 
and subsequent drop but different from MTC’s later, sharper 2016 peak and 
ensuing decline (See Figure 4-2). While, like BART and Muni, VTA trips have 
increasingly concentrated in the peak, VTA has generally seen declines across 
the board. Unlike BART in particular, VTA ridership does not exhibit as stark a 
divide between peak and off-peak service, nor are most of its ridership trends 
moving as cleanly up or down. 
Take changes in ridership by day of the week and time of day. Between 
the first month (January 2015) and last month (July 2018), weekday ridership 
has slowly and steadily declined (See Figure 4-35). Meanwhile, Saturday 
ridership has fallen by a larger percentage, and Sunday ridership has—
excluding a spike in the last two months of data—dropped similarly but with 
more variability. Looking past the monthly bumps and troughs, ridership is 
generally falling throughout the week. Ridership also fell somewhat uniformly 
by time of day, until mid-2017 (See Figure 4-36). A significant service 
reallocation that year ended up increasing morning and afternoon ridership 
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and decreasing ridership at other times of day.81 Again, ridership has 
concentrated at peak times, but only after the service change. 
Figure 4-35: Change in Monthly Ridership by Weekday 
 
Figure 4-36: Change in Monthly Ridership by Time of Day 
 
VTA’s peaking problem shows up most clearly when dividing ridership 
into weekday peak versus all other times (See Figure 4-37). Since the service 
 
81. Ling Hoang, “VTA’s Transit Service Redesign Plan Is Approved,” Santa Clara 
Valley Transportation Authority, May 5, 2017 and Gary Richards, “VTA Proposes Biggest 
Transit Overhaul since 2008,” Mercury News (San José, CA), Jan. 6, 2017. 
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changes, peak patronage has recovered to around ten percent above January 
2015 ridership—an increase that any transit agency would be thrilled to have. 
But at the same time, off-peak patronage has continued to drop, down around 
20 percent since January 2015. This decline has dragged VTA’s top-line 
ridership down with it. 
Figure 4-37: VTA’s Peaking Problem 
 
4.4.3. Modal and Geographic Breakdown of VTA Ridership 
As described at the beginning of this section, ridership trends in the 
Bay Area as a whole vary considerably by mode, with bus ridership 
consistently falling and rail ridership growing until recently. However, VTA has 
not seen the same split. As with differences by day of the week, VTA’s 
patronage is down on both of its primary modes. Since January 2015, rail and 
bus ridership have each fallen around ten percent, with significant month-to-
month variability in the former. Removing special service, like extra game-
day shuttles, somewhat smooths out these trends and produces the values in 
Figure 4-38. Ridership on the two modes track nearly perfectly throughout 
the timeframe of the data. Without BART to prop up the region’s rail numbers, 
rail and bus use have declined similarly on an agency like VTA. 
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Figure 4-38: Modal Similarities in VTA Ridership Change 
 
Across bus and rail, VTA ridership is concentrated in a few lines. The 
top five of VTA’s 79 lines in April 2018, listed in Table 4-10, carried 42 percent 
of the agency’s total ridership. Among them are the two main light-rail lines 
and three buses along major east-west corridors (See Figure 4-39). These 
lines, however, suffered some of the largest absolute declines between April 
2015 and April 2018. Indeed, four of the five lines in Table 4-10 rank in the 
bottom five by absolute change over that three-year period. As in Los 
Angeles82 but unlike on BART and SFMTA, VTA’s losses come from its most-
patronized lines. 
  
 
82. Manville, Taylor, and Blumenberg, Falling Transit Ridership. 
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Table 4-10: Lines with the Most Boardings, April 2018 
LINE 
MONTHLY 
BOARDINGS, 
APRIL 2018 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN MONTHLY 
BOARDINGS, APRIL 2015-APRIL 
2018 
901: Alum Rock-Santa Teresa 
(light rail) 408,178 -42,568 71
st out of 72 
22 
(regular bus) 300,053 -88,336 72
nd out of 72 
902: Mountain View-Winchester 
(light rail) 285,021 -17,628 68
th out of 72 
522 
(limited-stop bus) 200,446 +17,766 3
rd out of 72 
23 
(regular bus) 188,990 -31,810 70
th out of 72 
 
  
Where and When: Descriptive Findings | 78 
Figure 4-39: Lines with the Most Boardings, April 2018 
 
Meanwhile, 38 percent of VTA lines are gaining riders. The top five of 
these lines, both by absolute numbers and by percentage, lie west of San José, 
for the most part either long corridors ending at or shorter local routes within 
Silicon Valley (See Tables 4-11 and 4-12 and Figures 4-40 and 4-41). Despite 
the reputation of tech workers as taking private shuttles over public 
transportation, the high, growing number of jobs of all types in Silicon Valley, 
coupled with the lack of new housing nearby, may be fueling a rise in transit 
trips there.83  
 
83. Louis Hansen, “Bay Area Tops U.S. in New Office Space, but Lags in Housing 
Starts,” Mercury News (San José, CA), Oct. 22, 2018. 
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Table 4-11: Lines with the Largest 
Absolute Gains, April 2015-April 
2018 
LINE 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN 
MONTHLY BOARDINGS, 
APRIL 2015-APRIL 
2018 
81 
(regular bus) +27,135 
68 
(regular bus) +17,781 
522 
(ltd.-stop bus) +17,766 
88 
(regular bus) +8,927 
53 
(regular bus) +7,218 
 
Figure 4-40: Lines with the Largest 
Absolute Gains, April 2015-April 
2018 
Table 4-12: Lines with the Largest 
Percentage Gains, April 2015-April 
2018 
LINE 
PERCENT CHANGE IN 
MONTHLY BOARDINGS, 
APRIL 2015-APRIL 
2018 
304 
(ltd.-stop bus) +234% 
88 
(regular bus) +231% 
328 
(ltd.-stop bus) +136% 
81 
(regular bus) +124% 
89 
(regular bus) +92% 
 
Figure 4-41: Lines with the Largest 
Percentage Gains, April 2015-April 
2018 
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The lines with the greatest absolute losses, on the other hand, are 
radial light-rail and bus routes extending out from downtown San José (See 
Table 4-13 and Figure 4-42). As economic and job growth shift, perhaps 
central San José is no longer as much of an attractor of transit riders it once 
was. But these routes still carry the bulk of VTA ridership; as mentioned 
above, these lines mostly overlap with the list of highest-patronage lines (See 
Table 4-10). The lines with the largest percent change, on the other hand, are 
a collection of outlying local lines in smaller cities like Campbell and Gilroy 
(See Table 4-14 and Figure 4-43). These decreases indicate that, despite the 
losses in high-ridership lines, trips are also down on relatively low-ridership, 
low-service lines in built environments that are not especially transit-
supportive. 
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Table 4-13: Lines with the Largest 
Absolute Losses, April 2015-April 
2018 
LINE 
ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN 
MONTHLY BOARDINGS, 
APRIL 2015-APRIL 
2018 
902 
(light rail) -17,628 
26 
(regular bus) -23,093 
23 
(regular bus) -31,810 
901 
(light rail) -42,568 
22 
(regular bus) -88,336 
 
Figure 4-42: Lines with the Largest 
Absolute Losses, April 2015-April 
2018 
 
Table 4-14: Lines with the Largest 
Percentage Losses, April 2015-
April 2018 
LINE 
PERCENT CHANGE IN 
MONTHLY BOARDINGS, 
APRIL 2015-APRIL 
2018 
14 
(cmty. bus) -31% 
120 
(express bus) -33% 
49 
(regular bus) -36% 
48 
(regular bus) -39% 
180 
(express bus) -62% 
 
Figure 4-43: Lines with the Largest 
Percentage Losses, April 2015-
April 2018 
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How and Why: Causal Findings 
5.1. The Determinants of BART Ridership 
Over the whole Bay Area and on three of its largest agencies, troubling 
peaking problems and precipitous off-peak drops have proven harmful to 
top-line ridership. The causes of these trends are thus of great importance if 
the region hopes to recover from its recent transit-use decline. Using the 
multivariate statistical model detailed in Section 3.5, this section estimates the 
effects of a number of possible influences on ridership on BART, Northern 
California’s second-largest operator. In a word, the most powerful 
explanatory factor by far is jobs. 
5.2. Ridership Influences on Weekday Mornings 
Table 5-1 gives a summary of the A.M. weekday regression model for 
2011, the earliest year with full data available for each variable, and Table 5-2 
gives a summary of the same model for 2015, the most recent year with full 
data availability. Each model explains more than 70 percent of the variation 
in ridership. Even with fourteen explanatory factors, the adjusted R2 only 
drops slightly in each case. Among the determinants, twelve have a 
statistically significant effect on ridership with 95 percent confidence or better 
in both models and ten with 99.9 percent confidence or better in both models. 
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Table 5-1: Model Output, 2011, Weekday A.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at destination 0.445 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.299 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.225 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.223 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.161 0.000*** 
BART parking at origin 0.155 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.124 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.099 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.095 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.085 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.053 0.011* 
Household income at 
destination -0.035 0.012* 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.026 0.127 
Lines at origin 0.022 0.300 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.709 adjusted R2 = 0.707 n = 1,877 
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Table 5-2: Model Output, 2015, Weekday A.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at destination 0.445 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.227 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.232 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.232 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.177 0.000*** 
BART parking at origin 0.155 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.114 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.112 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.106 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.071 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.051 0.009** 
Household income at 
destination -0.035 0.008** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.003 0.867 
Lines at origin 0.003 0.898 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.719 adjusted R2 = 0.717 n = 1,965 
 
As these tables show, the number of jobs near the destination station 
far outweigh any of the other explanatory variables. Tables 5-1 and 5-2 are 
ordered by the standardized coefficient, a relative measure of the strength of 
the effect of each input. With only a few possible BART lines, an additional 
single line obviously adds more ridership than an additional single job, but the 
standardized coefficient corrects for that. By this measure, in each year, jobs 
at the destination had around a 1.5 times greater effect or more on ridership 
than the next-most important factor. Employment at the A.M. destination 
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dominates the model. With only job numbers by station and no other factors, 
an analyst could predict morning BART ridership at a relatively high accuracy. 
Moreover, the influence of jobs on BART patronage has grown during 
the years studied. While standardized coefficients for a given input cannot be 
directly compared across models, the ratio between two standardized 
coefficients in 2011 can be compared with the same ratio in 2015. In 2011, jobs 
at the destination had a 1.49 times greater effect on ridership than the next-
most predictive factor, travel time. By 2015, this ratio had grown: that year, 
jobs at the destination had a 1.61 times greater effect on ridership than the 
next-most important factor, whether the trip involves a transfer. This suggests 
that, increasingly, BART is a commuter-dominated system. This dependence 
on trips to work explains the sharp peaking trends detailed in Section 4.2. 
A few other factors stand out, though none so tall. In 2011, BART travel 
time placed second in its influence on ridership and whether the trip required 
a transfer ranked fourth; these inputs swapped spots in 2015. In either case, a 
long trip or a trip that involves changing trains depresses ridership, as 
research literature would suggest. Interestingly, though, the ratio of driving 
travel time to BART travel time was not a statistically significant influence on 
ridership (BART travel time, whether the trip involved a transfer, and the 
drive-time-to-BART-time ratio were not highly colinear, so I felt comfortable 
including them all in the model; including only BART travel time without the 
latter two did not substantively change the results.). 
Placing third both years was population density at the destination 
station. I did not expect it to be so influential on ridership, especially given 
that it placed much higher than population at the origin. However, on a 
commuter system like BART, population within a half-mile of the origin does 
not capture the wide catchment area for park-and-ride commuters. 
Population at the destination, meanwhile, likely less reflects the influence of 
people returning home in the A.M. and more serves as a proxy for a built 
environment that facilitates last-mile connections to destinations. For 
instance, if the area around a destination station has a dense population, it is 
also likely to be walkable, to have connecting local bus services (difficult to 
capture otherwise due to the need to obtain data from each connecting 
agency), etc.  
Notably, the number of lines at the destination—effectively a measure 
of headways/service frequency—is low on the list of influential factors, and 
the number of lines at the origin is not statistically significant at all. While 
Jarrett Walker is generally right that “frequency is freedom,” on a commuter 
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system like BART, many workers may be willing to make trips regardless of 
how long they have to wait for train.84 After all, as detailed in Section 2.3.3.1, 
peak-period ridership is generally less elastic than off-peak, and increasingly 
more of BART’s ridership is at peak times.85 And unlike some other trip types, 
the fixity of many work start times and BART’s relatively strict schedule allows 
riders to plan their arrival times at the origin station to minimize wait. 
Important to keep in mind, though, is that this statistical model does not 
correct for the endogeneity between service supply and ridership, as 
described in Section 3.5.2. In other words, the relatively low influence of 
service supply on BART ridership demonstrated by the models above actually 
represents a best-case scenario for the factor’s effect. In fairness, the number 
of lines serving each station varies only from one to four each; this small 
variance does dampen its effect in the model. Nevertheless, this reflects the 
realities of BART’s system, on which headways are consistent and relatively 
similar on the corridors with the large majority of riders. 
All other inputs have roughly the expected effects on ridership, in the 
expected directions. 
5.2. Ridership Influences on Weekday Afternoons 
and Evenings 
The same factors influence weekday BART ridership after noon as well. 
Tables 5-3 and 5-4 summarize the results of the model for P.M. weekday 
ridership in 2011 and 2015, respectively. Again, the models overall are quite 
predictive, explaining an even greater part of the variation in ridership than 
the A.M. models. 
  
 
84. Jarrett Walker, Human Transit: How Clearer Thinking about Public Transit Can 
Enrich Our Communities and Our Lives (Washington: Island, 2012), 85. 
85. Litman, “Transit Price Elasticities.” 
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Table 5-3: Model Output, 2011, Weekday P.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at origin 0.407 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.315 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.252 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.226 0.000*** 
Jobs at destination 0.224 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.215 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.151 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.137 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.136 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.120 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.080 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.065 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.033 0.090 
Lines at destination 0.013 0.535 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.734 adjusted R2 = 0.732 n = 1,862 
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Table 5-4: Model Output, 2015, Weekday P.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at origin 0.399 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.270 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.260 0.000*** 
Jobs at destination 0.244 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.236 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.201 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.160 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.158 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.120 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.105 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.077 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.069 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.040 0.029* 
Lines at destination 0.030 0.122 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.746 adjusted R2 = 0.744 n = 1,965 
 
Again, station-area jobs predominate. The location and number of jobs 
at the origin (as opposed to at the destination in the A.M. models) is the most 
influential factor on BART ridership both years. After noon, BART riders appear 
to primarily use the system to return from work. Since the P.M. includes 
afternoon pre-peak and evening post-peak periods, in which many non-work 
trips occur, the effect of jobs is less than in the A.M. Still, in both years, jobs at 
the origin are more than 1.25 times more predictive than the next-most 
influential factor. 
How and Why: Causal Findings | 89 
Like in the morning, the influence of jobs at the origin is growing over 
time. In 2011, jobs at the origin were 1.29 times more influential than the next-
most predictive factor, travel time, while in 2015, jobs at the origin were 1.48 
times more influential than the next factor, whether the trip requires a 
transfer. In both the morning and evening, jobs increasingly drive BART usage. 
Unlike the A.M. model, jobs at both ends of the trip are highly 
predictive. In the P.M., jobs at the destination ranked fifth-most influential in 
2011 and fourth in 2015. This factor may represent evening-shift commutes, 
but also the effects of running errands, social trips, etc. In the latter case, the 
traveler may not be taking BART to their own job, but they are traveling to job 
centers nonetheless. 
Otherwise, the P.M. models look fairly similar to the A.M. models. The 
few differences include: in the P.M., the drive-time-to-BART-time ratio is 
significant, but less influential than most of the other factors. The number of 
lines at each end of the trip is even less influential in the P.M. model than the 
A.M.; in 2011, neither lines at the origin nor lines at the destination reached a 
95 percent threshold of significance. All told, though, the top-line story is the 
same: jobs, jobs, jobs. 
5.3. 2018 Weekday Ridership Influences 
How have the determinants of BART ridership changed since 2015, as 
patronage has dropped? To explore this, I ran the same model for 2018 
weekday A.M. and P.M. BART ridership. This model, though, is a decidedly 
rougher estimation than the previous ones, due to data availability issues. 
LODES jobs numbers—the most influential determinant of BART ridership in 
the prior models—have only been released up to 2015, and ACS population 
estimates have only been published up to the five-year span centered on 
2015. To account for growth since then, for each factor with unavailable 2018 
data, I constructed a linear best-fit line for each station based on data points 
from 2011 through 2015. I thereby projected three further years of data, to 
2018. This method is admittedly imperfect. For instance, jobs in parts of San 
Francisco appear to be increasing faster than linearly. Nonetheless, the output 
remains essentially the same if 2015 jobs and population data are used to 
explain 2018 ridership instead of the 2018 jobs and population estimates 
created via the method above. 
Tables 5-5 and 5-6 show the A.M. and P.M. results, with inputs again 
ordered from most to least predictive of ridership. The models explain a 
similar share of the variation in ridership as the 2011 and 2015 models, over 70 
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percent. Indeed, the 2018 outputs generally look similar to the 2011 and 2015 
results and provide the same key takeaway: jobs still predict BART ridership 
the most. In the morning, jobs at the destination top the list of influential 
factors. In the evening, jobs at the origin do so, with jobs at the destination 
ranked fifth as well. In the A.M., jobs at the destination were 1.50 times more 
influential than the next most predictive factor, while in the P.M., jobs at the 
origin were 1.44 times more influential. These ratios are less than in 2015, but 
since the input job numbers are somewhat rough estimates, I am not ready to 
say for sure that jobs have decreased in their effect on ridership. Regardless, 
the model does show that jobs continue to drive ridership, even as transit use 
falls and employment continues to grow and concentrate. 
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Table 5-5: Model Output, 2018, Weekday A.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at destination 0.429 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.284 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.219 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.209 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.169 0.000*** 
BART parking at origin 0.146 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.117 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.096 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.088 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.069 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.055 0.005** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio 0.043 0.008** 
Household income at 
destination -0.040 0.002** 
Lines at origin 0.006 0.757 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.713 adjusted R2 = 0.711 n = 2,053 
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Table 5-6: Model Output, 2018, Weekday P.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at origin 0.404 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.281 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.237 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.230 0.000*** 
Jobs at destination 0.223 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.166 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.148 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.108 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.093 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.085 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.080 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.078 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.050 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.004 0.851 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.733 adjusted R2 = 0.731 n = 2,038 
 
5.4. Model Variants 
5.4.1. Elasticities 
The models above do not easily convey a key measure of the 
influences on BART ridership: elasticity. The elasticity of ridership with respect 
to a given input answers the question: what percentage does ridership change 
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when the input increases one percent, all else equal? To calculate the 
elasticity of ridership with respect to the various inputs above, I ran a “log-log 
model,” in which I took a natural logarithm of both BART ridership and all the 
input factors86 and then ran the regression. The results are presented in 
Appendix B. 
Overall, the log-log models explain less of the variation in ridership 
than the log-linear models above, albeit slightly, nor do they have a stronger 
theoretical basis for their use in this situation. That said, the model outputs are 
generally similar: jobs again rank most influential on ridership, as measured 
by the standardized coefficient. Other factors do have higher elasticities, but 
that is because each input is measured in different units. For instance, a 50% 
increase in the number of jobs near a station is hard to compare directly 
against a 50% increase in the number of lines serving a station, given the 
widely different ranges of these two inputs (See Tables 3-2 and 3-3) The most 
significant difference from the models above is that the number of lines ranks 
higher, placing third or fourth. All in all, the tables in Appendix B both confirm 
the prior findings and provide rule-of-thumb elasticities to communicate how 
changes in different inputs change BART ridership. 
5.4.2. Excluding Downtown San Francisco 
As described above, much of BART’s ridership comes from transbay 
trips to and from the four downtown San Francisco stations on Market Street. 
The outsized influence of these four outliers may obscure trends in the rest of 
the system, where most of the ridership loss is occurring. To help examine 
this, I re-ran all the above regressions, excluding all trips that end at the four 
downtown San Francisco stations in the A.M. and all trips that begin there in 
the P.M. The results of these models are presented in Appendix C. As 
expected, the influence of jobs falls, no longer taking the top spot in most of 
the models. However, even without downtown San Francisco’s huge job 
cluster, employment still is the second- or third-most predictive factor on 
ridership in most of the models. Travel time and whether the trip requires a 
transfer have more influence than in the full model, with the former’s effect 
decreasing slightly over time and the latter’s rising. Surveying this set of 
outputs, I see no clear “culprit” emerge to explain the decrease in ridership 
outside of downtown San Francisco. BART travel times have not changed 
much over the period analyzed, and almost every trip pair that required a 
 
86. Except the dummy variables, which were put into the model as normal. For 
BART-provided parking at the origin and destination, I took the natural logarithm of (the 
number of spaces plus one), since many stations have no BART parking spaces; the 
logarithm of zero is undefined. 
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transfer in 2011 also did in 2015 and 2018. Thus, the ultimate cause of the BART 
ridership drop outside of downtown San Francisco is due to some other factor 
or factors, like ridehail use or residential displacement, that, for lack of clear 
data, the models in this section do not capture. 
5.4.3. Off-peak 
As BART has seen the most severe ridership declines at off-peak hours, 
my final set of models consider only off-peak ridership. That is, I used annual 
BART ridership on weekends and weekdays outside of rush hours (as defined 
in Section 4.2.2) as the dependent variable for these models. The results, as 
well as further methodology, are presented in Appendix D. Each model 
explains a comparable share of the variation in ridership as the prior ones. 
Again, I find no smoking gun. In fact, jobs concentrations continue to 
top the lists of most influential factors. In all three years considered, jobs at 
the destination ranked most influential. Since both A.M. and P.M. ridership are 
included in these off-peak models, jobs at the origin also placed highly. It 
ranked third-most influential in 2011, rising to second-most in 2015 and 2018. 
Thus, even excluding the most commute-heavy times of day, jobs explain the 
largest share—and a growing share—of variation in BART ridership. Again, the 
reason for the off-peak slump lies beyond what these regressions can reveal. 
5.5. Caveats and Robustness 
5.5.1. Robustness Testing 
The models described above were robust to the inclusion and 
exclusion of a number of different variables, listed in Section 3.5.2. I also ran 
models using a half-mile radius for both jobs and population and using a 
quarter-mile radius for both. Like Guerra and Cervero, I found that these 
radius changes made little difference, but that a quarter-mile for jobs and a 
half-mile for population was slightly more predictive than the alternatives.87 
5.5.2. Homelessness, Police, and Cleanliness 
As described in Section 2.2, issues of safety and cleanliness on BART 
have dominated media coverage of the ridership decline. The lack of good 
time-series data on these factors, however, impeded me from including them 
in a model like the one above. Likewise, perceptions of cleanliness and safety 
can vary widely depending on how surveys are structured; people’s stated 
 
87. Guerra and Cervero, “Is a Half-mile?” 
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preferences and feelings on these issues may well differ from their actual 
preferences and feelings. 
Acknowledging those caveats, what modeling I was able to do shows 
no substantiable effects on ridership from these types of factors. Specifically, 
the effect on ridership from the number of homeless people in a station, the 
presence of police in a station, and the perception of cleanliness at a station 
are either not significant or inseparable from other factors’ effects. First, the 
2018 homeless counts in the four downtown San Francisco stations88 were 
too colinear with population density to establish an independent effect; the 
number of origin-destination pairs with full data dropped dramatically as 
well. Moreover, perceived station cleanliness—as measured on a four-point 
scale by a BART rider survey89—was too correlated with population and with 
number of lines to include in a model. Put differently, people experiencing 
homeless tend to be in dense areas, and stations with more people nearby 
and more lines going through tend to be more unclean. These conclusions are 
intuitive, but they prevent the independent effects of each factor from being 
analyzed in a model like the ones above. In general, though, it appears far 
more likely that population density and number of lines are responsible for 
this portion of the variation in ridership than presence of people experiencing 
homelessness or the perception of dirty stations. 
BART also surveyed riders in 2017 and 2018 asking if they had seen a 
police officer in the station.90 Unlike the factors above, the results of this 
survey were not substantially colinear with other inputs and therefore could 
be added into the model. When included, police presence did not have a 
statistically significant effect on ridership. I cannot, though, firmly draw 
conclusions here. In all likelihood, the presence of police both affects and is 
affected by the crime rate in the station, the crime rate in the area, and, 
unfortunately, the demographics of each station’s ridership. Without 
controlling for these other factors—and accounting their endogeneity—the 
ridership effects of police cannot be rigorously established (and hence why I 
left it out of the models above). Still, as a basis for potential future research, 
my analysis at least suggests that police presence does not significantly 
influence ridership. 
5.5.3. Methodological Limitations 
Despite their robustness to adding or swapping inputs, the statistical 
 
88. BART, Station Count Data, 2019. 
89. BART, Station Data Summary, n.d. 
90. Ibid. 
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models above do have some shortcomings. For one, the main models focus 
on weekday ridership, when jobs likely have a greater effect. Weekend 
ridership patterns divide less evenly into A.M. and P.M. directional flows, 
meaning that the effects of people traveling from home versus to home would 
not be as readily separable. The selection of BART itself to model—a system 
that effectively functions as commuter rail on its branches—also slants the 
results towards jobs being important, as compared to a model of, say, Muni. 
Even so, the scale of jobs’ effect is impressive. In the hot Bay Area economy, 
employment affects not just housing, tax revenue, and neighborhood change, 
but also transit use. 
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Light at the End of the Tunnel?: 
Conclusion 
6.1. Analysis 
The story of ridership in the Bay Area has not reached its happy ending, 
at least just yet. Into 2018, regional ridership is continuing to fall, according to 
preliminary data. And while, from the top-line numbers, 2018 would only be 
the second straight year of declines, key indicators like ridership per capita 
and productivity have been on the wane for a longer time. Gains on BART and 
generally high ridership on Muni have long obscured worrying drops among 
other operators across the region. Bus ridership has seen a slow but 
deepening decline for the past decade. Thus, policymakers should remain 
wary if ridership does begin to rise again. If ridership rebounds but 
productivity or ridership per capita stay flat or decline, planners should still 
worry about the longevity of the revival. 
On the Bay Area’s largest agencies, the same warning applies. While 
the details of each operator’s patronage changes vary, they share a common 
trend: peak ridership is either rising or falling only slightly, while off-peak 
ridership is dropping precipitously. On BART, more and more riders have 
packed into weekday, transbay trips into downtown San Francisco, while 
other trip types have shed riders significantly. On SFMTA, the busiest lines 
with the most frequent headways have picked up riders—some from local 
routes along the same corridor—as lower-service lines carry fewer and fewer 
trips. And on VTA, while the most well-traveled lines have lost trips, ridership 
during peak periods and into the heart of Silicon Valley is up as ridership at 
off-hours and in outlying areas is down. Undeniably, each of these 
conclusions comes with nuance and exceptions—especially concerning VTA, 
where losses have been more broad-based and more similar to declines 
observed elsewhere in America. But a common thread runs through each 
agency—a thread not woven into the ridership tapestry of other regions. For 
instance, in Southern California, the largest agencies and the most well-used 
lines through some of the densest parts of the metropolitan area have seen 
the greatest declines. In the Bay Area, the reverse tends to be true.91 
The number and location of jobs help explain why this is the case. As 
my statistical models demonstrate, concentrated station-area employment 
has the most influence, and a growing influence, on ridership on the region’s 
 
91. Manville, Taylor, and Blumenberg, Falling Transit Ridership. 
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largest multi-jurisdiction operator, BART. This confirms not only the 
descriptive trends on BART but those across the region. Jobs have increasingly 
concentrated in employment clusters like downtown San Francisco, to, from, 
and in which transit use has remained strong.92 Ridership depends upon 
commuting now more than ever, as BART and likely other agencies 
increasingly become home-to-work transportation primarily. 
Employment patterns explain the resilience of peak ridership, but the 
causes of the region’s decline—i.e., the causes of the sharp fall in off-peak 
patronage—remain to be determined. Research underway by the UCLA 
Institute of Transportation Studies aims to explore these factors, including 
residential displacement, ridehail growth, etc. Still, knowing that peak 
ridership is not the cause for concern—or, perhaps, a cause for concern due 
to overcrowding—helps to narrow the scope of further research. 
6.2. Policy Implications 
Where should MTC and the Bay Area’s transit operators look to reverse 
the region’s troubling transit trends? In light of these findings, I recommend 
that policymakers focus on new pressures on off-peak transit—the booming 
expansion of ridehail, the spatial dispersion of non-work destinations, etc. 
Given the continued strength of peak transit use, these factors merit more 
scrutiny than peak pressures like employment growth and congestion. 
In fact, transit operators should devise strategies to handle the 
problems that come with an over-reliance on peak ridership. When a transit 
agency carries most of its ridership at weekday rush hours, it must purchase 
and maintain a large fleet that sits mostly empty the rest of the day. It must 
hire, pay, and schedule many vehicle operators for full shifts, even if they are 
only needed at peak. And it must address rider discomfort caused by 
overcrowding. Until ridership evens out temporally and geographically, these 
problems and others like them will plague Bay Area transit agencies. 
It bears specific mention that service supply and headways do not 
appear to have affected ridership greatly. Thus, the addition of new service as 
a response to the ridership slump may not have the full restorative effect 
desired. Since 2014, service in revenue hours and revenue miles has increased 
regionwide and on each of the three profiled agencies. BART has opened 
extensions and kept headways the same, SFMTA has rolled out its Rapid 
Network, and VTA has reallocated service to peak times of day. The latter two 
of these have improved ridership on peak lines and times, but overall, despite 
 
92. Hannah King, “Employment Clusters Update,” Mar. 7, 2019. 
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the service increases, ridership remains stubbornly down. Likewise, the BART 
regression models show that service supply explains ridership weakly at best 
and not nearly as much as jobs, even under a favorable model design (To be 
sure, the number of BART lines at each station only varies from one to four, 
which may dampen its influence.). This finding does not necessarily mean that 
service boosts have been or will be in vain but rather that other forces are 
overwhelming their effects. This suggests that another round of service 
reallocation will not be enough to fix the problem. 
When it comes to reviving off-peak transit use, my findings present a 
difficult dilemma for planners. On the one hand, policies targeted at increasing 
non-commute, reverse direction, evening, and weekend trips are of great 
importance for addressing the most significant declining trip types. On the 
other, the most significant factors that influence transit use tend to be beyond 
agencies’ control. Transit operators cannot make short-term change to the 
location of jobs. None of the policy levers at agencies’ disposal, at least today, 
will have much effect on off-peak factors either. MTC and Bay Area cities 
could potentially have some influence on ridehail use, for instance, but trends 
like the replacement of errands with online shopping are too broad to be 
affected much by local policy. Policymakers must therefore make the difficult 
decision of whether to channel resources towards the most crowded trip 
types, to alleviate crowding and double down on their strongest market, or 
towards slumping trips types, to shore up the weakest parts of the transit 
network despite their limited control over them. 
On both horns of this dilemma lie solutions with at least some potential 
to improve ridership. If MTC and transit operators decide to deepen their 
investment in—and reliance on—the most well-ridden trip types, they could 
pursue a number of peak-focused strategies. In the short term, agencies could 
lengthen trains at rush hour, add more service in commute directions, create 
more transit-only lanes (and eventually construct a second Transbay Tube), 
implement congestion pricing, etc. Such strategies may help retain or grow 
peak-hour and peak-direction ridership, although they may do as much or 
more to improve trip satisfaction and speed for existing riders. If instead MTC 
and operators focus on restoring off-peak ridership, they should consider 
increasing midday, evening, and weekend headways; adding more service in 
counter-commute directions, restructuring route networks; and regulating or 
working with ridehail companies to make them better complements to transit. 
Of course, these latter set of strategies especially are easier said than done, 
and their individual effects may be small or slow to develop. Still, over-
dependence on peak trips is operationally and financially dangerous for 
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transit agencies, so a suite of off-peak investments may be worth pursuing. 
More research is needed on the effectiveness of off-peak-focused 
interventions in a region with high use of ridehail, worrying amounts of 
displacement, and other unique and modern factors; perhaps different 
agencies could test different strategies and compare results. 
While peak-focused and off-peak focused strategies are not mutually 
exclusive, policymakers should recognize that they may still be at odds, in a 
world of limited resources. Moreover, agencies should shape every strategy, 
as best they can, around the most influential factors on ridership, like job and 
population density. Service increases, for instance, will do little good if they 
do not serve major job or activity centers. Finally, MTC should consider 
supporting or incentivizing the above strategies with the capital and operating 
funds it disperses. 
Long-term, policies that move and/or enable jobs and housing 
concentrations in the region will significantly affect transit ridership. Plan Bay 
Area 2040, MTC and the Association of Bay Area Governments’ long-range 
Sustainable Communities Strategy, calls for significant employment and 
housing growth near transit. The plan anticipates that over two-thirds of new 
housing and jobs will occur in Priority Development Areas around high-
quality transit stops. While such a strategy serves a number of important 
policy goals, I urge some caution with respect to its effect on transit ridership. 
For one, adding housing around outlying BART stations or other far-flung 
transit nodes may actually reduce ridership. For example, someone living and 
working in Oakland will make many trips by foot or transit, since so many 
destinations are close, even if they drive to work. If that person moves to a 
transit-oriented development (TOD) on an outlying BART branch, they may 
start taking transit to work, but most of their other trips will have to be by car 
to reach stores, schools, etc. Even in a dense area, a TOD may also reduce 
ridership if it does not have strong affordability protections or requirements. 
As modeled by William Dominie, people who move into new TODs may use 
transit more than they used to, but at the same time, low-income, transit-
dependent residents are often displaced from the area—resulting in a net 
ridership loss.93 
 
93. MTC and ABAG, Plan Bay Area 2040: Regional Transportation Plan and 
Sustainable Communities Strategy for the San Francisco Bay Area, 2017–2040, Jul. 26, 
2017; MTC, “Priority Development Areas.” Metropolitan Transportation Commission, 2019; 
William Dominie, “Is Just Growth Smarter Growth? The Effects of Gentrification on Transit 
Ridership and Driving in Los Angeles’ Transit Station Area Neighborhoods,” APRP, UCLA, Los 
Angeles, 2012; and Miriam Zuk et al., “Gentrification, Displacement and the Role of Public 
Investment: A Literature Review” Working Paper 2015-05, Community Development 
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A long-range plan to build transit ridership should not only put housing 
near transit but also jobs near transit. Better yet, MTC should aim to locate 
housing near jobs, and transit ridership growth will follow. With such land-
use planning strategies and with well-designed affordability and anti-
displacement policies, employment and housing may restore off-peak transit 
use and retain peak transit riders across the region.  
 
Investment Center, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, Aug. 2015), 
68. 
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Appendix A: BART Segment Ridership 
Table A-1: BART Track Segments (Ordered by Change in the Number of 
Trips that Begin in, End in, and/or Pass through the Segment, 2012-2018) 
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Appendix B: Elasticities of BART 
Ridership 
Log-Log Model Outputs of BART Ridership 
Table B-1: Model Output, 2011, Weekday A.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT ELASTICITY SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at 
destination 0.437 0.380 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.269 N/A94 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.247 -0.735 0.000*** 
Lines at 
destination 0.214 0.633 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.134 N/A
94 0.000*** 
Origin at a 
terminus 0.122 N/A
94 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-
BART-time ratio 0.086 0.345 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.084 0.073 0.000*** 
Population at 
origin 0.078 0.150 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination -0.064 -0.122 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
origin 0.050 0.025 0.000*** 
Household 
income at origin -0.047 -0.169 0.000*** 
Household 
income at 
destination 
-0.003 -0.011 0.846 
 
(continued on next page) 
  
 
94. Dummy variables were not transformed into logarithms, so elasticity cannot be 
established through this method, but these variables were still included in the model. 
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(continued from previous page) 
 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT ELASTICITY SIGNIFICANCE 
Lines at origin 0.001 0.002 0.975 
(Constant) N/A N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.676 adjusted R2 = 0.673 n = 1,877 
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Table B-2: Model Output, 2011, Weekday P.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT ELASTICITY SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at origin 0.410 0.343 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.276 -0.791 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.270 N/A95 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.199 0.568 0.000*** 
Jobs at 
destination 0.157 0.131 0.000*** 
Origin at a 
terminus 0.143 N/A
95 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.128 N/A
95 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.069 0.129 0.000*** 
Household 
income at 
destination 
-0.043 -0.150 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-
BART-time ratio -0.040 -0.165 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination -0.019 -0.009 0.311 
Household 
income at origin -0.012 -0.040 0.455 
Lines at 
destination 0.006 0.016 0.800 
Population at 
origin -0.005 -0.009 0.817 
(Constant) N/A N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.684 adjusted R2 = 0.681 n = 1,862 
 
  
 
95. Dummy variables were not transformed into logarithms, so elasticity cannot be 
established through this method, but these variables were still included in the model. 
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Table B-3: Model Output, 2015, Weekday A.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT ELASTICITY SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at 
destination 0.495 0.428 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.303 N/A96 0.000*** 
Lines at 
destination 0.231 0.678 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.200 -0.611 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.184 N/A
96 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.130 0.113 0.000*** 
Origin at a 
terminus 0.118 N/A
96 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination -0.108 -0.150 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-
BART-time ratio 0.098 0.397 0.000*** 
Population at 
origin 0.092 0.128 0.000*** 
Household 
income at origin -0.074 -0.284 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
origin 0.067 0.033 0.000*** 
Lines at origin -0.023 -0.067 0.254 
Household 
income at 
destination 
0.022 0.082 0.106 
(Constant) N/A N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.718 adjusted R2 = 0.716 n = 1,965 
 
  
 
96. Dummy variables were not transformed into logarithms, so elasticity cannot be 
established through this method, but these variables were still included in the model. 
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Table B-4: Model Output, 2015, Weekday P.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT ELASTICITY SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at origin 0.475 0.398 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.301 N/A97 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.233 0.664 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.227 -0.673 0.000*** 
Jobs at 
destination 0.210 0.176 0.000*** 
Origin at a 
terminus 0.186 N/A
97 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.132 N/A
97 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.096 0.129 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-
BART-time ratio -0.076 -0.299 0.000*** 
Population at 
origin -0.066 -0.089 0.000*** 
Household 
income at 
destination 
-0.061 -0.225 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination -0.017 -0.008 0.293 
Lines at 
destination 0.005 0.015 0.792 
Household 
income at origin -0.004 -0.013 0.782 
(Constant) N/A N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.737 adjusted R2 = 0.735 n = 1,965 
 
  
 
97. Dummy variables were not transformed into logarithms, so elasticity cannot be 
established through this method, but these variables were still included in the model.  
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Table B-5: Model Output, 2018, Weekday A.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT ELASTICITY SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at 
destination 0.472 0.364 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.308 N/A98 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.270 N/A
98 0.000*** 
Lines at 
destination 0.218 0.659 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.194 -0.610 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.156 0.121 0.000*** 
Origin at a 
terminus 0.145 N/A
98 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-
BART-time ratio 0.134 0.567 0.000*** 
Population at 
origin 0.093 0.126 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
origin 0.089 0.046 0.000*** 
Household 
income at origin -0.074 -0.271 0.000*** 
Lines at origin -0.014 -0.043 0.472 
Household 
income at 
destination 
-0.013 -0.048 0.321 
Population at 
destination -0.002 -0.003 0.903 
(Constant) N/A N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.721 adjusted R2 = 0.719 n = 2,053 
 
  
 
98. Dummy variables were not transformed into logarithms, so elasticity cannot be 
established through this method, but these variables were still included in the model. 
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Table B-6: Model Output, 2018, Weekday P.M. 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT ELASTICITY SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at origin 0.472 0.347 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.310 N/A99 0.000*** 
Origin at a 
terminus 0.282 N/A
99 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.249 0.719 0.000*** 
Jobs at 
destination 0.234 0.173 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.221 -0.663 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.153 N/A
99 0.000*** 
Household 
income at 
destination 
-0.085 -0.298 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.081 0.105 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.030 0.015 0.066 
Household 
income at origin -0.017 -0.060 0.174 
Drive-time-to-
BART-time ratio 0.015 0.066 0.256 
Population at 
origin 0.013 0.017 0.423 
Lines at 
destination -0.009 -0.026 0.637 
(Constant) N/A N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.741 adjusted R2 = 0.739 n = 2,038 
  
 
99. Dummy variables were not transformed into logarithms, so elasticity cannot be 
established through this method, but these variables were still included in the model.  
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Appendix C: BART Model Excluding 
Downtown San Francisco 
Table C-1: Model Output, 2011, Weekday A.M., Excluding Destinations in 
Downtown San Francisco 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
BART travel time -0.363 0.000*** 
Jobs at destination 0.337 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.249 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.221 0.000*** 
BART parking at origin 0.179 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.168 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.136 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.135 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.130 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.126 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.099 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination 0.032 0.058 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.025 0.148 
Lines at origin 0.017 0.501 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.642 adjusted R2 = 0.639 n = 1,705 
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Table C-2: Model Output, 2011, Weekday P.M., Excluding Origins in 
Downtown San Francisco 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
BART travel time -0.380 0.000*** 
Jobs at destination 0.301 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.277 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.276 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.245 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.198 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.183 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.158 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.152 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.130 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.103 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.101 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.020 0.222 
Lines at destination 0.015 0.519 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.680 adjusted R2 = 0.677 n = 1,690 
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Table C-3: Model Output, 2015, Weekday A.M., Excluding Destinations in 
Downtown San Francisco 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at destination 0.314 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.311 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.289 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.248 0.000*** 
BART parking at origin 0.181 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.173 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.153 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.142 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.142 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.111 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.094 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination 0.014 0.409 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio 0.009 0.595 
Lines at origin -0.004 0.854 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.636 adjusted R2 = 0.633 n = 1,789 
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Table C-4: Model Output, 2015, Weekday P.M., Excluding Origins in 
Downtown San Francisco 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at destination 0.330 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.317 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.293 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.268 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.259 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.217 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.215 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.147 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.137 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.134 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.097 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.090 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.040 0.072 
Household income at 
origin -0.036 0.023* 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.690 adjusted R2 = 0.687 n = 1,789 
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Table C-5: Model Output, 2018, Weekday A.M., Excluding Destinations in 
Downtown San Francisco 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Transfer -0.322 0.000*** 
Jobs at destination 0.302 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.274 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.237 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.178 0.000*** 
BART parking at origin 0.168 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.156 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.129 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.116 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.092 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.089 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio 0.060 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.012 0.474 
Lines at origin 0.000 0.986 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.624 adjusted R2 = 0.622 n = 1,873 
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Table C-6: Model Output, 2018, Weekday P.M., Excluding Origins in 
Downtown San Francisco 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Transfer -0.310 0.000*** 
Jobs at destination 0.305 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.292 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.254 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.223 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.194 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.179 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.125 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.117 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.117 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.113 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.113 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.029 0.063 
Lines at destination 0.005 0.813 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.664 adjusted R2 = 0.662 n = 1,858 
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Appendix D: Model of Off-peak BART 
Ridership 
D.1. Methodology 
Unlike the others, these off-peak models lump together weekday A.M., 
weekday P.M., and weekend trips. Doing so provides a greater model size and 
allows me to draw conclusions across all off-peak times. However, some 
input variables differ between weekends and weekdays, so I had to make a 
few approximations. Since a significant majority of off-peak ridership occurs 
on weekdays—even without rush-hours, five weekdays of ridership outweigh 
two weekend days of ridership—I used weekday service patterns for the 
“transfer” and “number of lines” inputs. For the “BART travel time” and “drive-
time-to-BART-time ratio” inputs, I lacked weekend data altogether. I 
therefore used an average of early morning, midday, and evening weekday 
travel times, all of which are quite similar and all of which likely nearly match 
weekend travel times. 
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D.2. Model Outputs 
Table D-1: Model Output, 2011, Off-peak 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at destination 0.352 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.329 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.303 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.282 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.234 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.219 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.185 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.148 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.145 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.078 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.067 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.049 0.000*** 
BART parking at origin 0.039 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.024 0.107 
Lines at origin 0.012 0.568 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.713 adjusted R2 = 0.711 n = 1,713 
 
  
Appendix D: Model of Off-peak BART Ridership | 122 
Table D-2: Model Output, 2015, Off-peak 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at destination 0.354 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.316 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.277 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.273 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.253 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.211 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.162 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.153 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.145 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.079 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.063 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.053 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.032 0.000*** 
BART parking at origin 0.020 0.218 
Lines at origin 0.017 0.394 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.733 adjusted R2 = 0.730 n = 1,795 
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Table D-3: Model Output, 2018, Off-peak 
FACTOR STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Jobs at destination 0.349 0.000*** 
Jobs at origin 0.322 0.000*** 
Transfer -0.292 0.000*** 
BART travel time -0.241 0.000*** 
Population at 
destination 0.209 0.000*** 
Population at origin 0.185 0.000*** 
Origin at a terminus 0.152 0.000*** 
Destination at a 
terminus 0.136 0.000*** 
Drive-time-to-BART-
time ratio -0.117 0.000*** 
Household income at 
origin -0.085 0.000*** 
Lines at destination 0.058 0.000*** 
BART parking at 
destination 0.049 0.000*** 
Household income at 
destination -0.049 0.000*** 
Lines at origin 0.034 0.080 
BART parking at origin 0.012 0.449 
(Constant) N/A 0.000*** 
 
* significant at a 95 percent confidence level 
** significant at a 99 percent confidence level 
*** significant at a 99.9 percent confidence level 
 
COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
ADJUSTED COEFFICIENT OF 
DETERMINATION 
NUMBER OF ORIGIN-
DESTINATION PAIRS 
R2 = 0.732 adjusted R2 = 0.729 n = 1,877 
  
Bibliography | 124 
Bibliography 
Data Sources 
Bay Area Rapid Transit District, San Francisco. “Find Closest Station.” Bay Area Rapid 
Transit. 2018. Internet Archive. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20181203181333/https://www.bart.gov/stations/clos
est. 
———. “Geospatial Data.” Bay Area Rapid Transit. 2019. 
https://www.bart.gov/schedules/developers/geo. 
———. Parking Statistics 2019. 2019. 
———. Station Count Data. 2019. 
———. Station Data Summary. N.d. 
———. “Ridership Reports.” Bay Area Rapid Transit. 2019. 
https://www.bart.gov/about/reports/ridership. 
———. “System Facts.” Bay Area Rapid Transit. 2019. 
https://www.bart.gov/about/history/facts. 
 “CA Geographic Boundaries.” California Open Data Portal. February 2, 2017, Last updated 
February 27, 2019. https://data.ca.gov/dataset/ca-geographic-boundaries. 
“CaliDetail.” University of California, Los Angeles Common Collaboration and Learning 
Environment Shared System. 
Demery, Leroy. U.S. Urban Rail Transit Lines Opened from 1980. March 30, 2004. Last 
updated November 2011. Internet Archive. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20131104023212/http:/www.publictransit.us/ptlibrar
y/NorthAmericaRailTransitOpenings/Railopenings_US_Updated2011.pdf. 
“The National Transit Database (NTD),” Federal Transit Administration, 2017, 
https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd. 
San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency. Annual Ridership FY98-Present. 
———. “GTFS Transit Data.” S[an] F[rancisco] M[unicipal] T[ransportation] A[gency]. June 11, 
2013. https://www.sfmta.com/reports/gtfs-transit-data. 
———. “Muni Simple Routes.” DataSF. April 28, 2019. 
https://data.sfgov.org/Transportation/Muni-Simple-Routes/9exe-acju. 
———. “Muni System Map.” S[an] F[rancisco] M[unicipal] T[ransportation] A[gency]. 
Bibliography | 125 
[August 2017]. https://www.sfmta.com/maps/muni-system-map. 
———. “7R Service to Become 7 Local Service.” S[an] F[rancisco] M[unicipal] 
T[ransportation] A[gency]. August 14, 2017. https://www.sfmta.com/travel-
updates/7r-service-become-7-local-service. 
SF Bay Transit. N.d. https://sfbaytransit.org/. 
Thomas, Trevor. MTA Drive/Transit Time Skims. December 1, 2015. 
Valley Transportation Authority, Santa Clara (VTA). APR15 to JUL18. 
———. “By Type.” Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority. 2019. 
http://www.vta.org/getting-around/schedules/by-type. 
———. “GTFS Information.” Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority. 2019. 
http://www.vta.org/getting-around/GTFS-Info/GTFS-Information. 
———. “Light Rail Service Overview.” Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority. 2019. 
http://www.vta.org/getting-around/light-rail-service-overview. 
Voulgaris, Carole Turley, Brian D. Taylor, Evelyn Blumenberg, Anne Brown, and Kelcie Ralph. 
“Synergistic Neighborhood Relationships with Travel Behavior: An Analysis of 
Travel in 30,000 U.S. Neighborhoods,” Journal of Transport and Land Use 10, no 1. 
(2017): 437-61. University of California, Los Angeles] Institute of Transportation 
Studies. https://www.its.ucla.edu/publication/synergistic-neighborhood-
relationships-with-travel-behavior-an-analysis-of-travel-in-30000-u-s-
neighborhoods/. 
United States Census Bureau. American Community Survey. 2009-17. American FactFinder. 
https://factfinder.census.gov. 
———. “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2017.” March 
2018. American FactFinder. 
https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/PEP/2017/PEPANNRES/0100000
US. 
———. “Cartographic Boundary Shapefiles—Block Groups.” United States Census Bureau. 
April 9, 2018. https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/cbf/cbf_blkgrp.html. 
———. “Cartographic Boundary Shapefiles—Census Tracts.” United States Census Bureau. 
April 9, 2018. https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/cbf/cbf_tracts.html. 
U[nited] S[tates] Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies. “L[ongitudinal] E[mployer]-
H[ousehold] D[ynamics Origin-Destination Employment Statistics].” OnTheMap. 
N.d. https://onthemap.ces.census.gov/. 
U[nited] S[tates] Census Bureau, Population Division. Table 1. Intercensal Estimates of the 
Resident Population for Counties of California: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010. 
Bibliography | 126 
September 2011. https://www2.census.gov/programs-
surveys/popest/tables/2000-2010/intercensal/county/co-est00int-01-06.xls. 
———. Table 1. Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, 
Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010. September 2011. 
United States Census Bureau. https://www2.census.gov/programs-
surveys/popest/tables/2000-2010/intercensal/state/st-est00int-01.xls. 
Secondary Sources 
Alam, Bhuiyan, Hilary Nixon, and Qiong Zhang. Investigating the Determining Factors for 
Transit Travel Demand by Bus Mode in U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas. M[ineta] 
T[ransportation] I[nstitute] Report 12-30, Mineta Transportation Institute, San José, 
California, May 2015. Mineta Transportation Institute. 
http://transweb.sjsu.edu/sites/default/files/1101-transit-bus-demand-factors-in-
US-metro-areas.pdf. 
Arantani, Lori. “Metro’s Multimillion-dollar Mystery: Where Have Our Riders Gone?” 
Washington Post. October 1, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/metros-
multimillion-dollar-mystery-where-have-our-riders-gone/2016/10/01/2949d226-
85b8-11e6-92c2-14b64f3d453f_story.html. 
Babar, Yash and Gordon Burtch. “Examining the Impact of Ridehailing Services on Public 
Transit Use.” September 25, 2017. S[ocial] S[cience] R[esearch] N[etwork]. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042805. 
Barmann, Jay. “BART Says Their Oakland Airport Connector Is Losing Money Because Of 
Uber, Lyft.” SFist. March 8, 2017. 
https://sfist.com/2017/03/08/bart_says_their_oakland_airport_con/. 
———. “Overcrowded BART Trains Likely Causing Drop in Ridership, Ironically.” SFist. 
February 24, 2017. 
http://sfist.com/2017/02/24/overcrowded_bart_trains_likely_caus.php. 
BART Historical Timeline: Achievements Over the Years. N.d. Bay Area Rapid Transit. 
https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/docs/bart-historical-timeline.pdf. 
Bay Area Rapid Transit District, San Francisco. Annual Report. January 2019. Bay Area Rapid 
Transit. 
https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/docs/BART_Annual_%20Report%202018
_web.pdf. 
———. “BART to Antioch: East Contra Costa BART Extension.” Bay Area Rapid Transit. 2019. 
https://www.bart.gov/about/projects/ecc. 
Ben-Akiva, Moshe and Takayuki Morikawa. “Comparing Ridership Attraction of Rail and 
Bus.” Transport Policy 9 (2002): 107-16. ScienceDirect. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967070X02000094. 
Bibliography | 127 
Bliss, Laura. “What’s Behind Declining Transit Ridership Nationwide?: Pick a Culprit: The Rise 
of Ride-hailing Services, Budget Cuts, Cheap Oil, or Bad Service.” CityLab. February 
24, 2017. https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/02/whats-behind-
declining-transit-ridership-nationwide/517701/. 
Blumenberg, Evelyn, Anne Brown, Kelcie Ralph, Brian D. Taylor, and Carole Turley Voulgaris. 
Typecasting Neighborhoods and Travelers: Analyzing the Geography of Travel 
Behavior among Teens and Young Adults in the U.S. September 25, 2015. 
U[niversity of] C[alifornia] L[os] A[ngeles] Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies. 
http://www.lewis.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/10/Geography-of-
Youth-Travel_Final-Report.pdf. 
Boisjoly, Geneviève, Emily Grisé, Meadhbh Maguire, Marie-Pier Veillette, Robbin 
Deboosere, Emma Berrebi, and Ahmed El-Geneidy. “Invest in the Ride: A Fourteen-
year Longitudinal Analysis of the Determinants of Public Transport Ridership in 
Twenty-five North American Cities.” Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice 116 (2018): 434-45. ScienceDirect. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856418300296. 
Brown, Anne Elizabeth. “Ridehail Revolution: Ridehail Travel and Equity in Los Angeles.” PhD 
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2018. ITS: [University of 
California, Los Angeles] Institute of Transportation Studies. 
https://www.its.ucla.edu/2018/06/27/ridehail-revolution-groundbreaking-its-
dissertation-examines-discrimination-and-travel-patterns-for-lyft-uber-and-
taxis/. 
Brown, Jeffrey R. and Gregory L. Thompson. “The Relationship between Transit Ridership 
and Urban [Decentralization]: Insights from Atlanta.” Urban Studies 45, no. 5 and 6 
(May 2008): 1119-39. SAGE Journals. 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0042098008089856. 
Cabanatuan, Michael. “Oakland Airport Connector Back to BART Board.” SFGate. July 22, 
2010. https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Oakland-Airport-Connector-back-
to-BART-board-3257972.php. 
———. “With BART Ridership Down, and Complaints Up, Agency Promises New Cleanup.” 
San Francisco Chronicle. February 10, 2018. 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/With-BART-ridership-down-and-
complaints-up-12585051.php. 
———. “With Ridership Down, Complaints Up, BART to Look at Homeless Problem.” 
SFGATE. May 11, 2017. https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/With-ridership-
down-complaints-up-BART-to-look-11140277.php. 
Castiglione, Joe, Drew Cooper, Bhargava Sana, Dan Tischler, Tilly Chang, Greg[ory] Erhardt, 
Sneha Roy, Mei Chen, and {Richard] Alex[ander] Mucci. TNC’s and Congestion. 
October 2018. San Francisco County Transportation Authority: Plan. Fund. Deliver. 
https://www.sfcta.org/sites/default/files/content/Planning/TNCs/TNCs_Congestio
n_Report_181015_Final.pdf. 
Bibliography | 128 
Cervero, Robert. “Transit Pricing Research: A Review and Synthesis.” Transportation 17 
(1990): 117-39. SpringerLink. 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2FBF02125332.pdf. 
Cervero, Robert, Jin Murakami, and Mark Miller. “Direct Ridership Model of Bus Rapid 
Transit in Los Angeles County, California.” Transportation Research Record 2145 
(2010): 1-7. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, [and] Medicine: TRB: 
Transportation Research Board. 
https://trrjournalonline.trb.org/doi/pdf/10.3141/2145-01. 
Cervero, Robert and Michael Duncan. “Residential Self Selection and Rail Commuting: A 
Nested Logit Analysis.” Working paper, University of California Transportation 
Center, Berkeley, California, June 2008. eScholarship: UC Open Access 
Publications. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1wg020cd. 
Chatman, Daniel G. “Does TOD Need the T?: On the Importance of Factors Other than Rail 
Access.” Journal of the American Planning Association 79, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 17-
31. Taylor and Francis Online. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01944363.2013.791008. 
Chen, Cynthia, Don Varley, and Jason Chen. “What Affects Transit Ridership? A Dynamic 
Analysis Involving Multiple Factors, Lags[,] and Asymmetric [Behavior].” Urban 
Studies 48, no. 9 (July 2011): 1893-1908. SAGE Journals. 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0042098010379280. 
Chu, Xuehao. “Ridership Models at the Stop Level.” N[ational] C[enter for] T[ransit] 
R[esearch]-473-04, BC137-31, National Center for Transit Research, Center for 
Urban Transportation Research, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, 
December 2004. National Center for Transit Research: A Program of the Center for 
Urban Transportation Research at the University of South Florida. 
https://www.nctr.usf.edu/pdf/473-04.pdf. 
Circella, Giovanni, Farzad Alemi, Kate Tiedeman, Susan Handy, and Patricia Mokhtarian. The 
Adoption of Shared Mobility in California and Its Relationship with Other 
Components of Travel Behavior. March 2018. National Center for Sustainable 
Transportation. https://ncst.ucdavis.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NCST-TO-
033.1-Circella_Shared-Mobility_Final-Report_MAR-2018.pdf. 
Clewlow, Regina R. and Gouri Shankar Mishra. Disruptive Transportation: The Adoption, 
Utilization, and Impacts of Ride-Hailing in the United States. University of 
California, Davis-Institute of Transportation Studies-Research Report-17-07, 
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis, Davis, California, 
October 2017. ITS: UC Davis Institute of Transportation Studies. 
https://itspubs.ucdavis.edu/wp-
content/themes/ucdavis/pubs/download_pdf.php?id=2752. 
Colon, Dave. “Who’s to Blame for MTA’s Declining Ridership?” Curbed New York. July 25, 
2018. https://ny.curbed.com/2018/7/25/17613544/nyc-subway-mta-ridership-
decline. 
Bibliography | 129 
Conway, Matthew Wigginton, Deborah Salon, and David A. King. “Trends in Taxi Use and 
the Advent of Ridehailing, 1995-2017: Evidence from the U.S. National Household 
Travel Survey.” Urban Science 2, no. 3 (September 2018): 79 ff. MDPI. 
https://www.mdpi.com/2413-8851/2/3/79. 
Descant, Skip. “Seattle, Houston Buck Declining Bus Ridership Trend: The Two Cities Have 
Improved Bus Service at a Time when Transit Ridership in the United States 
Dropped 2.9 Percent in 2017.” Government Technology: FutureStructure. May 16, 
2018. http://www.govtech.com/fs/transportation/Seattle-Houston-Buck-
Declining-Bus-Ridership-Trend.html. 
Dias, Felipe F., Patrícia S. Lavieri, Venu M. Garikapati, Sebastian Astroza, Ram M. Pendyala, 
and Chandra R. Bhat. “A Behavioral Choice Model of the Use of Car-sharing and 
Ride-sourcing Services.” Transportation 44, no. 6 (November 2017): 1307-23. 
SpringerLink. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11116-017-9797-
8.pdf. 
Diaz, John. “BART Attack Brings Out Racist Responses.” SFGATE. April 29, 2017. 
https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/diaz/article/BART-attack-brings-out-racist-
responses-11108000.php. 
“Discrete Choice Analysis.” Columbia [University] Mailman School of Public Health. N.d. 
https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-
methods/discrete-choice-analysis. 
Dominie, William. “Is Just Growth Smarter Growth? The Effects of Gentrification on Transit 
Ridership and Driving in Los Angeles’ Transit Station Area Neighborhoods.” Applied 
planning research project, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, 2012. 
Driscoll, Richard A., Kurt R. Lehmann, Steven Polzin, and Jodi Godfrey. “The Effect of 
Demographic Changes on Transit Ridership Trends.” Transportation Research 
Record 2018: 1-9. SAGE Journals. 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0361198118777605. 
Eichenholtz, Paul. “BART Security Strategies Clash with Distrustful Ridership.” Golden Gate 
Xpress (San Francisco State University). October 23, 2018. 
https://goldengatexpress.org/2018/10/23/bart-security-strategies-clash-with-
distrustful-ridership/. 
Elkind, Ethan. “L.A. Times Misleads on Metro Rail Ridership History.” Ethan Elkind: Writings 
on the Environment and Politics, and Music. January 27, 2016. 
http://www.ethanelkind.com/l-a-times-misleads-on-metro-rail-ridership-
history/. 
Erhardt, Gregory D. “Fusion of Large Continuously Collected Data Sources: Understanding 
Travel Demand Trends and Measuring Transport Project Impacts.” PhD dissertation, 
University College London, London, 2016. Dropbox. 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/z16unyvcxy4ug78/AADxjVHsqdetibWXtaNmE9TAa
?dl=0&preview=Erhardt+Thesis-Final.pdf. 
Bibliography | 130 
Evans, Robert James. “The Value of Data: Analyzing Transportation Network Company Trips 
for Transit Planning.” PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, 2018. 
The University of Texas at Austin: Texas ScholarWorks: University of Texas 
Libraries. 
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/68999/EVANS-THESIS-
2018.pdf. 
Ewing, Reid and Robert Cervero. “Travel and the Built Environment: A Meta-Analysis.” 
Journal of the American Planning Association 76, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 265-94. 
Taylor and Francis Online. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01944361003766766. 
Farrell, Diana, Fiona Greig, and Amar Hamoudi. The Online Platform Economy in Twenty-
seven Metro Areas: The Experience of Drivers and Lessors. April 2019. JPMorgan 
Chase and Co[mpany]. 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/institute-ope-
cities.pdf. 
Fitzgerald Rodriguez, Joe. “Geary Bus Rapid Transit Gets Environmental ‘Green Light to 
Advance’ From Feds.” San Francisco Examiner. June 21, 2018. 
http://www.sfexaminer.com/geary-bus-rapid-transit-gets-environmental-green-
light-advance-feds/. 
———. “Historic Muni Streetcar Shortage Highlights Driver Training Woes.” San Francisco 
Examiner. September 8, 2016. https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/historic-muni-
streetcar-shortage-highlights-driver-training-woes/. 
Freemark, Yonah. “Route Miles for U.S. and Canada Rail Systems.” The Transport Politic. 
2019. https://www.thetransportpolitic.com/databook/route-miles-for-us-and-
canada-rail-systems/. 
Gehrke, Steven R., Alison Felix, and Timothy Reardon. Fare Choices: A Survey of Ride-
hailing Passengers in Metro Boston. Report #1, MAPC Research Brief, Metropolitan 
Area Planning Council, [Boston, Massachusetts], February 2018. MAPC: 
Metropolitan Area Planning Council. http://www.mapc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Fare-Choices-MAPC.pdf. 
Graehler, Michael, Junior, Richard Alexander Mucci, and Gregory D. Erhardt. “Understanding 
the Recent Transit Ridership Decline in Major US Cities: Service Cuts or Emerging 
Modes?” Paper presented at the Transportation Research Board 98th Annual 
Meeting, Washington, District of Columbia, January 13-7, 2019. Streetsblog USA. 
http://usa.streetsblog.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2019/01/19-04931-Transit-
Trends.pdf. 
Guerra, Erick and Robert Cervero. “Cost of a Ride: The Effects of Densities on Fixed-
guideway Transit Ridership and Costs.” Journal of the American Planning 
Association 77, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 267-90. Taylor and Francis Online. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01944363.2011.589767. 
Bibliography | 131 
———. “Is a Half-mile Circle the Right Standard for TODs?,” ACCESS 42 (Spring 2013): 17-
22. http://www.accessmagazine.org/spring-2013/half-mile-circle-right-standard-
tods/. 
Gutiérrez, Javier, Osvaldo Daniel Cardozo, and Juan Carlos García-Palomares. “Transit 
Ridership Forecasting at Station Level: An Approach Based on Distance-decay 
Weighted Regression.” Journal of Transport Geography 19, no. 6 (November 2011): 
1081-92. ScienceDirect. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0966692311000512. 
Grabar, Henry. “The Astounding Collapse of American Bus Ridership.” Slate. July 21, 2016. 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2016/07/21/buses_in_new_york_and_oth
er_u_s_cities_are_in_crisis.html. 
Hall, Jonathan D., Craig Palsson, and Joseph Price. “Is Uber a Substitute or Complement for 
Public Transit?” Working Paper tecipa-585, University of Toronto, Department of 
Economics, Toronto, Ontario, June 13, 2018. UTORweb: Individual Web Pages at 
the University of Toronto. 
http://individual.utoronto.ca/jhall/documents/Uber_and_Public_Transit.pdf. 
Hampshire, Robert C., Chris Simek, Tayo Fabusuyi, Xuan Di, and Xi Chen. “Measuring the 
Impact of an Unanticipated Disruption of Uber/Lyft in Austin, TX.” Paper presented 
at the Transportation Research Board 97th Annual Meeting, Washington, District of 
Columbia, January 7-11, 2018. S[ocial] S[cience] R[esearch] N[etwork] 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2977969. 
Hansen, Louis. “Bay Area Tops U.S. in New Office Space, but Lags in Housing Starts.” 
Mercury News (San José, CA). October 22, 2018. 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/10/22/bay-area-tops-u-s-in-new-office-
space-but-lags-in-housing-starts/. 
Healy, Michael C. BART: The Dramatic History of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System. 
Berkeley, California: Heyday, 2016. 
Henao, Alejandro. “Impacts of Ridesourcing—Lyft and Uber—on Transportation Including 
VMT, Mode Replacement, Parking, and Travel Behavior.” PhD dissertation, 
University of Colorado, 2017. ProQuest. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1899208739. 
Hoang, Ling. “VTA’s Transit Service Redesign Plan Is Approved.” Santa Clara Valley 
Transportation Authority. May 5, 2017. http://www.vta.org/News-and-
Media/Connect-with-VTA/VTAs-Transit-Service-Redesign-Plan-is-Approved. 
Hobson, Jeremy. “Why Public Transit Ridership Is Down in Most U.S. Cities.” WBUR. March 
21, 2017. http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2017/03/21/public-transit-ridership-
down. 
Hurd, Rick. “Audio Dispatch of Oakland BART Mob: ‘It’s a Group of 50. They Bum-rushed 
the Entire Train.’” Mercury News (San José, California). April 25, 2017. 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/04/25/audio-dispatch-of-oakland-bart-
Bibliography | 132 
mob-its-a-group-of-50-they-bum-rushed-the-entire-train/. 
Kabak, Benjamin. “Where Have All the Transit Riders Gone?” Second Avenue Sagas. May 
20, 2018. http://secondavenuesagas.com/2018/05/20/transit-riders-gone/. 
Kasperkevic, Jana. “Do People Even Work 9-to-5 Anymore?” Marketplace. May 28, 2018. 
https://www.marketplace.org/2018/05/28/business/ive-always-wondered/why-
do-keep-using-9-5. 
King, Hannah. “Employment Clusters Update.” Google Slides. March 7, 2019. 
Kuby, Michael, Anthony Barranda, and Christopher Upchurch. “Factors Influencing Light-rail 
Station Boardings in the United States.” Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice 38, no. 3 (March 2004): 223-47. ScienceDirect. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856403001046. 
KGO-TV. “Commute Challenge: This Might Be the Fastest Way around the Bay.” ABC7 
News. October 24, 2018. https://abc7news.com/traffic/commute-challenge-this-
might-be-the-fastest-way-around-the-bay/4549557/. 
———. “What We Know about Deadly Stabbing at Oakland’s MacArthur BART Station.” 
ABC7 News. July 25, 2018. https://abc7news.com/what-we-know-about-deadly-
oakland-bart-stabbing/3812465/. 
Lane, Bradley W. “A Time-series Analysis of Gasoline Prices and Public Transportation in 
U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” Journal of Transport Geography 22 (2012): 221-35. 
ScienceDirect. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0966692311001578. 
Lavieri, Patrícia S., Felipe F. Dias, Natalia Ruiz Juri, James Kuhr, and Chandra R. Bhat. “A 
Model of Ridesourcing Demand Generation and Distribution.” Transportation 
Research Record 2672, no. 46 (2018): 31-40. SAGE Journals. 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0361198118756628. 
Litman, Todd. “Transit Price Elasticities and Cross-Elasticities.” Journal of Public 
Transportation 7, no. 2 (2004): 37-58. Scholar Commons: University of South 
Florida. 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1339&context=jpt. 
Liu, Chengxi, Yusak O. Susilo, and Anders Karlström. “Weather Variability and Travel 
Behaviour—What We Know and What We Do Not Know,” Transport Reviews 37, 
no. 6 (2017): 715-41. Taylor and Francis Online. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01441647.2017.1293188. 
Matier, Phil. “BART’s Oakland Airport Connector Isn’t a Big Money Maker Yet.” KPIX 5: CBS 
S[an]F[rancisco] Bay Area. March 8, 2017. 
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2017/03/08/barts-oakland-airport-connector-
isnt-a-big-money-maker-yet/.  
———. “BART’s Oakland Airport Connector Turning into Big Money Loser.” San Francisco 
Bibliography | 133 
Chronicle. March 8, 2017. Last updated March 9, 2017. 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/BART-s-Oakland-airport-
connector-turning-into-10984679.php. 
Matier, [Phil] and [Andy] Ross. “BART Ridership Drops on Nights, Weekends.” San Francisco 
Chronicle. August 20, 2018. https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-
ross/article/BART-ridership-drops-on-nights-weekends-13166386.php. 
———. “BART’s Oakland Airport Connector Too Costly to Stop.” SFGate. May 11, 2011. 
https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/BART-s-Oakland-Airport-
Connector-too-costly-to-2372367.php. 
Manville, Michael [Keith]. “Travel and the Built Environment: Time for Change.” Journal of 
the American Planning Association 83, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 29-32. Taylor and 
Francis Online. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01944363.2016.1249508. 
Manville, Michael [Keith], Brian D. Taylor, and Evelyn Blumenberg. Falling Transit Ridership: 
California and Southern California. January 2018. SCAG: Innovating for a Better 
Tomorrow. 
https://www.scag.ca.gov/Documents/ITS_SCAG_Transit_Ridership.pdf. 
McFadden, Daniel L. “The Path to Discrete-choice Models.” ACCESS 20 (Spring 2002): 2-7. 
https://www.accessmagazine.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/7/2016/07/access20-01-the-path-to-discrete-choice-
models.pdf. 
Melendez, Lyanne. “BART Riders Increasingly Concerned with Safety.” ABC7 News. July 26, 
2018. https://abc7news.com/bart-riders-increasingly-concerned-with-safety-
/3829762/. 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission. “Priority Development Areas.” Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission. 2019. https://mtc.ca.gov/our-work/plans-
projects/focused-growth-livable-communities/priority-development-areas. 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission and Association of Bay Area Governments. Plan 
Bay Area 2040: Regional Transportation Plan and Sustainable Communities 
Strategy for the San Francisco Bay Area, 2017–2040. July 26, 2017. Plan Bay Area 
2040: Plan Bay Area. http://2040.planbayarea.org/cdn/ff/buje2Q801oUV3Vpib-
FoJ6mkOfWC9S9sgrSgJrwFBgo/1510696833/public/2017-
11/Final_Plan_Bay_Area_2040.pdf. 
Mitchell, Houston. “Yogi Berra Dies at 90: Here Are Some of His Greatest Quotes.” Los 
Angeles Times. September 22, 2015. 
https://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-yogi-berra-turns-90-
quotes-20150512-story.html. 
Mucci, Richard A[lexander] and Gregory D. Erhardt. “Evaluating the Ability of Transit Direct 
Ridership Models to Forecast Medium-Term Ridership Changes: Evidence from San 
Francisco.” Transportation Research Record 2672, no. 46 (2018): 21-30. SAGE 
Bibliography | 134 
Journals. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0361198118758632. 
Murphy, Colin. Shared Mobility and the Transformation of Public Transit. Transit 
Cooperative Research Program Project J-11, Task 21, Shared-use Mobility Center, 
Chicago, Illinois, March 2016. Edited by Tim Frisbie. APTA: American Public 
Transportation Association. 
http://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/APTA-
Shared-Mobility.pdf. 
Nelson, Laura J. “The Metro Can Take You Farther than Ever. Here’s Why Ridership 
Dropped—Again.” Los Angeles Times. February 13, 2017. 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-2016-metro-ridership-decline-
20170209-story.html. 
Nelson, Laura J. and Dan Weikel. “Billions Spent, but Fewer People Are Using Public 
Transportation in Southern California.” Los Angeles Times. January 27, 2016. 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ridership-slump-20160127-
story.html. 
New Transbay Rail Crossing: Program Overview + Project Contracting Plan. November 15, 
2018. Bay Area Rapid Transit. https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/docs/6-
A%20%20New%20Transbay%20Rail%20Crossing%20Update%20Presentation.pdf
. 
N[ew] Y[ork] C[ity] Department of Transportation. New York City Mobility Report. June 2018. 
The Official Website of the City of New York. 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/mobility-report-2018-print.pdf. 
[Parker, Kim et al.] “The State of American Jobs.” Pew Research Center: Social and 
Demographic Trends. October 6, 2016. 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/10/06/1-changes-in-the-american-
workplace/. 
“Population Density for U.S. Cities Statistics.” Governing. 2019. 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/population-density-land-area-cities-
map.html. 
Rajamani, Jayanthi, Chandra R. Bhat, Susan Handy, Gerritt Knaap, and Yan Song. “Assessing 
Impact of Urban Form Measures on Nonwork Trip Mode Choice after Controlling 
for Demographic and Level-of-service Effects.” Transportation Research Record 
1831 (2003): 158-65. TRB: Transportation Research Board. 
https://trrjournalonline.trb.org/doi/pdf/10.3141/1831-18. 
Rayle, Lisa, Danielle Dai, Nelson Chan, Robert Cervero, and Susan Shaheen. “Just a Better 
Taxi?: A Survey-based Comparison of Taxis, Transit, and Ridesourcing Services in 
San Francisco.” Transport Policy 45 (2016): 168-78. ScienceDirect. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967070X15300627. 
Rhodes, Michael. “Civil Rights Complaint Filed Against BART Over OAK Airport Connector.” 
Streetsblog San Francisco. September 4, 2009. 
Bibliography | 135 
https://sf.streetsblog.org/2009/09/04/civil-rights-complaint-filed-against-bart-
over-oak-airport-connector/. 
Richards, Gary. “Marin Bus Ridership Decline Mirrors Bay Area.” Marin Independent Journal. 
June 4, 2018. http://www.marinij.com/general-news/20180604/marin-bus-
ridership-decline-mirrors-bay-area. 
———. “VTA Proposes Biggest Transit Overhaul since 2008.” Mercury News (San José, CA). 
January 6, 2017. https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/01/06/vta-proposes-
biggest-transit-overhaul-since-2008/. 
Rubin, Thomas A. “Is the Los Angeles Time[s] Article, ‘Billions Spent, But Fewer People Are 
Using Public Transportation in Southern California,’ Misleading?” N.d. Electronic 
Drummer: The Website of the Thoreau Institute. 
http://ti.org/docs/RubinonLATimesStory.doc. 
Rudick, Roger. “Pics from the Warm Springs/South Fremont BART Opening Celebration.” 
Streetsblog San Francisco. Mar. 24, 2017. 
https://sf.streetsblog.org/2017/03/24/pics-from-the-warm-springssouth-
fremont-bart-opening-celebration/. 
“Sacramento Regional Transit District Rolls Back Fares: Board Approves Sweeping Ridership 
Building Initiatives, Including Fare Reductions, 25-cent Transfers, and 15-minute 
Frequency for Light Rail Service on Weekends.” Sacramento Regional Transit 
District. August 28, 2018. http://www.sacrt.com/apps/sacramento-regional-
transit-district-rolls-back-fares/. 
S[an] F[rancisco] M[unicipal] T[ransportation] A[gency]. “Muni Forward Brings You More 
Service, Muni Rapid, New Map.” S[an] F[rancisco] M[unicipal] T[ransportation] 
A[gency]. April 3, 2015. https://www.sfmta.com/blog/muni-forward-brings-you-
more-service-muni-rapid-new-map. 
———. “Muni History.” S[an] F[rancisco] M[unicipal] T[ransportation] A[gency]. 2019. 
https://www.sfmta.com/getting-around/muni/muni-history. 
Sankin, Aaron. “BART Police Department: Is It Necessary?” Huffington Post. August 31, 2011. 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/31/bart-police-department-
necessary_n_944103.html. 
Schaller, Bruce. The New Automobility: Lyft, Uber and the Future of American Cities. July 
25, 2018. Schaller Consulting. 
http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/automobility.pdf. 
———. Unsustainable?: The Growth of App-based Ride Services and Traffic, Travel and 
the Future of New York City. February 27, 2017. Schaller Consulting. 
http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/unsustainable.pdf. 
Schimek, Paul. “Dynamic Estimates of Fare Elasticity for U.S. Public Transit.” Transportation 
Research Record 2538 (2015): 96-101. TRB: Transportation Research Board. 
Bibliography | 136 
https://trrjournalonline.trb.org/doi/abs/10.3141/2538-11. 
Schmitt, Angie. “D.C. Metro Seeks Better Service, Fare Cuts to Stop Ridership Death Spiral.” 
Streetsblog USA. October 29, 2018. https://usa.streetsblog.org/2018/10/29/d-c-
metro-seeks-better-service-fare-cuts-to-stop-ridership-death-spiral/. 
———. “Study: Uber and Lyft Caused U.S. Transit Decline.” Streetsblog USA. January 22, 
2019. https://usa.streetsblog.org/2019/01/22/study-uber-and-lyft-are-
responsible-for-u-s-transit-decline/. 
Schwartz, Hart. “Declining Transit Ridership: Revolutionary or Routine?” The Fuse: Igniting 
Conversations and Commentary about Energy. April 4, 2018. 
http://energyfuse.org/declining-transit-ridership-revolutionary-routine/. 
Siddiqui, Faiz. “Falling Transit Ridership Poses an ‘Emergency’ for Cities, Experts Fear.” 
Washington Post. March 24, 2018. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/falling-transit-
ridership-poses-an-emergency-for-cities-experts-fear/2018/03/20/ffb67c28-
2865-11e8-874b-d517e912f125_story.html. 
Stevens, Mark R. “Does Compact Development Make People Drive Less?” Journal of the 
American Planning Association 83, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 7-18. Taylor and Francis 
Online. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01944363.2016.1240044. 
Taylor, B[rian] D. and C[amille] N. Y. Fink. “Explaining Transit Ridership: What Has the 
Evidence Shown?” Transportation Letters 5, no. 1 ([Winter] 2013): 15-26. Taylor and 
Francis Online. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1179/1942786712Z.0000000003. 
———. “The Factors Influencing Transit Ridership: A Review and Analysis of the Ridership 
Literature.” U[niversity of ] C[alifornia] L[os] A[ngeles] Department of Urban 
Planning Working Paper, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, 
California, September 1, 2003. eScholarship: UC Open Access Publications. 
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt3xk9j8m2/qt3xk9j8m2.pdf. 
  Taylor, Brian D., Mark Garrett, and Hiroyuki Iseki. “Measuring Cost Variability in Provision of 
Transit Service.” Transportation Research Record 1735, no. 1 (2000): 101-12. SAGE 
Journals. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.3141/1735-13. 
Taylor, Brian D., Douglas Miller, Hiroyuki Iseki, and Camille Fink. “Nature and/or Nurture?: 
Analyzing the Determinants of Transit Ridership across U.S. Urbanized Areas.” 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 43 (2009): 60-77. 
ScienceDirect. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856408001274. 
Thompson, Gregory L. and Jeffrey R. Brown. “Explaining Variation in Transit Ridership in U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas between 1990 and 2000: Multivariate Analysis.” Transportation 
Research Record 1986 (2016): 172-81. SAGE Journals. 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0361198106198600121. 
Bibliography | 137 
Thompson, Gregory [L.], Jeffrey [R.] Brown, and Torsha Bhattacharya. “What Really Matters 
for Increasing Transit Ridership: Understanding the Determinants of Transit 
Ridership Demand in Broward County, Florida.” Urban Studies 49, no. 15 
(November 2012): 3327-45. SAGE Journals. 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0042098012443864. 
Tinoco, Matt. “Metro’s Declining Ridership, Explained.” Curbed Los Angeles. August 29, 
2017. https://la.curbed.com/2017/8/29/16219230/transit-metro-ridership-down-
why. 
V[alley] T[ransportation] A[uthority, Santa Clara]. Santa Clara Valley Transportation 
Authority History. November 7, 2005. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority. 
http://www.vta.org/sfc/servlet.shepherd/version/download/068A0000001FaML 
Veltman, Chloe. “BART Looks for Solutions After Another Steep Drop in Weekend 
Ridership.” KQED. August 20, 2018. https://www.kqed.org/news/11687848/bart-
looks-for-solutions-after-another-steep-drop-in-weekend-ridership. 
Walker, Jarrett. Human Transit: How Clearer Thinking about Public Transit Can Enrich Our 
Communities and Our Lives. Washington: Island, 2012. 
Wang, Kyungsoon and Myungje Woo. “The Relationship between Transit-rich 
Neighborhoods and Transit Ridership: Evidence from the Decentralization of 
Poverty.” Applied Geography 86 (September 2017): 183-96. ScienceDirect. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0143622817307166. 
Zuk, Miriam, Ariel H. Bierbaum, Karen Chapple, Karolina Gorska, Anastasia Loukaitou-
Sideris, Paul Ong, and Trevor Thomas. “Gentrification, Displacement and the Role of 
Public Investment: A Literature Review.” Working Paper 2015-05, Community 
Development Investment Center, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San 
Francisco, California, August 2015. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/wp2015-05.pdf. 
